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Discussing the reach of the Ministry of Public Security’s power might seem like a tired topic to some. Yet, the Ministry itself ensures the conversation never gets boring. [1]

For over a year, the police have dominated the news cycle, leaving citizens running in circles. Just as people adjust to new requirements for paperwork, administrative procedures, and digital transformation, a new layer has been added: scoring.

A recent draft resolution on developing “digital citizens” has drawn sharp attention for proposing that citizens be scored and ranked based on their usage of VNeID, with tax and administrative incentives tied to those rankings. [2]

The accompanying explanatory documents reveal an even broader ambition: transforming VNeID from a simple ID tool into a “super app” comprising a national e-wallet, digital signatures, personal data repositories, official email addresses, and even a “social network.”

While opinions on the convenience of such a system may vary, a fundamental legal question must be answered before any praise or criticism is offered: Does the Ministry of Public Security actually have the authority to score and rank citizens?

Key Mechanics of the Draft Resolution To determine if the Ministry of Public Security is exceeding its authority, it is necessary to examine the specific mechanics of the draft proposal.

The draft introduces a “digital citizen score” that classifies individuals into three tiers:

Active: 350 points or higher Basic: 100–349 points Not yet ranked: Below 100 points Points are awarded based on the “frequency of using digital services, data updates, and contributions in the digital environment […]”. [3] Crucially, these scores are tied to tangible benefits; citizens ranked as “active” will receive reductions in taxes, fees, and administrative charges. Those with lower scores will not.

Furthermore, the proposal aims to transform VNeID into a “super application.” Beyond identification, it would include personal data storage, digital signatures, a national e-wallet, and an official email address for every citizen. The documents remain vague, however, on the specific purpose of this email address or the consequences of ignoring it.

These details suggest a scope that far exceeds that of a convenient utility app. This policy potentially redefines the status of citizenship and access to public services, raising fundamental questions about how the state uses data to shape society.

The Cost of Non-Compliance State media insists that citizen scoring is not meant to punish or restrict anyone’s rights. [4] While this is technically true because the draft focuses on rewards rather than sanctions, public policy does not require direct punishment to force compliance.

This creates a dynamic of “soft reward-and-punishment.” Citizens are not penalized directly for opting out, but they are placed at a significant disadvantage if they do not participate. The “rewards” in question are not merely symbolic medals; they are tangible forms of preferential treatment regarding taxes, fees, and administrative procedures—essential aspects of life in society.

This aligns with the concept of “ choice architecture ” described by Richard H. Thaler, professor of economics, and Cass R. Sunstein, professor of law at Harvard. They note that governments can use “nudges” to subtly steer citizens toward desired behaviors without using coercive force. [5]

By designing invisible incentives, the state can strongly influence decisions even without explicit mandates. When privileges are tied to being “active” on a platform, the claim that the system is “not compulsory” becomes mere rhetoric.

The system effectively operates on a simple premise: “active” citizens move faster, pay less, and enjoy convenience, while “unranked” citizens must pay full fees and wait longer. Although there is no direct punishment, the implication is undeniable: compliance is necessary to avoid disadvantage.

The Leap from Identification to Evaluation Clarity is vital to prevent the debate from sliding into the assumption that managing data automatically grants the right to use it however an agency pleases.

There is a fundamental difference between administrative authority and normative power. Managing identity data—verifying identity, preventing fraud, and streamlining processes—is operational. Scoring and ranking citizens, however, is normative. It establishes behavioral standards, segments the population into tiers like “active” or “unranked,” and assigns different privileges to each. This is not infrastructure management; it is social engineering.

Consequently, classifying citizens is not merely a technical process; it is also a judgment on who is “good enough” or “active enough” in the eyes of the state.

This conflicts with the 2013 Constitution , which guarantees equality. Article 16 explicitly states, “Everyone is equal before the law,” while Article 59 mandates that the State ensure equal opportunities for social welfare. [6] These are legal obligations; the state cannot discriminate in providing public services without legitimate legal grounds, such as a criminal conviction.

Is a low digital score a legitimate ground for discrimination?

A citizen with “insufficient points” has broken no laws. They are not tax evaders or fraudsters; they simply fail to meet an arbitrary metric of “activity.” Yet, this failure results in tangible disadvantages: denied tax cuts, higher fees, and slower service.

In a rule-of-law state, disadvantages are imposed only for violations of the law, determined through fair procedures with the right to appeal. [7] The proposed scoring model inverts this logic. Citizens are penalized not for doing wrong, but for failing to do “enough” of what is encouraged, placing them at a structural disadvantage without any legal transgression.

Defining the Boundaries of Power “Overstepping” is not merely about breaking procedural rules; it is about a fundamental shift in function—expanding from managing infrastructure to setting moral and behavioral standards for citizens. This expansion occurs across three distinct layers:

From Management to Judgment : Managing data is an administrative task. However, categorizing citizens as “active” or “unranked” establishes a value hierarchy. When one agency controls both the data and the criteria for evaluation, its role shifts from operator to judge. From Encouragement to Stratification : While governments often encourage digitalization through efficiency, this proposal goes further. By embedding preferential treatment into the system, it creates policy-driven social stratification, affecting everyday access to services. The Absence of Safeguards : Every scoring system risks using flawed data or algorithms. Without mechanisms for citizens to view, correct, or challenge their scores, this power becomes opaque. It inflicts real disadvantages that individuals cannot meaningfully contest. Legal scholars Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale describe this phenomenon as “ The Scored Society, ” warning that such systems lack procedural fairness while imposing heavy consequences on personal lives. [8] Sociologist David Lyon defines this as “social sorting”—using surveillance to classify people and justifying unequal treatment based on those classifications. [9]

The ultimate question is not just whether the Ministry is exceeding its mandate, but whether a modern state has the legitimate right to employ such methods. The danger is clear: the state is claiming the right to judge citizens outside the legal system, creating inequality based solely on participation in a digital platform.

The debate over citizen scoring returns to a fundamental question: where does the state position itself in relation to its people?

If the role of the state is management, the focus should be on simplifying procedures, securing data, and accelerating public services.

However, once the state begins evaluating citizens, it ceases to merely manage and begins to grade. This inevitably leads to stratification, dividing society into higher and lower categories—favored citizens versus disadvantaged ones.

In a functioning society, citizens should not be required to prove they are “active”—whether toward a digital platform or the Ministry of Public Security—simply to access rights that are legally theirs.

Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Dec. 22, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: Trường An. (2025, December 20). Nhìn lại 2025: Bộ Công an đã mở rộng quyền lực thế nào? Luật Khoa tạp chí. https://luatkhoa.com/2025/12/nhin-lai-2025-bo-cong-an-da-mo-rong-quyen-luc-the-nao/ The Vietnamese. (2025, December). Ministry of Public Security pushes social credit system without waiting for lawmakers . The Vietnamese Magazine . https://www.thevietnamese.org/2025/12/ministry-of-public-security-pushes-social-credit-system-without-waiting-for-lawmakers/ VnExpress. (2025, December 21). Hệ thống “chấm điểm công dân số” trên VNeID dự kiến hoạt động ra sao. vnexpress.net . https://vnexpress.net/he-thong-cham-diem-cong-dan-so-tren-vneid-du-kien-hoat-dong-ra-sao-4996291.html Việt, Q. (2025, December 21). Điểm công dân số trên VNeID không áp dụng để xử phạt người dân. Báo Lao Động . https://laodong.vn/phap-luat/diem-cong-dan-so-tren-vneid-khong-ap-dung-de-xu-phat-nguoi-dan-1628844.ldo Thaler, R. H., Sunstein, C. R., & Balz, J. P. (2010). Choice Architecture. SSRN Electronic Journal . https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1583509 Thuvienphapluat.Vn. (2025, June 16). Hiến pháp 2013. THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT . https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Hien-phap-nam-2013-215627.aspx Nguyên tắc này là nền tảng của học thuyết rule of law, được A.V. Dicey khái quát từ cuối thế kỷ XIX, và sau này trở thành chuẩn mực phổ quát của due process of law trong luật hiến pháp và nhân quyền hiện đại. Citron, D. K., & Pasquale, F. (n.d.). The Scored Society: Due process for Automated predictions . UW Law Digital Commons. https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol89/iss1/2/ Lyon, D. (2003). Surveillance as social sorting. In Privacy, Risk, and Digital Discrimination . Routledge. https://infodocks.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/david_lyon_surveillance_as_social_sorting.pdf