Key Events * Vietnam Probes Massive Credit Data Breach Affecting 160 Million Records; * Thanh Hóa Leadership Shake-Up as Top Officials Arrested
Nguyễn Quang A wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on September 15, 2025. Đàm
As the Israeli army issues [1] sweeping evacuation orders for Gaza City residents before launching more destructive strikes against Hamas,
Reuters reports that Việt Nam is investigating one of its largest-ever data breaches after the National Credit Information Center (CIC), under the State Bank, confirmed that the cybercrime group ShinyHunters had exfiltrated roughly 160 million records of personal and credit‐related data.
According to the Vietnam Cyber Emergency Response Team (VNCERT), the breach involved unauthorized access to the State Bank of Vietnam’s database; the full scope is still being assessed. The data being sold on dark web forums includes names, addresses, ID numbers, debt and income records, risk analyses, and other sensitive personally identifiable information (PII).
CIC and the State Bank have said that certain high‐sensitivity financial details—such as bank account numbers, balances, credit/debit card numbers, CVV codes, and transaction histories—were not included in the leak.
The authorities have appealed to the public to refrain from downloading or spreading the exposed data, warning that use or sharing of the leaked data could fall under legal penalties in accordance with Vietnamese cybersecurity and data protection laws.
Although CIC’s services remain operational and the breach apparently hasn’t disrupted financial operations, experts warn that this incident may lead to increased costs for banks needing stronger cybersecurity.
Thanh Hóa, one of Việt Nam’s most populous provinces, is undergoing a political upheaval unprecedented in decades as a wave of arrests sweeps through the provincial leadership, reshaping its power structure and drawing national attention.
On Sept. 11, the People’s Procuracy of Thanh Hóa Province approved the arrest of Nguyễn Văn Thi, permanent vice chairman of the Provincial People’s Committee, on charges of “abuse of power in the performance of official duties.” The police have not disclosed the specific violations tied to his case.
The next day, prosecutors indicted and detained several other current and former officials, including Lê Anh Xuân, current secretary of Hạc Thành Ward and the former secretary of the Thanh Hóa City Party Committee; Trần Anh Chung, director of the Department of Industry and Trade, former chairman of the Thanh Hóa City People’s Committee; Lê Mai Khanh, chairman of Đông Sơn Ward People’s Committee, and former vice chairman of the Thanh Hóa City People’s Committee); and Tào Minh Hạnh, former director of the city’s Land Development Center.
Investigators have linked these arrests to the case of businessman Cao Tiến Đoan, widely known as “bầu Đoan,” chairman of Đông Á Real Estate Group, who was taken into custody on Aug. 29 for “violating accounting regulations causing serious consequences.”
Adding to the turmoil, state media briefly reported on Sept. 13 that former Thanh Hóa Party Secretary Đỗ Trọng Hưng had been barred from leaving the country due to an ongoing investigation. The reports were quickly removed, fueling speculation about the depth of the crisis.
By Sept. 17, the shake-up reached the province’s highest offices. The Communist Party’s Central Committee approved early retirement for Lại Thế Nguyên, permanent deputy secretary of the Provincial Party Committee and chairman of the Provincial People’s Council; Đỗ Minh Tuấn, deputy secretary of the Provincial Party Committee and chairman of the Provincial People’s Committee, both of whom had been absent from official duties since early September.
On the same day, the Provincial People’s Council elected Nguyễn Hoài Anh, newly appointed deputy secretary of the Thanh Hóa Provincial Party Committee, as chairman of the Provincial People’s Committee, replacing Đỗ Minh Tuấn.
Perhaps most striking, the Politburo reassigned Maj.. Gen. Nguyễn Hồng Phong, director of the General Department of Homeland Security under the Ministry of Public Security, to serve as permanent deputy secretary of Thanh Hóa Province’s Party Committee. His appointment brings a powerful security figure into the heart of the province’s leadership at a time of acute political instability.
Analysts view the developments as part of a broader anti-corruption campaign sweeping Việt Nam, but the scale and speed of changes in Thanh Hóa suggest deeper struggles within local power networks. For residents, the “political earthquake” has raised questions not only about corruption but also about how the central authorities intend to reassert control in one of the country’s most strategically important provinces.
The Vietnamese government is considering a new draft decree that would mandate police screening for investment projects in sectors such as energy, telecommunications, construction, and infrastructure. The proposal, led by the Ministry of Public Security, aims to strengthen national security and solidify the Communist Party’s oversight of foreign and domestic investment.
Under the draft, owners would need police approval before proceeding with projects involving critical infrastructure—ports, oilfields, satellite services—and even less obviously sensitive ones like industrial parks and golf courses. Public comment is open until Sept. 22; if no major changes are requested, the prime minister may sign it into law.
Proponents argue the rules are necessary given increasing geopolitical competition, alleging that without such scrutiny, strategic vulnerabilities could be exploited. Critics, however, warn the regulation may raise compliance costs, delay investments, and create uncertainty for both foreign companies (including U.S. firms planning telecom services) and Vietnamese businesses.
Currently, the police largely play an advisory role in investment approvals; under the draft decree they would possess significantly greater authority, including the ability to veto projects based on undefined security criteria.
Analysts say the reform reflects a growing trend in Vietnam toward intertwining security concerns with economic policy. While foreign direct investment has been a major driver of Vietnam’s economic growth, this shift could complicate relations with foreign investors and affect project feasibility in sensitive or strategically located regions.
Internal Vietnamese government documents obtained by the Associated Press reveal a covert arrangement between Việt Nam and Russia designed to bypass U.S. and Western sanctions, allowing Việt Nam to acquire Russian military equipment without direct financial transfers through the global banking system.
Under the scheme, Việt Nam purchases arms—fighter jets, tanks, and ships—on credit from Moscow. It then paid that credit back from its share of profits from a joint Vietnam-Russia oil company operating in Siberia.
Profits beyond those repayments are transferred to the Russian state-owned oil company Zarubezhneft, which then channels an equivalent amount back to Việt Nam’s state oil group Petrovietnam (PVN) via a joint venture. This structure avoids crossing global banking networks like SWIFT that are commonly used in sanctions enforcement.
The documents, including a 2024 memo from PVN to the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry and Trade, were drafted ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Việt Nam. A second source, in a faction within Việt Nam’s government, leaked the files on condition of anonymity out of concern over the risks to relations with both Moscow and Washington.
Việt Nam’s ceneral director of PVN, Lê Ngọc Sơn, is quoted in the documents as saying that the strategy is “relatively confidential and appropriate” given the risk of sanctions, especially if the banking isolation of Russian institutions is expanded.
The U.S. State Department has not confirmed specific counter-measures; it issued a general reminder that engaging with sanctioned entities can carry risks under U.S. laws, including CAATSA, the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Vietnamese and Russian government entities named in the scheme have not made a public statement regarding the allegations.
Analysts say this revelation underscores Việt Nam’s delicate balancing act: deepening defense ties with Russia while managing increasing diplomatic and economic pressure from the U.S. and its Western partners. The arrangement also raises concerns over financial transparency and the enforceability of secondary sanctions, particularly in a region where strategic interests intersect.
The Supreme People’s Procuracy has issued an indictment against 28 defendants in a sprawling corruption scandal at the former High People’s Court in Đà Nẵng, where lawyers, prosecutors, and judges allegedly colluded in a “case-buying” network that tainted both criminal and civil proceedings.
According to the indictment, the defendants face charges of “giving bribes,” “brokering bribes,” and “receiving bribes.” The cases involved criminal trials, inheritance disputes, business litigation, and civil lawsuits, with defendants paying others to sway outcomes in their favor.
Investigators said the network operated in at least 20 identified cases, though not all attempts to “buy justice” succeeded. In many instances, defendants handed over bribes to individuals who lacked real authority to intervene. As a result, participants often had to pay higher sums, engage with multiple intermediaries, and even involve up to five different brokers before finally reaching an official capable of influencing the verdict.
The bribes varied in size and form. Most transactions were conducted via bank transfers, with amounts ranging from several hundred million to several billion đồng. In some cases, funds were funneled through family members or delivered in cash. The indictment noted that cash handovers remained a common practice in the most sensitive deals.
The scandal has implicated a wide array of legal professionals, blurring the line between defense attorneys, court officials, and judicial oversight bodies. Prosecutors emphasized that the breadth of participation—from lawyers to judges and kiểm sát viên (prosecutors)—makes this one of the most serious corruption cases in Việt Nam’s judicial system in recent years.
In an effort to mitigate sentencing, 17 defendants and their families have voluntarily returned a combined 1.255 trillion dồng ($50 million), prosecutors confirmed. This recovery is considered significant but still leaves unanswered questions about the full scope of illicit funds exchanged.
Observers note that the Đà Nẵng scandal illustrates systemic vulnerabilities in Việt Nam’s courts, where prolonged public concern over judicial integrity has now been confirmed by concrete evidence of corruption. Analysts say the case is likely to become a landmark trial in the country’s broader anti-corruption campaign, both for the unprecedented number of defendants and for exposing the inner workings of “chạy án”—the practice of bribing officials to alter judicial outcomes.
The Supreme People’s Court has pledged stricter oversight and procedural reforms in response, but public trust remains fragile. As the trial progresses, the outcome will be closely watched as a litmus test of whether Việt Nam’s courts can meaningfully confront corruption within their own ranks.
Vietnamese activists Trịnh Bá Tư, Đặng Đình Bách, and Bùi Văn Thuận launched a hunger strike at Prison No. 6 in Nghệ An on September 2, protesting the detention of political prisoners and calling for full respect of human rights as a step toward national democratization. According to Đỗ Thu (Trịnh Bá Tư’s sister-in-law), Đặng Đình Bách and Bùi Văn Thuận ended their strike after 10 days, while Trịnh Bá Tư continued for 20 days. Thu also reported that in August, prison authorities denied inmates phone access to families, citing storms and flooding.
Việt Nam, long reliant on export-driven manufacturing, is starting to feel the sting of newly imposed U.S. tariffs. Though the country struck an early agreement with Washington to ease tariffs from an initially proposed 46% down to 20%, economic forecasters are flagging concern: the World Bank recently revised the 2025 growth forecast down to 6.6% from earlier estimates of 6.8%.
While the major export sectors remain resilient, several indicators—like slowing U.S. orders and higher costs in global supply chains—are flashing warning signs. Vietnam now faces a tricky balancing act: preserve export competitiveness without sacrificing its economic growth targets.
The Ministry of Public Security has proposed exempting state officials, civil servants, and public employees from paying personal income tax, according to feedback on the draft amendment to the Personal Income Tax Law. The ministry argued that since these groups are paid directly from the state budget and then required to pay income tax back into the same budget, the process is redundant. Exemption, it said, would streamline administrative procedures and reduce staffing needs. The proposal, submitted to the Ministry of Finance, is under review as part of broader tax reform discussions.
Police in Nam Xuân Commune fined N.K.Tr., 59, 10 million đồng for posting what authorities called false information about forest rangers on social media. On Sept. 9, Tr. commented under an article about the case of “Mạnh gỗ,” alleging that “no forest ranger is clean” and that “natural forests inside protected reserves are being destroyed.” Officials determined the remarks were untrue and harmful. The fine was issued as an administrative penalty, underscoring Việt Nam’s tightening scrutiny of online speech related to state officials and sensitive environmental issues.
Fulcrum/Dien Nguyen An Luong/Sept. 18
“The timing helps explain why. Vietnam has been ramping up nationalism as the core of regime legitimacy, roping key influencers into circulating state-sanctioned messages. In that context, the immediate objective was to make an example of Tran Thanh’s influence, and just as importantly, to set the norm for how other influencers should toe the official line.
The defining feature of the Tran Thanh [1] saga was its scale: a coordinated online barrage reinforced by an equally relentless push through state-controlled media. The strength of the pushback was so strong that even some of Tran Thanh’s naysayers and fence-sitters in this case might have found the narrative excessive, even bordering on absurd. But such excess was precisely the point.
Heavy-handed state messaging aims less to persuade than to demonstrate strength and resolve. It also serves to signal what the regime considers its core priorities and red lines. The volume and severity of the vitriol against Tran Thanh telegraphed a stern message: Love for the regime must be performative and ‘pure.’”
[1] Trấn Thành is one of the current most popular artists in Việt Nam.
Nguyễn Quang A wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on September 15, 2025. Đàm
Key Events * Activist Trịnh Bá Phương, Already in Prison, Faces New Trial in a Việt Nam Court; * Vingroup Pursues Legal
Đan Thanh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on July 18, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh
Key Events * Dissident Vương Văn Thả’s Death in Custody Sparks Suspicion; * Rights Activist Lý Quang Sơn Detained Without Explanation;
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