Việt Nam’s Floods Lay Bare the Harsh Realities of Environmental Authoritarianism
Night fell, and as people slept, the water began to surge from nowhere. Unlike rain-driven floods, torrents unleashed by hydropower
Night fell, and as people slept, the water began to surge from nowhere. Unlike rain-driven floods, torrents unleashed by hydropower dams rise with terrifying suddenness.
This release is often a desperate measure. When stormwaters fill reservoirs to their breaking point, operators face a choice: open the floodgates to relieve pressure or risk a total structural failure of the dam. They choose to save the dam, but the cost is often paid by those living downstream.
In Phú Yên, this meant residents had no prior warning and only minutes to flee. [1] Those who could not outrun the floodwaters died, and hundreds of thousands of others were stranded for days on their rooftops, facing hunger, cold, and despair. [2]
While storms may be an act of nature, dam releases are not. Natural disasters are unpredictable, but preparedness and relief are not.
Despite the countless storms that strike Việt Nam year after year, emergency readiness, relief efforts, and response experience remain stagnant. Whenever disasters hit, people are left to rely on their own limited means to survive.
This reality implies that natural disasters and crises are not simply “acts of heaven,” but are intrinsically linked to the realities of environmental governance in Việt Nam.
Environmental Authoritarianism in Việt Nam
While Việt Nam is widely recognized as a one-party authoritarian state, the concept of "environmental authoritarianism" may be less familiar. This term refers to a top-down model of governance in which environmental issues are tightly controlled by a particular segment of society, with little to no participation from other stakeholders. Such governance is typically dominated by groups presumed to possess specialized knowledge, often described as an “environmental elite.”
In their study on environmental authoritarianism in Việt Nam’s water governance, Ole Bruun and Oliver Rubin argue that the system is defined by two key traits: a marked trend toward technocratisation and an ongoing intensification of authoritarian control. [3]
This technocratic trend reflects a lack of community involvement in shaping environmental policy. Under this model, plans are conceived and prepared by political elites. The public is only informed once decisions have been finalized. The land reclamation project in Đà Nẵng serves as an example.
City authorities drafted the plan, designed the model, and set the budget themselves. [4] Public consultation was extremely limited. When residents raised concerns, officials simply offered counter-arguments and proceeded with the project. [5]
The second characteristic is the intensification of authoritarian control. This has emerged more clearly in recent years, reflecting a mindset that environmental governance is bound with political control and the consolidation of state legitimacy. Bruun and Rubin highlight the government’s tendency to increase repression—through digital measures and restricting civil society—whenever natural disasters occur.
Because environmental issues often intersect with political security, authorities view them as potential triggers for social unrest. For instance, during historic floods in the South Central region, the government penalized social media accounts accused of spreading “false information.” [6] Dozens of people who posted about the damage or criticized the government response were intimidated, warned, or forced to delete posts. This suggests authorities feared that public anger over the floods could threaten the Communist Party’s control.
An Example of Flood Governance
Applying the concepts of technocratisation and authoritarian control to flood management—a subject Bruun and Rubin have studied for over a decade—reveals the flaws in Việt Nam's water governance.
First, because environmental governance in Việt Nam is technocratic and lacks participation from local communities, flood-response strategies tend to focus narrowly on physical infrastructure. Environmental elites view flood solutions primarily as geographic and technical matters; as a result, they concentrate on building bridges, reservoirs, and dikes.
While this approach can yield immediate results, it fails to encourage grounded discussions at the local level. Consequently, support measures often emphasize short-term relief—such as distributing food and drinking water—while long-term adaptation programs are largely absent. According to the research, only 1% of people affected by flooding reported receiving government loans to improve their homes or invest in long-term flood-resilient infrastructure.
In addition, Ole Bruun and Oliver Rubin argue that flood governance in Việt Nam reflects a form of captured collaboration. On the surface, it appears that multiple actors are working together, but in reality, authorities tightly restrict the participation of stakeholders and local communities—everything must remain under state control.
A prominent example is the Việt Nam Fatherland Front’s monopoly on receiving relief donations. From the outside, this may seem like seamless coordination, but it reflects an intention to centralize aid. Following scandals involving celebrities, this recent disaster made the reluctance of independent groups even more visible. [7] For instance, Nguyễn Ngọc Huy—one of Việt Nam’s leading experts on extreme weather warning—announced that his relief initiative would accept only in-kind donations, not money. [8]
Flood governance, disaster relief, and environmental management are closely tied to state legitimacy. This explains why the Fatherland Front felt compelled to “prove” its transparency last year by publicly releasing bank statements—giving the public a chance to eagerly “check VAR.” [9] And this year, the Fatherland Front went a step further, taking center stage by collecting a full 20 billion đồng in donations. [10]
The pattern of “monopoly” is also seen in the warning system. People trust the National Center for Hydrometeorological Forecasting, yet during the recent floods, this agency largely failed to warn residents in time. [11]
Ultimately, flood governance in Việt Nam is a top-down technocratic system marked by monopolization. This is likely a major reason why Việt Nam faces devastating floods year after year. As the propaganda says, people continue to “gain experience,” yet in reality, they suffer enormous losses, including their lives.
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Sa Huỳnh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Nov. 26, 2025. The Vietnamese Magazine has the copyrights for its English translation.
1. Diễm, T., & Thi, T. (2025, November 19). Người dân ngỡ ngàng trước trận mưa lụt “lạ đời chưa từng thấy.” Báo Điện Tử Dân Trí. https://dantri.com.vn/thoi-su/nguoi-dan-ngo-ngang-truoc-tran-mua-lut-la-doi-chua-tung-thay-20251119145419762.htm
2. VnExpress. (2025, November 25). Vì sao chậm giải cứu hàng nghìn người kẹt ở rốn lũ Đăk Lăk? vnexpress.net. https://vnexpress.net/vi-sao-cham-giai-cuu-hang-nghin-nguoi-ket-o-ron-lu-dak-lak-4985702.html
3. Bruun, Ole, and Olivier Rubin. “Authoritarian Environmentalism—Captured Collaboration in Vietnamese Water Management.” Environmental Management 71, no. 3 (April 26, 2022): 538–50. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-022-01650-7.
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5. Sơn, H. (2025, August 4). Người dân góp ý 'chỉ nên lấn một phần' vịnh Đà Nẵng, Sở Xây dựng nói gì? Báo Thanh Niên. https://thanhnien.vn/nguoi-dan-gop-y-chi-nen-lan-mot-phan-vinh-da-nang-so-xay-dung-noi-gi-1852508041023047.htm
6. VnExpress. (2025, November 23). 52 tài khoản đăng tin sai về mưa lũ miền Trung bị xử lý. vnexpress.net. https://vnexpress.net/52-tai-khoan-dang-tin-sai-ve-mua-lu-mien-trung-bi-xu-ly-4984273.html
7. P.C.Tùng. (2020, November 2). Thủy Tiên phân trần sau dư luận trái chiều khi từ thiện ở Quảng Bình, Quảng Trị. Báo Thanh Niên. https://thanhnien.vn/thuy-tien-phan-tran-sau-du-luan-trai-chieu-khi-tu-thien-o-quang-binh-quang-tri-1851008303.htm
8. See: https://www.facebook.com/1389595810/posts/10239703225543870/
9. Tuấn, N. H. (2024, September 13). Xuyên đêm ‘check var’ sao kê, dân mạng cười xỉu. TUOI TRE ONLINE. https://tuoitre.vn/xuyen-dem-check-var-sao-ke-dan-mang-cuoi-xiu-20240913101717247.htm
10. Baochinhphu.Vn. (2025, November 22). Ủy ban Trung ương MTTQ Việt Nam trao 20 tỷ đồng hỗ trợ Lâm Đồng khắc phục hậu quả mưa lũ. baochinhphu.vn. https://baochinhphu.vn/uy-ban-trung-uong-mttq-viet-nam-trao-20-ty-dong-ho-tro-lam-dong-khac-phuc-hau-qua-mua-lu-102251122152839161.htm
11. Tu, C. (2025, November 23). ‘Mưa lũ ở Nam Trung Bộ là cực đoan, hiếm gặp, gần như không thể dự báo chính xác định lượng’. TUOI TRE ONLINE. https://tuoitre.vn/mua-lu-o-nam-trung-bo-la-cuc-doan-hiem-gap-gan-nhu-khong-the-du-bao-chinh-xac-dinh-luong-2025112316214402.htm
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