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On Oct. 24, Deputy Minister of National Defense of Việt Nam Hoàng Xuân Chiến appeared on Human Rights Watch’s “Hall of Shame.” Chiến was accused of the “ inappropriate touching ” of a Korean female government employee during a banquet on Sept. 11, held as part of the Việt Nam–Korea Defense Dialogue in Seoul. [1]

The revelation immediately drew widespread attention in both countries—partly because it concerns the personal ethics of a senior Vietnamese defense official, and also because it comes at a time when Việt Nam–Korea relations are closer than ever since being upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership in late 2022.

The allegation of sexual harassment has not been supported by any public evidence. Yet the lack of transparency in how Hà Nội has handled the matter could undermine accountability and the ethical standards of public service at the heart of Việt Nam’s so-called “bamboo diplomacy.”

Action in Seoul, Silence in Hà Nội Sources in South Korea provided relatively specific details about the alleged misconduct. Yonhap News reported that General Hoàng Xuân Chiến “touched” the Korean female employee in an inappropriate manner. [2]

The South Korean Ministry of National Defense later summoned Việt Nam’s defense attaché on Sept. 19, issued a formal note of protest, and requested that Việt Nam take steps to prevent similar incidents. This was a standard diplomatic reaction—firm enough to express serious concern, yet still within the limits of protocol. According to Seoul’s defense ministry, the case was “handled in accordance with principles,” suggesting no criminal charge was filed as no specific disciplinary or legal action was disclosed.

Out of respect for the victim’s privacy, South Korea has not revealed further details. To date, Korean media have not published any photos, videos, or documents, nor have they identified the alleged victim.

In Việt Nam, state-run media outlets have offered no official response, even as the story spread rapidly through Korean press, Vietnamese social media, and independent news channels. The silence of mainstream Vietnamese newspapers on an issue involving a high-ranking official is unusual, but not entirely surprising in the S-shaped nation.

Coincidentally—or perhaps not—on Sept. 19, the very same day that South Korea sent its note of protest, Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính signed a decision to extend the term of office for “Comrade Senior Lieutenant General Hoàng Xuân Chiến, Member of the Party Central Committee and Member of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission.” [3]

Just nine days later, on Sept. 28, the Quân đội Nhân dân (People’s Army Newspaper) reported that Chiến had accompanied Vyacheslav Volodin, Chairman of the Russian State Duma, on a visit to the Việt Nam–Russia Tropical Center in Hà Nội. [4] This suggests Chiến continues to perform his official duties as normal.

The controversy in Seoul appears to have had no impact on his rank or responsibilities—perhaps because the meeting with Russia had been previously planned and Hà Nội preferred not to disrupt it.

Việt Nam–Korea Relations More than 320,000 South Korean soldiers fought in the Việt Nam War, committing massacres and atrocities that left deep scars. [5] Among the most horrific was the February 1968 massacre of civilians in the villages of Phong Nhất and Phong Nhị (Quảng Nam Province)—a trauma that remains vivid even today.

Yet, in the decades since, South Korea has become one of Việt Nam’s most important strategic partners. As of October 2025, it is Việt Nam’s largest foreign investor, with over 95.04 billion USD in FDI across 10,264 projects. [6] Today, most Samsung smartphones are assembled in Việt Nam. [7]

Both sides have set a target of 150 billion USD in two-way trade by 2030. [8] This goal was reaffirmed in August during the state visit of General Secretary of the Communist Party of Việt Nam Tô Lâm to South Korea, where leaders pledged to “consolidate political trust and promote practical cooperation in diplomacy, defense, and security.” [9]

Defense cooperation, in particular, has been growing rapidly. Việt Nam is eager to access South Korea’s advanced defense technologies, while Seoul views Hà Nội as a key security partner. In August, Hanwha Aerospace signed an agreement to supply Việt Nam with 20 K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers, a deal expected to enhance “interoperability and coordinated combat capabilities.” [10]

Against this backdrop of flourishing relations, the allegation involving a Vietnamese defense official was bound to cause unease. Still, few expect the episode to seriously disrupt bilateral ties. The structural and economic interests between the two countries are simply too large for Seoul to alter its policy over a single official’s alleged misconduct.

No Public Evidence, Three Possible Explanations So far, major Vietnamese media have published no evidence substantiating the allegations of “sexual misconduct” against Chiến. This silence, however, is not without precedent.

In previous cases where Vietnamese diplomats were accused of sexual misconduct abroad—such as in New Zealand and Chile in 2024—Hà Nội initially kept silent and reportedly handled the matter internally. [11] The Chiến scandal thus appears to be part of a broader pattern of alleged misconduct handled with official discretion.

Based on this observable pattern, there are three possible explanations for the lack of public information.

First, internal investigations may be underway, prompting officials to remain silent to ensure procedural integrity and avoid reputational harm if the accusations prove unfounded. Second, this is a diplomatically sensitive issue that both sides prefer to handle discreetly to prevent escalation. Third, the credibility of the accusation itself may not yet meet the threshold for public disclosure.

This lack of transparency prompted Human Rights Watch to call on Việt Nam to conduct an independent investigation, disclose the findings publicly, and impose penalties if wrongdoing is found. [12] HRW’s demand does not equate to a presumption of guilt; it emphasizes instead the principle of accountability.

Yet, Việt Nam is unlikely to publish its conclusions. The earlier incidents in New Zealand and Chile have already disappeared from view.

Is South Korea Testing Việt Nam–North Korea Relations? While no credible evidence has surfaced, the timing of the South Korean media coverage has led some to question if it was linked to Việt Nam’s relations with North Korea.

On Oct. 9, just days before Korean outlets reported heavily on the scandal, General Secretary Tô Lâm made a state visit to North Korea. Nhân Dân newspaper reported that the trip aimed to “foster friendship and elevate relations between the Parties and States of Việt Nam and North Korea,” [13] and included five major agreements that signaled Hà Nội’s intent to “ remain loyal to its friends .” [14]

The trip came amid worsening inter-Korean relations, [15] and as South Korea and the United States held joint military drills to deter Pyongyang. [16]

This theory, however, is directly contradicted by the timeline. The alleged misconduct (Sept. 11) and South Korea’s formal note of protest (Sept. 19) both occurred well before Tô Lâm visited Pyongyang in October.

Furthermore, the strategic momentum in Việt Nam–South Korea relations remains strong. Both capitals continued expanding economic cooperation, coordinating on potential tariff risks from Donald Trump’s administration, and reaffirming defense-technology collaboration. Seoul understands Việt Nam’s long-standing practice of “balancing” relations, and there is little reason to believe it would exploit the controversy to pressure Hà Nội.

A Test of Ethics in “Bamboo Diplomacy” Việt Nam’s response to the case exemplifies one version of its “bamboo diplomacy”: maintaining friendly ties with South Korea, North Korea, and other partners alike—while remaining silent to ride out the media storm. As long as no official conclusion has been announced, the issue remains personal to Chiến and is unlikely to compel Hà Nội to abandon its flexible, bamboo-like approach.

If Việt Nam were to announce a transparent internal investigation and cooperate with Seoul at the victim’s request, such action would not weaken but rather strengthen the credibility of its “bamboo diplomacy.”

Yet the current avoidance strategy carries broader risks, undermining perceptions of transparency and public communication. Prolonged silence may also be interpreted as diplomatic irresponsibility—not only by the South Korean public but also by citizens within Việt Nam itself.

Still, Hà Nội appears to believe that “silence is golden.” The scandal may fade, but the repeated allegations of sexual harassment involving its officials since 2024 should serve as a warning to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is a reminder that Vietnamese diplomacy must balance flexibility with a firm commitment to public-service ethics.

Nguyễn Hưng Bình wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Oct. 27, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: Pearson, E. (2025, October 24). Alleged Sexual Harassment by Vietnamese Officials Ignored—Again. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/24/alleged-sexual-harassment-by-vietnamese-officials-ignored-again Hyun-soo, K. (2025, October 20). S. Korea calls in Vietnamese defense attache over alleged sexual misconduct. Yonhap News Agency. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251020012100315 Bổ nhiệm lại, kéo dài thời gian giữ chức vụ Thứ trưởng Bộ Quốc phòng. (2025, September 19). Báo Điện tử Chính phủ. https://baochinhphu.vn/bo-nhiem-lai-keo-dai-thoi-gian-giu-chuc-vu-thu-truong-bo-quoc-phong-102250919161724761.htm Phương, H. (2025, September 28). Chủ tịch Duma Quốc gia Quốc hội Liên bang Nga thăm Trung tâm Nhiệt đới Việt – Nga. Quân đội Nhân dân. https://www.qdnd.vn/quoc-te/doi-ngoai-quoc-phong/chu-tich-duma-quoc-gia-quoc-hoi-lien-bang-nga-tham-trung-tam-nhiet-doi-viet-nga-848080 An, T. (2025, May 2). Ngăn những vụ thảm sát như Hà My, Phong Nhất-Phong Nhị… Tiền phong. https://tienphong.vn/ngan-nhung-vu-tham-sat-nhu-ha-my-phong-nhat-phong-nhi-post1738026.tpo Nhi, P. (2025, October 1). Hàn Quốc “vững tin” vào môi trường đầu tư Việt Nam, đẩy mạnh mở rộng sang lĩnh vực mới. VnEconomy. https://vneconomy.vn/han-quoc-vung-tin-vao-moi-truong-dau-tu-viet-nam-day-manh-mo-rong-sang-linh-vuc-moi.htm Vinh, Q. (2025, March 30). Gần như mọi điện thoại Samsung bán ra trên thế giới đều sản xuất ở Việt Nam: Thời của Trung Quốc đã qua. CafeF. https://cafef.vn/gan-nhu-moi-dien-thoai-samsung-ban-ra-tren-the-gioi-deu-san-xuat-o-viet-nam-thoi-cua-trung-quoc-da-qua-188250330191212253.chn Khanh, H. (2025, August 13). Việt Nam – Hàn Quốc hướng đến kim ngạch thương mại 150 tỉ USD. Thanh Niên. https://thanhnien.vn/viet-nam-han-quoc-huong-den-kim-ngach-thuong-mai-150-ti-usd-185250812234304421.htm TTXVN. (2025, August 13). Tuyên bố chung về làm sâu sắc hơn Quan hệ đối tác chiến lược toàn diện Việt Nam – Hàn Quốc. Báo Điện tử Chính phủ. https://baochinhphu.vn/tuyen-bo-chung-ve-lam-sau-sac-hon-quan-he-doi-tac-chien-luoc-toan-dien-viet-nam-han-quoc-102250811194218425.htm Việt Nam và Hàn Quốc ‘chốt đơn’ 20 pháo tự hành K9 Thunder 250 triệu USD. (2025, August 15). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c9vd1z9elv2o Thứ trưởng Bộ Quốc phòng Việt Nam bị cáo buộc sàm sỡ tại Hàn Quốc. (2025, October 21). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/c93dlvj8nx5o See [1]. Báo Nhân dân. (2025, October 12). Vun đắp tình hữu nghị, nâng tầm quan hệ hai Đảng, hai nước Việt Nam và Triều Tiên. https://nhandan.vn/vun-dap-tinh-huu-nghi-nang-tam-quan-he-hai-dang-hai-nuoc-viet-nam-va-trieu-tien-post914700.html Ông Tô Lâm thăm Triều Tiên: Ảnh hưởng thế nào đến vị thế Việt Nam? (2025, October 12). BBC. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cge2e1ywd4go Ng, K. (2024, October 17). Hiến pháp Triều Tiên gọi Hàn Quốc là ‘quốc gia thù địch’. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/vietnamese/articles/cy43zwzl57ko Hạnh, M. (2025, August 23). Triều Tiên cáo buộc Hàn Quốc nổ súng ở biên giới. Tiền Phong. https://tienphong.vn/trieu-tien-cao-buoc-han-quoc-no-sung-o-bien-gioi-post1771800.tpo