Key Events * Deputy Minister of National Defense Hoàng Xuân Chiến accused of sexual harassment in South Korea; * Tô Lâm’s
The leaders of the Communist Party of Vietnam, much like ordinary citizens, admire Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore’s skyscrapers,
According to Reuters and Politico, Tô Lâm, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Việt Nam, will embark on a
On the night of Oct. 20, several major South Korean news outlets — including Yonhap, KBS, and The Korea Times — simultaneously reported that Lieutenant General Hoàng Xuân Chiến, Việt Nam’s deputy minister of national defense, has been accused of sexual harassment during his official trip to Seoul.
According to these reports, the incident allegedly occurred on Sept. 11, during Chiến’s participation in the 14th Seoul Defense Dialogue. At a reception for senior military officials held at the Lotte World Hotel in Seoul, Chiến was accused of inappropriately touching a female civil servant. He left South Korea the following day, Sept. 12.
On Sept. 19, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense summoned Việt Nam’s defense attaché in Seoul to lodge a formal protest, demanding measures to prevent similar incidents.
AFP South Korea later reported that the Vietnamese attaché expressed regret and assured Seoul that such behavior would not happen again. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese Embassy in South Korea has remained silent, declining to comment when contacted by the local press.
Việt Nam’s state-controlled media has avoided mentioning the allegations. On the same day the story broke internationally, domestic outlets reported only on Chiến’s participation in a ceremony to sign a memorandum on post-war mine and explosive ordnance awareness education — with no reference to the South Korean accusations. Neither Chiến nor any government platform has issued a statement on the matter.
Public reaction inside Việt Nam has been lively. The Facebook page “Tifosi,” known for its pro-government stance, dismissed the reports as fabrications by the South Korean media. Some Vietnamese commentators questioned Seoul’s motives in publicizing the case.
On Facebook, economist Nguyễn Đức Thành suggested that the timing might reflect geopolitical tensions. In August, Việt Nam finalized an agreement to purchase K9 self-propelled howitzers from South Korea, but two months later signed a defense pact with North Korea — raising concerns in Seoul about possible military information leaks between the two adversaries.
This is not the first scandal of its kind involving Vietnamese officials abroad. In 2024, two separate incidents were reported during overseas visits of Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính to New Zealand and President Lương Cường to Chile, both involving alleged sexual misconduct within diplomatic delegations.
The Vietnamese government remains tight-lipped about the news, while international scrutiny of its diplomatic conduct continues to grow, testing Hà Nội’s ability to manage reputational damage in an increasingly globalized arena.
Việt Nam’s top leader, Tô Lâm, is set to travel to the United Kingdom on Oct. 29 for a pivotal two-day visit that could elevate Hà Nội-London ties to the highest level: a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
During the trip, Tô Lâm is expected to meet British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and possibly have an audience with King Charles III, with a stop at the University of Oxford for cooperation deals in health and education.
This potential upgrade would bring the UK into Vietnam’s top diplomatic tier — joining 13 current partners and making it the 14th. The expansion reflects a sharp escalation in Vietnam’s foreign-policy ambitions under Tô Lâm, who has overseen multiple upgrades since August 2024.
While state media in Vietnam has remained silent on the trip, the larger trend is unmistakable: Vietnam is accelerating its global ambitions and rewriting the map of its strategic relationships. Analysts will be watching closely to see if this visit results in a formal agreement or simply sets the stage for further negotiations.
For Vietnam, the transformation is clear: diplomatic ties are no longer just a side-note but a key strategic pillar of its national agenda.
On the morning of Oct. 20, Vietnam’s 15th National Assembly convened its 10th and final session, expected to last 40 days. Lawmakers face what is being described as an unprecedented legislative workload — the largest in the country’s parliamentary history.
During this session, the National Assembly is scheduled to review and pass 53 legislative items, including 49 draft laws and 4 resolutions. Among the key bills are major amendments to the Cybersecurity Law, Press Law, Law on Enforcement of Criminal Judgments, and Law on Protection of State Secrets.
Notably, most of these legislative proposals are being fast-tracked under simplified procedures, raising concerns over the depth and quality of legislative scrutiny.
Beyond lawmaking, the Assembly will also deliberate on 13 key policy groups encompassing economic management, state budgets, government oversight, personnel appointments, and other national issues.
According to Nguyễn Văn Hiển, deputy chief of the National Assembly Office, the “enormous volume of work” is one reason the legislature has dropped live questioning sessions from this meeting — a move that effectively limits direct accountability and debate.
Despite being officially described as the highest organ of state power, the National Assembly continues to operate under the political direction of the Communist Party. As part of this final session, deputies are also expected to discuss and contribute feedback to the draft documents for the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party, scheduled for early 2026, underscoring the party’s guiding influence over state institutions.
The rushed pace of legislation has not gone unnoticed. On Oct. 14, National Assembly Chairman Trần Thanh Mẫn publicly criticized the government pressure to pass bills with impossible speeds, remarking wryly:
“At least give us three to five days. We’re not the Monkey King (Tề Thiên Đại Thánh) who can study and vote on a law overnight.”
His rare criticism reflects growing tension between the legislature’s procedural limits and the executive’s urgency to push through broad reforms before the current term ends. As Vietnam’s 15th National Assembly enters its final stretch, observers say the session will test the boundaries between efficiency and oversight in an increasingly compressed political calendar.
On Oct. 15, Vietnam’s Central Propaganda and Mass Mobilization Commissions jointly released the draft documents for the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party, calling for public feedback from October 15 to November 15 — the first time in the Party’s history such consultation has been made public.
The draft political reports, which have been under preparation since the 8th Central Committee Plenum in October 2023, have undergone near-monthly revisions. While the party presents this as an inclusive and democratic gesture, it has simultaneously instructed state-controlled media and information agencies to avoid reporting that lacks “proper orientation” or which carries “distorted or provocative content” regarding the public consultation process.
Feedback is being solicited not only from citizens inside Vietnam but also from overseas Vietnamese communities, political and social organizations, and other mass associations. Notably, the National Assembly, now in its final session, has also been directed to spend time discussing and commenting on these same party drafts — underscoring the party’s dominance over the legislative agenda.
Despite being formally presented as a broad civic exercise, the initiative highlights the limits of Vietnam’s one-party political system, where the Communist Party remains the sole legal political organization. In this environment, critical or people expressing dissenting opinions are often punished, and independent voices lack institutional channels to participate meaningfully in shaping policy.
Observers note that the public consultation may serve more as a symbolic affirmation of unity and control rather than a genuine exercise in democratic deliberation. Still, the move reflects a subtle shift in the Party’s communication strategy — seeking greater legitimacy by invoking public participation, even within tightly managed boundaries.
As the countdown to the 14th Party Congress begins, the process illustrates Vietnam’s paradox: a government eager to project openness and modernization while maintaining rigid control over political discourse and civic expression.
China has stepped up patrols around disputed reefs controlled by Việt Nam in the South China Sea, according to reports from the South China Morning Post. The Chinese Coast Guard’s operations near the Spratly Islands (Trường Sa) mark a new escalation in Beijing’s efforts to assert sovereignty over contested maritime territories.
The patrols, which include multiple Coast Guard vessels, were reportedly observed near Pearson Reef (Phan Vinh) and Lansdowne Reef (Đá Len Đao)—both currently occupied by Việt Nam. The Chinese authorities have described the operations as “routine law enforcement,” while Vietnamese officials have not publicly commented.
The move comes amid growing regional friction following Beijing’s release of new maritime regulations authorizing its Coast Guard to detain foreign vessels in “Chinese waters.” Analysts say the actions are part of China’s broader campaign to normalize its presence across the South China Sea and test the responses of smaller claimant nations like Việt Nam and the Philippines.
Beijing’s latest maneuvers also coincide with heightened military activity by the United States and its allies, including recent joint naval exercises with Japan and Australia. These parallel developments underscore the intensifying competition for influence and control in one of the world’s most strategically vital waterways.
Regional observers warn that the Chinese patrols near Vietnamese-held features could strain already fragile diplomatic ties. Hà Nội has traditionally balanced between protesting China’s incursions and maintaining stable bilateral relations. However, this latest move could compel Việt Nam to issue a formal diplomatic note or reinforce its maritime defenses around the affected reefs.
As tensions simmer, experts caution that continued Chinese patrols risk raising the likelihood of at-sea confrontations, further complicating efforts to finalize the long-delayed Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN.
A landmark United Nations cybercrime treaty is set to be signed in Hà Nội this weekend, with dozens of countries expected to participate. According to Reuters, the agreement aims to bolster international cooperation against cyber-offenses such as phishing, ransomware and online trafficking that cost the global economy trillions. However, tech firms and human-rights advocates warn that the treaty’s vague definitions may enable government surveillance and stifle free expression. As host and signatory, Việt Nam’s role draws added scrutiny given its track record on digital freedom.
On Oct. 21, Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security announced a plan to let citizens submit and verify land ownership information via the VNeID app, even though no current law authorizes the integration of land and housing data into the digital platform. The proposal, mentioned only in a pending draft decree, has raised concerns over legality and data security. Experts warn that the 2013 Land Law does not recognize digital land certificates, making any “e-red book” on VNeID legally invalid. Recent cyberattacks, including a massive leak from the National Credit Information Center, have further fueled public skepticism.
According to Human Rights Watch [HRW], Việt Nam’s systematic suppression of free speech, assembly, and political dissent is taking a heavy toll even as foreign governments deepen economic and security ties with Hà Nội. The report highlights a sharp rise in prosecutions under Article 331 of the penal code — over 140 cases since 2018 — targeting bloggers, ethnic minorities, and labor-rights activists. HRW warns that sustained repression threatens not only civil liberties but also Việt Nam’s long-term economic prospects by undermining rule of law and innovation. It urges international partners to press Việt Nam on human-rights reforms as part of strategic engagements.
Human Rights Watch/Elaine Pearson, Deborah Brown/Oct. 24
“Vietnam’s president has welcomed the new Cybercrime Convention as a valuable tool to counter any threat that ‘endangers security, undermines political and economic stability, and disrupts social life.’
In Vietnam, the authorities typically use laws to censor and silence any online expression of views critical of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the country’s political leadership. For instance, in June 2024, the prominent journalist Truong Huy San, known as Huy Duc, posted on social media about the growing political power of the Vietnamese police. Days later, police arrested and charged Huy Duc with violating a vague criminal provision on ‘abusing the rights to democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the State.’
Vietnamese authorities have commonly used this provision, which carries a penalty of up to seven years in prison, to target critics of the government. Huy Duc was sentenced to 30 months in prison – where he remains today.”
The leaders of the Communist Party of Vietnam, much like ordinary citizens, admire Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore’s skyscrapers,
According to Reuters and Politico, Tô Lâm, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Việt Nam, will embark on a
In 2023, the Ministry of Public Security announced that it would prosecute suspects arrested in the Central Highlands incident, verifying
The 2018 street protests against the draft Cybersecurity Law and the Law on Special Economic Zones, which saw large crowds
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