Việt Nam's Paradox of Silence and Protest

The 2018 street protests against the draft Cybersecurity Law and the Law on Special Economic Zones, which saw large crowds gather inside and outside the country, remain a defining moment in Việt Nam’s post-1975 history of public demonstrations. [1][2][3] Since then, however, a similar atmosphere has not been seen.

This absence of public mobilization is especially notable in 2025, as conditions that previously sparked unrest have returned. The concept of special economic zones has resurfaced, [4] and the Ministry of Public Security is amending the 2018 Cybersecurity Law to further restrict human rights. [5][6] Despite these developments, there have been no protests or even significant public discussions.

This unusual silence brings to mind a "golden" period of protest in Việt Nam, when public demonstrations were so frequent that "protesting" itself seemed to be normalizing as a part of the political culture. [7] The trend was significant enough that the National Assembly was, at one point, preparing to review a draft Law on Demonstrations. [8]

Furthermore, the post-2019 period is not lacking in controversy, seeing major political upheavals like scandals involving top leaders and unpopular policies such as the proposed ban on gasoline-powered motorbikes. [9] Still, no protest of sufficient scale has emerged to create social pressure or reaffirm the people's voice. 

This begs the question: what caused this shift?

Two Currents of Protest, One Common Outcome

To understand the decline of Việt Nam’s protest culture, it is necessary to first classify the forms of demonstrations that have taken place. Based on their purposes and characteristics, protests in Việt Nam can roughly be divided into two main categories.

The first (Type 1) consists of demonstrations directly related to people’s livelihoods—conflicts of interest between citizens and local authorities. Typical examples of this category include the incidents in Văn Giang (Hưng Yên, 2012), Đồng Tâm (Hà Nội, 2020), and the riots in the Central Highlands. [10][11][12]

These were protests tied to the defense of the legitimate interests of certain communities, often concerning land disputes, the living environment, religion, or other specific rights of particular social groups. However, these protests often directly challenged the interests of the authorities and thus could neither endure nor create any lasting impact. Typically, such incidents were swiftly suppressed at their locations, strictly censored in the media, and most participants were later prosecuted and convicted.

In the Văn Giang land seizure protest, dozens of farmers were arrested, and many were sentenced to prison for “disturbing public order.” [13][14] In the Đồng Tâm incident, 29 defendants were brought to trial, with two sons of the late village elder Lê Đình Kình—Lê Đình Công and Lê Đình Chức—sentenced to death on charges of murder. [15] And in the case of the attacks on two commune offices in Đắk Lắk, nearly a hundred individuals were prosecuted for “terrorism aimed at opposing the people’s government” and for other related charges. [16]

The second category (Type 2) consists of protests aimed at expressing political consciousness over national and public issues. These are demonstrations organized in response to matters such as violations of national sovereignty and territorial integrity; opposition to policies with far-reaching impacts; or outrage over major scandals and misconduct, such as the Formosa environmental disaster in Hà Tĩnh. [17]

This second type of protest can be traced through events such as demonstrations opposing China’s incursions into Vietnamese sovereignty (in 2007, 2012, and 2014), or the protests against the draft laws on Special Economic Zones and Cybersecurity in 2018. [18][19][20][21]

Unlike the first type, these protests carried a broader resonance, as the issues they addressed concerned the collective interests of the nation—and, in some cases, even aligned with the government’s own official stance on foreign policy. For that very reason, the authorities tended to act more cautiously, unable to easily deny the legitimacy of such protest goals, and therefore taking more time to deliberate on whether and how to suppress them.

Although these movements produced tangible effects—such as the National Assembly postponing the passage of the draft Law on Special Economic Zones to calm public opinion [22]—their ultimate outcome is clear. [23] It is evident that regardless of the cause, protests in Việt Nam have all ended the same way: many participants have found themselves imprisoned, harassed, or arrested.

Furthermore, some demonstrations have been branded as the result of “hostile forces” inciting or exploiting patriotic sentiment. [24][25] State-run media also actively portray these activities in a negative light. [26] Over time, instead of being recognized as a legitimate exercise of citizens’ rights, protesting has gradually come to be seen as a dangerous, condemnable act that disrupts social order.

It seems that the Vietnamese government has succeeded in creating a psychological shadow over the notion of protest. As a result, people have developed a habit of self-censorship: they avoid discussing, sharing, or participating in—and perhaps even thinking about—protests. The question, “What can a protest even achieve?” has become a common refrain, reflecting a deep loss of faith in the possibility of change through collective action. [27]

“Bearing the Blame for the Protest”

The decline of Việt Nam’s protest culture perhaps stems not only from individuals’ fear for their own safety. It is also because the Vietnamese government does not merely suppress those who directly take part, but extends pressure to their family members as well.

The authorities’ actions go beyond physical violence. They also employ psychological abuse that fosters a persistent sense that protesting is an “abnormal” act. This suppression also has cross-border reach.

In May 2025, police in Nghệ An Province summoned the relatives of 18 people who had participated in a protest in London, England. [28] The police accused those protesters of being “incited by reactionary forces” to engage in anti-state activities on Reunification Day (April 30). In reality, their protest called for greater freedom, democracy, and the protection of human rights for the Vietnamese people. [29]

Despite protesters being fully capable adults, the Vietnamese authorities still summon their family members for “working sessions.” This occurs even when the protest did not take place inside Việt Nam, but under an entirely different legal system in another country. Under the pretext of “rehabilitating misguided individuals,” the police have exerted pressure on relatives, urging them to in turn pressure those labeled as “misguided.” [30]

The unspoken message is clear: participating in a protest, even abroad, harms oneself and also implicates one’s family. For this reason, even though many sympathize with the goals of such demonstrations, they dare not join—fearing that their loved ones will bear the consequences.

Vague Provisions, Rights Only on Paper

This situation raises a fundamental question: Is protesting illegal? If not, why does the state work so hard to stop it? 

The answer is a paradox: in Việt Nam, protesting is both legal and illegal.

The legality stems from Article 25 of the 2013 Constitution, which states: “Citizens have the right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, access to information, and the right to assembly, association, and demonstration.” [31] However, this right is immediately qualified by the stipulation that “the exercise of these rights shall be provided by law.”

These provisions are defined by Clause 2 of Article 14, which clearly states the limits of the right to protest alongside other human rights:

“Human rights and citizens’ rights may only be restricted by law in cases deemed necessary for reasons of national defense, national security, social order and safety, social morality, or public health.”

These broad and ambiguous provisions turn the right to protest into a "conditional right," with the government defining the conditions. Citizens are left unable to foresee when a protest might be restricted or what legal consequences they could face.

This ambiguity is compounded by the fact that Việt Nam still lacks a specific Law on Demonstrations. The existing Decree No. 38/2005/NĐ-CP only requires that public gatherings be “registered in advance with the competent People’s Committee where the activities take place” and must “comply with the registered content.” [32]

No viable mechanism exists for citizens to lawfully register a protest, as authorities can easily reject applications or set unreasonable and burdensome requirements. This allows the government to exploit the constitutional loopholes to suppress protests under the pretext of protecting national and community interests.

This legal vacuum is heavily exploited in practice. Protesters are easily accused of offenses under the 2015 Penal Code, including “activities aimed at overthrowing the people’s government,” “rioting,” “disrupting security,” or “disturbing public order.” [33] Milder cases may result in fines under administrative decrees, such as Decree No. 144/2021/NĐ-CP. [34]

This creates a paradox: the right to protest is constitutional, but no legal mechanism exists to exercise it. This ensures that any spontaneous protest is deemed “illegal” and punishable.

A second, historical paradox exists. While history textbooks celebrate protests from the 1945–1975 period as patriotic struggles for justice and progress, today's protests are portrayed by authorities as illegal acts that exploit patriotism to incite disorder.

This narrative denies what can be seen as a cultural tradition of the Vietnamese people, which has existed for centuries. [35] Wherever there was injustice, defiance arose. For ordinary, unarmed citizens, their voices and collective presence were their only weapons. But when such a tradition is denied—and when cultural expression is met with violence—who would still dare to protest?

Trường An wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Oct. 6, 2025. The Vietnamese Magazine has the copyright of its English version.