Key Events * Last-Minute Speaker Purge Mars International Vietnam Studies Conference; * New Seat Plan Boosts Central, Military and Police Power in
On the Day of the Imprisoned Writer, Swedish PEN’s 2025 Tucholsky Prize honors jailed Vietnamese activist.
In the first days of September, Việt Nam's online sphere was consumed by a "witch-hunt style showdown&
Several scholars say they were abruptly removed from the speaker lineup for a session with General Secretary Tô Lâm during the 7th International Conference on Vietnamese Studies (ICVNS 2025), BBC Vietnamese reported on Nov. 11. Their accounts shed rare light on the extent of political gatekeeping inside one of the country’s most prominent academic forums.
According to an exclusive BBC report, three anonymous sources said they had been officially invited to present papers at the major conference, held from Oct. 25–26, only to be removed from the program at the last minute. One scholar—initially slated as a plenary speaker and a participant in the meeting with Tô Lâm—said he was later told his recent work on political factions in Việt Nam had angered the Communist Party chief’s security team.
On Nov. 1, Professor Carl Thayer posted on Facebook the speech he had prepared for the meeting with Tô Lâm, noting that although he was physically present in the delegation of scholars, he “was not called upon to deliver” his remarks.
A second academic told the BBC they had been commissioned to produce two papers totaling 12,000–13,000 words, but were denied the opportunity to present them. Another source confirmed that Dr. Alex-Thái Đình Võ’s paper on national reconciliation was also removed. Two individuals familiar with the process told the BBC that conference censors flagged 19 invited guests for being “politically or security sensitive.”
A prestigious stage under tight control
First held in 1998 and jointly organized by Vietnam National University, Hà Nội, and the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, the International Conference on Vietnamese Studies has long been considered a flagship academic event for Việt Nam research inside and outside the country. The conference is held every four years and regularly attracts leading scholars in the field. This year, notable experts on Vietnamese politics—such as Trần Văn Thọ, Carl Thayer, and Alex-Thái Đình Võ—were on the participant list.
But the controversy underscores how political constraints continue to shape, limit, and sometimes silence intellectual inquiry in Việt Nam. As a one-party state, the government enforces an extensive censorship apparatus that restricts academic freedom and narrows the boundaries of permissible public discourse.
The practice is not new. In 2013, Hanoi National University of Education revoked researcher Đỗ Thị Thoan’s (Nhã Thuyên’s) master’s degree over her thesis examining the avant-garde poetry group Mở Miệng—deemed politically sensitive.
A 2022 study by Dr. Thủy Nguyen documented how state censorship has fostered pervasive self-censorship within the academic community, discouraging scholars from investigating politically sensitive themes.
The latest episode at ICVNS 2025 illustrates how those pressures persist. For many observers, the removal of invited speakers—especially those researching politics, reconciliation, and contemporary Vietnamese developments—signals an increasingly narrow space for open academic exchange. In a forum designed to promote international scholarship on Việt Nam, critical voices remain vulnerable to political vetoes.
The country’s National Assembly is moving into a new election cycle with a proposed structure that further strengthens central authority and expands the presence of the military and police within the legislative body.
The Standing Committee of the National Assembly announced on Nov. 10 that it had issued Resolution 1891 outlining the projected number, composition, and categories of deputies for the 16th National Assembly — changes that reflect the Communist Party’s tight control over the electoral process.
Under the proposal, the total number of deputies will remain fixed at 500. However, the number of centrally managed deputies — those selected from national-level institutions and often closely aligned with the party leadership — will increase by 10, rising to 217 deputies, or 43.4% of the body. Meanwhile, the number of deputies drawn from localities will fall to 283, accounting for 56.6%.
The Standing Committee also plans to expand the number of full-time central deputies, increasing from 133 to 145 (29% of the total). Representation from the security sector will rise as well: the Ministry of National Defense will have 13 deputies (2.6%), and the Ministry of Public Security will have three deputies (0.6%).
Another notable change is the adjustment in how seats are allocated to provinces and municipalities. Under the new rules, every province or centrally governed city must have at least four deputies who are locally residents, up from the current threshold of three. Regardless of size, every locality must have no fewer than seven deputies in total.
Predetermined structure under party direction
In Việt Nam’s one-party system, the structure of the National Assembly — including its distribution of seats across demographic, political, and institutional categories — is decided in advance based on guidelines set by the Communist Party. These predetermined quotas shape who can run and ultimately who gets elected.
For the upcoming 16th National Assembly, the system divides candidate slots into three categories:
While these categories create an appearance of diversity, all candidates — even those technically considered “independent” — must ultimately pass through screening by Fatherland Front committees, which operate under Party oversight.
Context: restricted political space
According to Freedom House’s 2025 report, Việt Nam remains classified as “Not Free,” scoring 4 out of 40 points on political rights and 0 out of 12 on electoral process indicators. The organization notes that while independent candidates are allowed on paper, in practice they are systematically barred from running.
The decline in non–Communist Party deputies highlights this tightening control. Over the past four terms, the number of non-Party deputies has steadily fallen: 43 in the 12th Assembly, 42 in the 13th, 21 in the 14th, and just 14 in the current 15th Assembly.
As Việt Nam prepares for its next election cycle, the new structural adjustments signal not a move toward pluralism, but a reaffirmation of the party’s dominance — ensuring that the National Assembly remains firmly aligned with the priorities of the state’s political and security apparatus.
Vietnam’s National Assembly has elected Nguyễn Văn Quảng as chief justice of the Supreme People’s Court, making him the first person since 2007 to assume the post without a background in the Ministry of Public Security. The vote took place on the morning of November 10, with Quảng receiving 440 out of 441 ballots.
His appointment comes amid an unusually turbulent period in the country’s judicial leadership. During the 2021–2026 term alone, the top judicial seat has changed hands three times: from Nguyễn Hòa Bình (April 2016–August 2024), to Lê Minh Trí (August 2024–November 2025), and now to Nguyễn Văn Quảng.
With a new National Assembly set to be elected in mid-2026, Quảng will serve only about six months before the next term begins.
A career outlined with gaps
State media did not publish a full professional biography for Quảng, providing only records dating back to 2005. The only outlet to present a more complete résumé was the Đà Nẵng Police Newspaper, which included information on his career from 1990 onward.
Born in Hải Phòng, Quảng holds a doctorate in law. He is currently a member of the Communist Party’s 13th Central Committee and a sitting deputy in the 15th National Assembly. He has held a series of prosecutorial positions, including:
In December 2019, he was transferred to Đà Nẵng to serve as the city’s standing deputy party secretary and was later elected party secretary of the city. Most recently, in September 2025, he was reassigned as permanent deputy inspector general of the Government Inspectorate, replacing Trần Đức Thắng, now minister of Natural Resources and Environment.
A controversial mark on his record
Quảng’s most widely discussed action in the judicial sphere occurred in November 2019, when he signed the cassation protest in the high-profile Hồ Duy Hải case, triggering the Supreme People’s Court’s cassation hearing on May 8, 2020. The case has long been criticized by legal experts and human rights advocates over allegations of procedural violations and wrongful conviction.
Leadership reshuffle continues
Quảng replaces Lê Minh Trí, who himself served a brief and transitional term. On Nov. 4, the Communist Party’s Politburo reassigned Trí to the role of Permanent Deputy Head of the Central Committee’s Internal Affairs Commission. His departure opened the path for Quảng’s elevation to chief justice.
The rapid rotation of top judicial leaders, coupled with limited public transparency around their professional histories, highlights the party’s political management of the justice sector.
Quảng’s appointment, while notable for breaking an 18-year pattern of police-linked leadership, still reflects a tightly controlled system in which key positions shift according to the party’s internal calculations rather than open institutional processes.
A new draft bill before Vietnam’s National Assembly has triggered heated debate over a proposal to transfer authority for injury forensics from the health sector to provincial-level police — a move critics say would further expand the already growing powers of the Ministry of Public Security.
The discussion took place during the Nov. 11 morning session, as lawmakers examined revisions to the Law on Judicial Expertise.
At the center of the controversy is Clause 4, Article 7 of the draft law, which stipulates that both autopsy forensics and injury forensics would be handled by public forensic organizations under provincial and municipal police departments.
Under existing regulations, injury assessments fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health. The draft also allows forensic units under provincial health departments to be dissolved or newly created depending on local conditions.
Support from the security sector
Supporters of the shift argued that the police already possess sufficient technical capacity and that consolidating responsibilities would streamline resources.
Nguyễn Tiến Nam — head of the Institute of Criminal Science under the Ministry of Public Security and a National Assembly deputy representing Quảng Trị — said forensic injury assessments conducted by provincial police would avoid unnecessary duplication and reduce waste. He insisted that provincial police forensic units are fully capable of carrying out such tasks.
Concerns about conflict of interest
But several lawmakers voiced strong reservations, warning that injury forensics is a specialized medical task and should remain within the health sector.
Transferring the function to police, they argued, risks undermining impartiality: if approved, the Ministry of Public Security would serve as investigator, the authority requesting forensic examination, and the entity performing the assessment — collapsing three distinct roles into one institution.
Critics fear this concentration of power could compromise objectivity in criminal investigations, particularly in cases involving allegations of police abuse or misconduct. They urged caution, noting that forensic independence is a safeguard for defendants, victims, and the justice system.
A pattern of expanding police authority
The proposal arrives amid a broader trend: the Ministry of Public Security has been rapidly accumulating new responsibilities across multiple domains. Since early 2025, the ministry has taken over tasks once managed by other ministries and agencies, including:
This expansion has sparked ongoing concern among legal observers, human rights advocates, and some legislators, who see the ministry becoming an increasingly dominant institution in public administration.
The debate over the forensic assessment bill highlights the tension between efficiency and oversight. While supporters describe the reform as practical and resource-saving, opponents warn that concentrating investigative and forensic functions in the same agency threatens the fairness of the justice process.
As the draft law moves forward, the National Assembly faces a defining question: how much power should be entrusted to the police in a system already marked by limited external checks and balances?
Việt Nam’s commune-level police forces will gain significantly expanded administrative powers beginning Dec. 15, as a new government decree dramatically increases the maximum fines local police chiefs may impose and authorizes new punitive measures. The shift marks yet another step in a years-long trend of strengthening grassroots police authority.
On Oct. 30, the government issued Decree No. 282/2025 on administrative violations in security, public order, social safety, social evils prevention, and domestic violence prevention. Compared with previous regulations, the decree substantially expands the sanctioning authority of commune police chiefs.
Under the new rules, the maximum fines they may issue will rise from the current ceiling of 1.5–2.5 million đồng to 15-37.5 million đồng — an increase of 10 to 15 times.
The decree also grants commune police additional powers, including the ability to temporarily revoke licenses, suspend professional certificates, or halt certain activities when violations fall under their administrative jurisdiction. The decree will take effect on Dec. 15.
A widening arc of police authority
The expansion of commune-level police powers comes in the broader context of major structural reforms within the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), which has steadily centralized and expanded its authority across multiple levels of government.
A key precursor was the amended Criminal Procedure Code, set to take effect July 1, 2025, which upgraded the role of commune police by granting them authority not only to detain suspects and receive criminal complaints but also to initiate criminal investigations in cases involving minor offenses.
This marked a major departure from the previous framework, where commune police served primarily as frontline responders rather than investigators.
Earlier, in March 2025, the MPS abolished all district-level police departments nationwide, reallocating their functions to provincial and commune police. The move effectively elevated commune forces to a far more central role in law enforcement and public administration.
This process began even earlier. Since 2018, under Minister Tô Lâm, the ministry implemented sweeping reforms that “professionalized” the commune police by assigning full-time, centrally trained officers to commune posts. These officers replaced the former semi-professional or part-time communal security forces, solidifying the state’s direct control at the village and township level.
Concerns about unchecked power
Alongside these reforms, concerns about overreach and abuse of power have grown. Commune police, as the force closest to ordinary citizens, wield direct influence over daily life in rural and semi-urban communities.
While officials argue that expanding local police powers strengthens public security and administrative efficiency, critics warn that concentrating more authority in a force embedded so deeply in community life heightens the risk of intimidation, arbitrary punishment, and procedural violations.
Human rights observers and some legal experts have pointed out that administrative fines as high as 37.5 million đồng — nearly equivalent to several months’ income for many households — represent a serious coercive tool. When combined with investigative powers and the ability to suspend licenses or activities, the commune police become an institution with few local checks and minimal external oversight.
As Decree 282/2025 takes effect, it marks another milestone in the centralization of policing authority at the most local level — a shift that continues to redefine the balance between state power and citizen protections in Việt Nam.
Reuters reports that Việt Nam aims to sign a trade agreement with the United States soon, Deputy Prime Minister Bùi Thanh Sơn announced on November 12, as talks began in Washington. The deal would maintain the current 20% U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese imports, but exempt select products while opening Vietnam’s market further to U.S. goods. With a $111 billion trade surplus with the U.S. in the first 10 months of 2025, Hanoi is under pressure to rebalance the relationship and capitalize on its position in global supply chains.
Thousands of farmers in Hưng Yên Province are resisting land clearance for the planned US$1.5 billion luxury resort branded by The Trump Organization, designed to feature hotels, residential units, and golf courses. While the project was celebrated with a glossy launch five months ago, much of the site remains farmland as locals reject compensation offers of around 320,000 đồng per m² — roughly a year’s income for many. Farmers say the terms are unfair and have petitioned authorities to at least double the payout.
HCMC has suspended its plan to create a single consolidated media agency, “HCMC Newspaper, Radio and Television,” the Standing Committee of the City Party Committee announced on Nov. 10. Officials said the pause is to revise the proposal and draft a more suitable option. Under the original roadmap, the city would dissolve or merge long-established newspapers—including Tuổi Trẻ, Pháp Luật sM, Sài Gòn Tiếp Thị, and Kinh Tế Sài Gòn—into party-run Sài Gòn Giải Phóng. The plan sparked concern that the city’s diverse media landscape could be drastically reduced to one party-controlled outlet.
During a discussion on the implementation of the state budget on October 30, National Assembly delegate Thạch Phước Bình identified
Key Events * Party Central Committee Delays Leadership Decisions; * Hà Nội’s New Party Chief Signals the Consolidation of Tô Lâm’
Key Events * Human Rights Advocates Condemn Việt Nam’s Detention of BBC Journalist During Tô Lam’s UK Visit; * Court
The Vietnamese government has long been implementing a national project to digitize and store citizens’ data for administrative purposes. The
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