Việt Nam's Path to Prosperity: Is “Streamlining the Apparatus” Enough?
In 2025, Việt Nam witnessed a lightning-fast constitutional amendment process completed in just 43 days. The sweeping overhaul abolished the
In 2025, Việt Nam witnessed a lightning-fast constitutional amendment process completed in just 43 days. The sweeping overhaul abolished the district-level administrative unit, merged and reduced the number of provinces by half, and reaffirmed the central role of the Việt Nam Fatherland Front in overseeing civil society organizations. [1] This reform reflects the political confidence of General Secretary Tô Lâm and a powerful alignment within the Party and State institutions behind his agenda.
According to a Việt Nam specialist at the National War College in the United States, Professor Zachary Abuza, the primary rationale for this rapid reform is the need to “streamline the apparatus” to stimulate economic growth, mainly by attracting and retaining foreign investors. [2] This aligns with Tô Lâm’s ambition to push Việt Nam out of the middle-income trap and accelerate development.
The amendment is just the beginning, paving the way for numerous legal revisions and a restructuring of the court system, which has long been organized along administrative lines. [3] It is also likely that another, broader round of constitutional reform will be carried out at the 2026 Party Congress. [4]
This raises a crucial question about Tô Lâm’s “Bright Việt Nam” vision: Will these administrative reforms be enough to meet the strategic goals for 2030 and 2045? If economic growth is the true driver, genuine prosperity may require more substantial changes—reforms that touch the very foundations of the rule of law and political freedom. [5]
Data collected over the past 30 years by the Atlantic Council’s Center for Freedom and Prosperity, a Washington D.C. based think tank, shows a clear link between freedom and prosperity, with the rule of law being the single most powerful factor influencing long-term growth. [6] Countries with strong legal systems tend to make greater progress in both political and economic reform; clear laws, independent courts, and accountability are fundamental to effective governance and sustainable economic development.
The 2024 Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, once again highlight this strong correlation, offering insights into what Việt Nam may need to reform to become more prosperous. [7] The country’s latest rankings place it at 74th out of 164 in terms of prosperity (“moderate prosperity”) but only 101st in freedom (“low freedom”). [8] While these are not yet strong rankings, they do mark a positive trend: compared to 2023, Việt Nam has climbed 19 places in prosperity and 22 places in freedom. [9]
However, a closer look at the data reveals significant weaknesses. The freedom index is composed of three parts: economic freedom, political freedom, and rule of law. According to the report, Việt Nam's progress stems mainly from gains in economic freedom. The rule-of-law sub-index shows little improvement, with judicial independence scoring just 32.9/100 and legal clarity at a similarly weak 35.7/100. Bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption also score 43.7/100. This indicates that the courts do not yet apply laws impartially and legal frameworks remain inconsistent and unpredictable.
Political freedom, though slightly improved, also remains very low. The overall score is just 49.3/100, with political rights at a mere 8/100, indicating minimal protection for freedoms of association, expression, and access to information. These figures reveal two fundamental priorities if Việt Nam is to sustain its growth: strengthening the rule of law and expanding political freedom. The Atlantic Council emphasizes that these two pillars are essential, citing the experiences of Rwanda and Nigeria as case studies. [10]
In 1995, Rwanda and Nigeria had almost identical freedom scores, but over the next three decades, their development paths diverged sharply. Rwanda advanced steadily in rule of law and economic freedom while its political freedom barely changed—a path that mirrors the pre-democratic phases of countries like South Korea and Spain. Nigeria, conversely, followed a “democratization-first” path after its 1999 transition to civilian rule, resulting in greater political freedom but weaker state capacity and inconsistent reforms.
The results of these different strategies are telling. Rwanda’s focus on restoring security and rebuilding its economy after the 1994 genocide led to impressive gains, with its prosperity score rising by 19 points between 1995 and 2024, compared to Nigeria's gain of about 13 points. However, Rwanda's progress may now be constrained by its long-standing limits on political freedom, as it has not yet made the leap to full democracy.
Nigeria, by contrast, demonstrates that political freedom alone is not enough to ensure sustained development. Its initial gains after democratizing have faltered because liberalization was not matched by continuous efforts to strengthen the rule of law. Economic reforms have been uneven, and legal institutions remain weak, undermined by corruption and bureaucracy. Decades later, its scores for corruption remain dismal (133rd out of 164 countries), while political instability is even worse (151st). Ultimately, without a stable market framework and robust legal foundations, Nigeria's overall development remains constrained.
The lesson from Rwanda and Nigeria is clear: streamlining the administrative apparatus alone is not enough to drive economic development. To achieve genuine prosperity, Việt Nam must construct a true rule-of-law state, beginning with an independent judiciary that can enforce laws fairly, alongside a legislative process that guarantees clarity and consistency.. Focusing solely on “cadre management” or the organization of a single party is not a sustainable solution, because political freedom is indispensable for achieving maximum prosperity.
Judicial reform offers a crucial opportunity to adopt fundamental safeguards for judicial independence—such as transparent appointment mechanisms, strict qualification standards, fixed terms, and adequate compensation. [11]
Still, one key question looms above all: Will Tô Lâm truly have enough confidence to loosen political control in the name of economic development—if the sweeping constitutional reform expected in 2026 indeed takes place?
Hoàng Mai wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Sept. 26, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
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