Why the Press is Shut Out of Việt Nam’s 14th Party Congress
In many countries, politics unfolds in the public eye. Citizens can watch televised debates of lawmakers arguing over bills or
In many countries, politics unfolds in the public eye. Citizens can watch televised debates of lawmakers arguing over bills or casting votes to select a prime minister, with journalists reporting every moment live from the ground.
In Việt Nam, however, such transparency is almost nonexistent.
The Communist Party Congress, arguably the most important event in the country’s political life, is also its most secretive. The public is permitted to view only the opening and closing ceremonies. The real substance of the event—discussions, debates, voting, and personnel selection—takes place behind firmly shut doors.
Journalists are barred from these sessions, and delegates are forbidden from bringing mobile phones. The secrecy of the process frequently evokes comparisons to the Vatican’s papal conclave. The situation raises a critical question: how can such a major political event remain so effectively sealed off from the public, and what role is left for the press?
Technically, the press is allowed to be present. Credentials are issued not only to state media but also to foreign outlets such as the BBC and Reuters. During the opening session of the 14th Congress, journalists could be seen in a designated area on an upper level, observing the main hall from behind a railing.
However, that's the limit of their access. Reporters are permitted to attend only the opening and closing ceremonies. These sessions are largely performative, consisting of report readings, general goal announcements, and broad personnel introductions. They feature no debates, no voting, and no exercise of “real power.”
The critical work—discussing documents, exchanging opinions, holding debates, casting votes, and finalizing personnel decisions—occurs during closed sessions. Journalists are strictly barred from the hall during these times. Instead, they are confined to the Congress Press Center, where authorities provide indirect updates on developments inside.
Readers of state media during the Party Congress will encounter a recurring statistic: “1,586 delegates represent more than 5.6 million Party members.” [1] This phrasing serves a specific function—it frames the event as an internal Party matter, rather than a public one.
Because the Party Congress is defined as internal business, the press is excluded from the inner circle. This exclusion is likely designed to insulate personnel selection and policy debates from public pressure. From the system’s perspective, restricting access to an internal event is logical.
However, such an arrangement creates a contradiction. Every decision in that hall directly impacts the public, yet they remain excluded from the process. This reality clashes sharply with the slogan, “the people know, the people discuss, the people oversee,” a principle General Secretary Tô Lâm explicitly emphasized in his opening address at the 14th Congress. [2]
Analyzing the 2021 leadership transition, scholar Lê Hồng Hiệp noted a fact evident to any observer: senior personnel decisions are the centerpiece of every Party Congress. [3] These changes compel attention precisely because high-level party politics are shrouded in secrecy and difficult for outsiders to access.
Behind the scenes, the Congress involves intense internal debates, candidate vetting, nominations, withdrawals, and voting. If this process were open to scrutiny, it would trigger two consequences the system is desperate to avoid.
First, visible disagreements would undermine the image of “absolute consensus,” the foundation of the party’s stability. Second, transparency would allow the public to trace factional dynamics. This could erode legitimacy by framing party elections as transactional power bargaining rather than collective decision-making.
To preserve the image of stability and unity essential to a single-party system, the “real” work of the Congress must happen in a closed setting. The public is presented with ceremonies and speeches, while the actual negotiation of power remains sealed away.
The Party Congress determines more than just personnel; it charts the nation’s course for the next five years. In such a high-stakes environment, the system views uncontrolled information as a liability that could complicate governance. Consequently, it enforces a single, unified stream of communication.
The flow is strictly hierarchical:
This structure mirrors the "authoritarian political communication" described by Anne-Marie Brady in Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China.
As Brady notes regarding China, a closed media system is essential for maintaining political stability. [4] In Việt Nam, this top-down chain minimizes speculation and filters out any analysis that contradicts the state's preference. The public receives only the final, polished result, with the messy process completely obscured.
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While the press is present, they are there merely to witness the ceremonial side of the Congress. Everything else is revealed only within the strict limits set by the Party.
The information released is carefully curated—saying just enough of the right things to preserve a smooth facade of consensus. This tight control reveals a singular priority: to ensure that the outside world sees a party that is perfectly unified and cohesive.
Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Jan. 23, 2026. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
1. Mai, B. (2026, January 20). [Infographic] Cơ cấu, thành phần đại biểu dự Đại hội XIV của Đảng. Báo Nhân Dân Điện Tử. https://nhandan.vn/infographic-co-cau-thanh-phan-dai-bieu-du-dai-hoi-xiv-cua-dang-post938145.html
2. Tcct. (2026, January 20). Toàn văn phát biểu của Tổng Bí thư Tô Lâm trình bày Báo cáo về các Văn kiện trình Đại hội XIV của Đảng. Tạp Chí Công Thương. https://tapchicongthuong.vn/toan-van-phat-bieu-cua-tong-bi-thu-to-lam-trinh-bay-bao-cao-ve-cac-van-kien-trinh-dai-hoi-xiv-cua-dang-407038.htm
3. Previewing Vietnam’s leadership transition in 2021. (2020). In ISSN 2335-6677: Vol. No. 41 [Journal-article]. https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_41.pdf
4. Reny, M. (2010). Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and thought work in contemporary China. China Perspectives, 2010(1). https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.5089
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