Maintaining a balance between representation and expertise is a critical consideration in the administrative systems of democratic nations. [1] An analysis of Việt Nam’s current administrative apparatus reveals how these two elements manifest—or fail to—within its unique structure.
At first glance, Việt Nam’s state structure appears similar to that of democratic nations, possessing central and local governments, a National Assembly and People’s Councils, and a court and prosecutorial system.
While the administrative apparatus belongs to the executive branch, a critical distinction exists: unlike in democracies, all three branches of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) are under the comprehensive and absolute control of the Communist Party of Việt Nam.
In parliamentary systems such as the United Kingdom, Australia, or Japan, elections are the primary mechanism for selecting politicians. The prime minister heads the government (and thus the administrative system) and is typically the leader of the ruling party in parliament.
Ministers are senior party members responsible for shaping policy within their portfolios. Under the principle of representative delegation, the prime minister and ruling party derive their legitimacy from the electorate’s votes, and their policies are expected to reflect the will and aspirations of voters.
In contrast, politicians in Việt Nam operate under a different set of rules. Because the Communist Party monopolizes political power, any individual wishing to advance in public office must first become a Party member.
Việt Nam’s personnel management and appointment system is modeled after the “nomenklatura” mechanism of the former Soviet Union— still widely used in China— under which a select group of top Communist officials occupy key positions in government, mass organizations, and the military. Membership and promotion within this nomenklatura are based largely on political loyalty, personal networks, and endorsement from senior leaders, rather than merit or the ballot box.
At the local level, a Party member aspiring to lead a province, such as Kiên Giang, must first secure a seat on the provincial Party committee and, ideally, within its standing committee.
At the national level, the Politburo and the Party Central Committee are the most powerful bodies. To hold key state positions such as provincial secretary, minister, prime minister, National Assembly chairperson, state president, general secretary, or chief justice, one must first become a Central Committee member.
Formally, the Central Committee is “elected” every five years at the Party Congress. In practice, however, most new members are pre-selected and endorsed by the outgoing Central Committee; it is exceedingly rare for a delegate to win election through nomination from the floor or self-nomination. [3]
Personnel selection is tightly managed by the Central Organization Commission, the Politburo, and the Secretariat. This top-down process is often influenced by internal bargaining and factional struggles among elite groups. Advancement depends less on ability than on choosing the right patron—or, as the Vietnamese idiom puts it, “worshiping the right person.”
To maintain their own grip on power, top leaders also tend to install loyalists rather than the most competent officials. [4] This dynamic perpetuates factional networks and political patronage systems, a defining feature of one-party rule and a major source of state power corruption. [5]
The Central Organization Commission wields enormous power in this process. According to Decision No. 80-QĐ/TW of the Politburo, it is tasked with “evaluating, planning, training, appointing, re-appointing, nominating, and recommending candidates for leadership positions under the management authority of the Politburo and the Secretariat.”
To illustrate this further, scholar Richard McGregor once likened the Chinese equivalent to an imaginary U.S. institution that would:
“Oversee the appointments of the entire U.S. Cabinet, all state governors and deputy governors, mayors of major cities, heads of federal regulatory agencies, CEOs of GE, Exxon-Mobil, Wal-Mart, and about fifty other top corporations, Supreme Court justices, editors-in-chief of The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal, owners of broadcast and cable TV networks, presidents of Yale and Harvard, and directors of major think tanks like Brookings and Heritage.” [6]
In other words, the head of the Central Organization Commission is among the most powerful figures in Việt Nam’s political hierarchy.
Following global trends, Việt Nam’s public institutions have adopted civil service examinations. If implemented transparently and competitively, such exams could help select candidates with the right knowledge, skills, and experience while reducing the practice of “buying” government jobs.
However, recruitment is only the first step. Retaining talented personnel depends on broader factors such as the work environment, promotion mechanisms, and compensation.
To promote integrity and curb corruption, the Communist Party has introduced various reforms—asset and income declarations, confidence votes, self-criticism sessions, and rotation of leadership cadres. [7] Officials are also discouraged from serving in their home provinces or holding the same leadership position for more than two consecutive terms. [8]
Still, these measures remain largely superficial and situational, failing to address the root of the problem: excessive concentration of personnel authority in the hands of local Party secretaries.
At its core, Việt Nam’s system of personnel appointment concentrates excessive power in the hands of local Party secretaries.
In practice, few members of the standing committees dare to challenge their secretaries during personnel deliberations, fearing political backlash. This concentration of power creates fertile ground for bribery and favoritism, as those seeking promotion often resort to illicit payments to secure lucrative or politically advantageous posts. [9]
In a system devoid of genuine representation, citizens’ will and aspirations have virtually no bearing on how public officials are chosen. Thus, calls for officials to “love the people” and “serve as their loyal servants” ring hollow.
Furthermore, checks and balances are almost nonexistent.
The National Assembly and People’s Councils are controlled through the “party nominates, people vote” mechanism. With few non-party deputies and no electoral competition, these bodies have little incentive to exercise oversight over the government. [9]
The absence of other accountability mechanisms—an independent judiciary, freedom of information, and a free press—further entrenches corruption and the buying and selling of public office as chronic features of Việt Nam’s political system.
A sound political “rulebook”—one that respects the people’s voice through free, fair, and competitive elections—allows democracies to produce capable and committed leaders. These leaders, in turn, appoint and supervise competent bureaucrats, driving the development of an efficient and responsive administrative system.
By contrast, a flawed rulebook—like that of Việt Nam or China—ensures that no matter how many “anti-corruption campaigns” or “tiger and fly” purges are launched, corruption and abuse of power persist. The cascade of corruption scandals and the downfall of numerous senior officials have not only eroded public trust but also demoralized conscientious Party members.
Việt Nam’s institutional “garment” has become too tight, patched, and worn—constraining the country’s growth and progress.
Hoàng Dạ Lan wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Mar. 5, 2024. J. Miu translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
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