Chasing the 2045 Dream: What are the Bottlenecks Holding Việt Nam Back?

The 13th National Congress of the Communist Party in 2021 established the goal of transforming Việt Nam into a developed, high-income country by 2045, identifying science, technology, and innovation as the primary engines for this journey. However, for the nation to truly "turn into a dragon," this technological drive cannot be a solitary one. It must be intrinsically linked to institutional reform, human resource development, and a robust industrial foundation. 

Hence, policymakers must remain clear-headed and avoid an over-reliance or “idolization” of technology, especially if institutional frameworks and implementation capacity are not yet ready. 

A Growing Digital Economy

An assessment of Việt Nam’s technological capability reveals a complex picture. According to WIPO, the country ranked 44th out of 133 countries in the Global Innovation Index 2024 and was praised for its promising development potential. [1] However, this high-level ranking is tempered by low foundational investment; Việt Nam’s spending on R&D reached only about 0.43% of GDP in 2021, significantly lower than that of Asia’s leading technology economies. [2] This reflects a pattern where the country’s standout strength lies in output indicators like high-tech exports, while its weaknesses are concentrated in human capital and institutional quality.

Despite these challenges, the digital sector has become a remarkable bright spot. In 2024, the Ministry of Information and Communications reported that the revenue of digital technology enterprises reached approximately $158 billion; the country had about 73,788 digital tech firms, with foreign market earnings estimated at $11.5 billion; and hardware and electronics exports alone accounted for roughly $133.2 billion. [3] These figures show that “Vietnamese digital enterprises are gradually shifting from assembly and outsourcing to creation, self-design, and mastery of core technologies.” [4] 

The macroeconomic momentum from this shift has also become clearer, as the digital economy was estimated to account for 18.3% of GDP in 2024, growing at an average annual rate above 20%—the fastest in Southeast Asia. [5] With Việt Nam currently being one of the ten fastest-growing e-commerce markets in the world, it is undeniable that the digital economy is playing an increasingly important role in the nation’s development. [6]

Concerning Limitations

Alongside the positive signals, Việt Nam's technology sector faces clear and serious limitations.

First, the country still relies heavily on assembly within the technology value chain. According to the General Statistics Office, the electrical–electronic sector exported about $126.5 billion in 2024, yet domestic value-added remains thin as local enterprises control few stages involving design, standards, or intellectual property. [7]

Second, the semiconductor industry—the backbone of the digital economy—remains nascent. While recent foreign direct investment from multinational corporations like Amkor Technology, Hana Micron, and Intel has spurred growth in assembly, packaging, and testing (ATP), domestic capacity is limited. A 2024 report by the Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group projected that Việt Nam could raise its global share of ATP from about 1% in 2022 to 8–9% by 2032. [8] However, domestic capability in high-value areas like design and front-end fabrication remains embryonic, with the outlook depending heavily on the execution of technology transfer policies. [9]

Third, the bottleneck in high-quality human resources is unresolved. The government has announced a target of training 50,000 semiconductor engineers by 2030, supported by a long-term development program. [10] However, translating these ambitions into practical capability requires developing internationally standardized research programs, providing sufficient hands-on training, and establishing open mechanisms to attract foreign experts.

Lessons from the Region

To capitalize on its latecomer advantage, Việt Nam can draw crucial lessons from the focused strategies and policies of its regional neighbors.

South Korea offers a lesson in the sheer scale of investment required. The country maintains one of the highest R&D intensities in the OECD, spending 5.0% of its GDP in 2023. [11] In April 2025, its government announced an expansion of semiconductor investment to 33 trillion KRW (about $23.2 billion) and unveiled a plan to construct a "mega semiconductor cluster" by 2047, supported by significant tax and infrastructure incentives. [12, 13]

From Taiwan comes a model for technological depth and dominance. [14] The island’s R&D expenditure reached TWD 937.3 billion ($30.63 billion) in 2023, with 78.1% driven by its electronics and optoelectronics industries. [15, 16] This decades-long strategy—focused on core technology and tight industry-academia collaboration—has enabled firms like TSMC to produce about 90% of the world’s most advanced chips and create a "Silicon Shield" by attracting foreign R&D centers. [17, 18]

Singapore, in contrast, provides a lesson in building a symbiotic ecosystem. Rather than building massive factories, it targets investments to link R&D and enterprise. Its R&D expenditure was 1.8% of GDP in 2022, guided by a $25 billion SGD plan focused on “promoting technology transfer and strengthening firms’ innovation capacity.” [19] While its spending is less than South Korea's, Singapore's policy consistency and discipline has turned it into a global hub for tech startups, entrepreneurs, and investors. [20]

What Should Việt Nam Do?

From the experiences of East Asian economies, two crucial areas of investment stand out for Việt Nam.

First is the “depth” of knowledge investment. With Việt Nam spending only around 0.43% of its GDP on R&D—a fraction of the 2.62% world average—expecting breakthroughs in core technology is unrealistic. [21, 22] This challenge is compounded by a substantial gap between research and application. A study by two lecturers from Hanoi Law University points out that the country’s R&D ecosystem is “fragmented,” with little collaboration between government regulators, private firms, and research institutes, limiting the commercialization of innovations. [23]

Second, policy models from the region offer clear lessons. South Korea employs large, stable support packages; Taiwan focuses on core technologies; and Singapore optimizes institutional connectivity. Drawing from these comparisons, Việt Nam should pursue a more feasible roadmap with specific, prioritized objectives rather than spreading its resources thinly. This requires action across several interconnected fronts.

On institutions and supply chains, Việt Nam needs to refine its mechanisms for selecting national-level science and technology missions and link public funding with corporate sponsorship. South Korea’s use of credit incentives and streamlined procedures shows a path to stimulating employment and attracting talent. [24] In parallel, the country should identify sectors of relative advantage, such as assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP), for deep investment. FDI incentives must be tied to technology transfer commitments and co-development with domestic firms, not just tax holidays.

On human resources, the target of 50,000 semiconductor engineers by 2030 must be accompanied by standardized benchmarks and industry co-designed training programs. Taiwan’s experience underscores the value of a tight “government–university–industry” linkage, where students and engineers gain practical experience on real production lines. [25] Without such links, even large-scale training will struggle to translate into competitive capacity.

Effective governance also requires better data and a focus on inclusivity. While the digital economy’s estimated 18.3% share of GDP is encouraging, the next step is to disaggregate these contributions by sector and region to design more effective policies. [26] This is crucial for addressing the wide gap in technological literacy between adaptive urban centers and lagging rural regions, ensuring national initiatives are not exclusionary. [27]

Ultimately, policymakers must not “idolize” technology if institutional foundations and execution capacity remain unprepared. Many large semiconductor projects worldwide have collapsed under the realities of bureaucracy, infrastructure deficits, or labor shortages. South Korea’s success is due not only to its deep pockets but also to its disciplined implementation and strong domestic enterprises. Taiwan does not just have TSMC—it has a “TSMC ecosystem” supported by highly educated, well-paid, and prestigious jobs. 

The lesson for Việt Nam is to patiently build reliable and transparent supporting industries and institutions that provide strong investor confidence, while concurrently training competent specialists with solid skills.

***

Việt Nam’s potential for technological breakthroughs is evident in its expanding digital economy, high-tech exports, and the recent influx of semiconductor investment. However, to translate this promise into reality and truly “become a dragon” by 2045, a series of decisive actions is required. The country must elevate its R&D spending, concentrate resources on a few high-priority clusters, standardize semiconductor and AI training to international levels, and intrinsically link FDI incentives to technology transfer and localization. Only then can technology genuinely serve as the engine propelling Việt Nam toward stronger development and deeper global integration.

Nguyễn N. Hạnh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Oct. 2, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.