Economic Potential: The True Strategic Power of Việt Nam’s Central Highlands

The Central Highlands (Tây Nguyên) is a geographic region consistently described in Vietnamese state media as a strategic and critically important location for national security. However, there is still little research or reporting that clarifies the true strategic nature of this region.

For example, a commentary published by the Vietnam News Agency offered such remarks as:

“Many of our generals, as well as foreign ones, have asserted that Tây Nguyên is so important that whoever controls it can be said to control Việt Nam and Indochina.” 

“Throughout the 30-year liberation war, not only did we but also the French, Americans, and the world recognize the crucial position of this region. They regarded Tây Nguyên as the ‘roof of Indochina,’ a land adjacent to the Indochina crossroads. Therefore, occupying this region made it easier to control all of Indochina.” [1]

These statements are surface-level, declarative, and highly generalized, making the message easy to deploy but insufficient for explaining Tây Nguyên’s strategic significance. In its analysis, the article mentions French and American attention but ultimately only notes that battles there were supportive of the primary battle at Điện Biên Phủ or that the communist army “targeted” Buôn Ma Thuột to shake the entire South.

Similarly, another analysis in Tạp chí Quốc phòng toàn dân emphasizes Tây Nguyên’s strategic position during the fight against the United States. According to this account, Tây Nguyên functioned as a buffer zone to disconnect two other strategic military regions of the South Vietnamese government: Huế–Đà Nẵng and Saigon. [2] The offensive in Tây Nguyên, described as an opening campaign, was aimed at this internal objective. Other interpretations or explanations were not mentioned.

So, are there other ways to understand Tây Nguyên’s strategic significance? And are there factors beyond brief geopolitical statements that contribute to its importance?

Historical Dimension

Until recently, historical perspectives that considered the indigenous Thượng people in Tây Nguyên as isolated, underdeveloped groups have been largely discredited.

Scholars such as Jean Boulbet, Gerald C. Hickey, and Oscar Salemink note that the rise of lowland kingdoms, including Champa and the Đàng Trong administration under the Nguyễn lords, relied heavily on the Thượng people as intermediaries. These groups connected inland political entities with merchants operating in the South China Sea. [3] Specifically, lowland kingdoms maintained friendly relations with autonomous Austronesian-speaking communities (Jarai, Êđê [Rhadé], Churu, Raglai) and Austroasiatic-speaking communities (Hrê, Bahnar, Koho, Ma).

This cooperation enabled lowland kingdoms to access valuable resources from Tây Nguyên and trade with inland kingdoms, thereby turning southern ports into hubs that attracted merchants from China, Japan, India, Arabia, and Europe. For downstream trade, the Chams and Kinh used highland goods—including precious woods, rattan, honey, spices, rhinoceros horn, and tiger products. For upstream trade, they resold goods such as salt, fish sauce, dried fish, Chinese ceramics, and high-quality iron products to the highland communities.

This trade foundation sustained the prosperity of the Đàng Trong administration. By maintaining this economic base, the Nguyễn lords could repel attacks from the Trịnh lords in Đàng Ngoài, expand southward, and adopt advanced Western products and technology.

However, mismanagement, corruption, and excessive taxation by the Đàng Trong eventually weakened relations with the Tây Nguyên communities. Historian Li Tana notes that this discontent, together with Cham’s resistance to Nguyễn authority, laid the political foundation and mobilized significant resources for the Tây Sơn uprising. [4] From this starting point, the Tây Sơn brothers systematically overthrew the Nguyễn lords, Trịnh lords, and the Later Lê dynasty.

In other words, Tây Nguyên was never peripheral to Việt Nam’s historical trajectory. The region played a strategic role in shaping modern Việt Nam.

Geopolitical and Military Dimension

The strategic value of Tây Nguyên was first identified by Western missionaries and later reinforced by French military leaders such as Galliéni and Ardant du Picq. [5] This perception was so significant that during World War II, the Vichy France colonial authorities planned to make Tây Nguyên the new heart of Indochina, with Đà Lạt as the federal capital. [6] The plan failed only when Japan staged a military coup against the French in 1945.

Decades later, the sentiment remained. Việt Nam Democratic Republic General Văn Tiến Dũng cited South Vietnamese General Phạm Văn Phú as stating that whoever controls Tây Nguyên controls all of southern Việt Nam. [7]

Despite these strong assertions, clear explanations are often absent. A conventional analysis suggests that Tây Nguyên’s importance stems from its geography. It is close enough to the coast to support transportation and coastal defense, yet its mountainous terrain makes it difficult to assault directly from the sea. It also provides strategic access to surrounding lowlands and river valleys, and during the Second Indochina War, it was a central node connecting North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Hồ Chí Minh Trail through Cambodia and Laos.

Ultimately, its natural defensive terrain is not inherently unique. In the context of Việt Nam, Tây Nguyên is particularly significant because it can be used to sever transportation and communication between the Central and Southern regions. Expanding this significance to all of Indochina, however, would require more substantial evidence and research.

Economic Dimension

While the label “fortress of Indochina” may be an exaggeration, Tây Nguyên’s economic contribution is the likely reason the region remains central to disputes over control.

In agriculture, Tây Nguyên is a leading producer of some of Việt Nam’s top export commodities, including pepper, coffee, rubber, and cashew. In 2018, its provinces led in multiple industrial crop sectors. [8] Đắk Lắk province alone had the largest coffee plantation area in the country at 201,152 hectares—over 40% of Tây Nguyên’s coffee area and 30% of the national total—producing over 450,000 tons annually. Thanks to this region, Việt Nam is one of the world’s top coffee exporters. [9]

Similarly, in 2020, Tây Nguyên accounted for more than 60% of national pepper cultivation and is the country’s second-largest specialized region for rubber, after Southeast  Việt Nam. [10][11][12] Each of these sectors contributes billions of U.S. dollars annually to Việt Nam’s export value, reinforcing the region's importance for national economic security.

However, this large-scale cultivation, driven by millions of Kinh migrants, has come at a great cost to local indigenous communities like the Jarai and Êđê. They have been forced to largely relinquish claims to traditional lands, unique cultivation techniques, and village political structures.

For this reason, stabilizing Tây Nguyên, even through coercive force, is a top priority for Hà Nội. Any recognition of local sovereignty or self-determination threatens the state’s control over vast agricultural areas and their high-value supply chains. This economic picture is further reinforced by the region's valuable mineral resources, including bauxite, iron, magnesite, and diatomite.

Tây Nguyên’s importance is often framed through the lens of geopolitics and military strategy, and national defense. However, this perspective is incomplete. The region's enduring strategic power, both historically and today, lies in its economic value. 

In the past, cooperation between Kinh and indigenous communities turned southern ports into international trade hubs; today, the highlands drive Việt Nam’s status as a top global exporter across multiple sectors. The region is not strategic merely because of its geography—its significance is economic, and any unrest there ultimately stems from disputes over the distribution of its wealth.

Nguyễn Quốc Tấn Trung wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on July 12, 2023. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.