Key Events * Việt Nam Intensifies Crackdown, Extends Trịnh Bá Phương’s Prison Term to 21 Years; * Fifth Pillar Added to
Huỳnh Kha wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Feb. 21, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh
Hiếu Mạnh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on July 23, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh
On Sept. 27, 2025, the People’s Court of Đà Nẵng held a first-instance trial against Trịnh Bá Phương, who is already serving a 10-year sentence and five years of probation. His family asserts that the combined sentences of 21 years in prison and five years of probation were imposed unjustly.
Despite being designated a public hearing, neither family members nor representatives from the German, British, or European Union embassies were permitted entry. The courtroom was heavily sealed off by hundreds of security and police officers, and all surrounding access points were blocked.
Embassies had previously communicated with court officials (including one clerk named Lĩnh, who claimed that embassy staff would be admitted with valid identification), but upon arrival entry was refused.
Inside the courtroom, Phương and his defense lawyers were frequently interrupted and prevented from speaking. Authorities allegedly silenced his final statement by gagging him, and the presiding judge, Đinh Tấn Long, accused the defense of being overly verbose and threatened to revoke their right to participate. In the end, Phương was tried in absentia.
During the investigative phase, Phương’s request to access his case files was denied, and his lawyers were excluded from the proceedings.
The case partly centers on a banner that was allegedly found in his prison cell with slogans critical of the Communist Party and the judiciary—statements his defense rejects as being his.
Two forensic agencies, one in Quảng Nam Province and the other the Forensic Science Institute in Đà Nẵng, declined to assess the banner. No witness from the prison confirmed Phương’s authorship, and he maintains his innocence.
In November 2024, officers reportedly searched Phương’s belongings while he was on day 18 of a hunger strike. He refused to sign the search record and later demanded the disclosure of room search video footage, which investigators did not provide.
Prosecutors sought a sentence of 9–10 years; the court ultimately handed down 11 years, close to the maximum penalty under Clause 1 of Article 117 of Vietnam’s Penal Code.
Now the family faces staggering hardship: among five family members serving prison sentences, the combined total exceeds 40 years, with 11 years of probation.
However, his family, through his wife Đỗ Thu, offers their thanks to the foreign embassies in Hà Nội, international human rights groups, legal supporters, and all those who have stood with them—especially representatives from Germany, the UK, and the EU who traveled from Hà Nội to Đà Nẵng in adverse weather to attend the trial.
Phương’s trial highlights persistent and systemic concerns about due process, access to legal defense, and transparency in politically sensitive cases in Vietnam.
The Communist Party of Vietnam has formally expanded its most powerful leadership circle, transforming the long-standing “tứ trụ” (four pillars) into a “ngũ trụ” (five pillars), following a new regulation issued by the party’s Central Committee.
For decades, Vietnam’s political system has centered on four key positions: the party general secretary, the state president, the prime minister, and the National Assembly chair. Now, under Regulation No. 368-QĐ/TW, issued on Sept. 8 and effective immediately, the standing member of the Party Secretariat has been added as a fifth seat in the country’s top leadership.
This rule replaces Politburo Conclusion No. 35-KL/TW from May 2022, formalizing a practice that had already been visible in recent Central Committee meetings, where five leaders routinely occupied the front row.
The standing member of the Secretariat is considered a senior leadership role and has historically served as a stepping stone to higher office. Past holders such as Trương Tấn Sang, Võ Văn Thưởng, and Lương Cường all later rose to become state president.
In the current 2021–2026 term, the post has already seen rapid turnover: from Võ Văn Thưởng to Trương Thị Mai, then Lương Cường, and currently Trần Cẩm Tú.
Beyond elevating the Secretariat’s standing, Regulation 368 also broadens the list of “senior leadership” positions. These now include the chair of the Central Inspection Committee, the heads of Party Central Commissions, the chief of the Party Central Office, and the director of the Hồ Chí Minh National Academy of Politics.
This shift underscores the party’s intent to institutionalize more posts within its highest leadership tier, potentially reshaping the balance of power within the Politburo and Central Committee.
One notable beneficiary is Nguyễn Thanh Nghị, the eldest son of former Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng. Appointed in August as head of the Central Committee’s Policy and Strategy Commission, he now formally holds the rank of “senior leader” less than a month into his new role.
The institutionalization of a five-pillar leadership model marks a significant evolution in Vietnam’s governance structure. While it consolidates the Secretariat’s influence within the party hierarchy, it also highlights the fluidity of succession politics, as senior officials continue to cycle through these roles with an eye toward future top posts.
Observers note that this adjustment could strengthen the party’s collective leadership model, while also signaling internal recalibrations of power at a time when questions of succession and stability remain central to Vietnam’s political landscape.
The Vietnamese government is considering a new draft decree that would mandate police screening for investment projects in sectors such as energy, telecommunications, construction, and infrastructure. The proposal, led by the Ministry of Public Security, aims to strengthen national security and solidify the Communist Party’s oversight of foreign and domestic investment.
Under the draft, owners would need police approval before proceeding with projects involving critical infrastructure—ports, oilfields, and satellite services—and even less obviously sensitive ones such as industrial parks and golf courses. Public comment is open until Sept. 22; if no major changes are requested, the prime minister may sign it into law.
Proponents argue the rules are necessary given increasing geopolitical competition, alleging that without such scrutiny, strategic vulnerabilities could be exploited. Critics, however, warn the regulation may raise compliance costs, delay investments, and create uncertainty for both foreign companies (including U.S. firms planning telecom services) and Vietnamese businesses.
Currently, the police largely play an advisory role in investment approvals; under the draft decree, they would possess significantly greater authority, including the ability to veto projects based on undefined security criteria.
Analysts say the reform reflects a growing trend in Vietnam toward intertwining security concerns with economic policy. While foreign direct investment has been a major driver of Vietnam’s economic growth, this shift could complicate relations with foreign investors and affect project feasibility in sensitive or strategically located regions.
After nearly 10 days of hearings, the Hanoi People’s Court on Sept. 18 handed down prison sentences to 29 defendants in a sweeping corruption case linked to the Thuận An Group and several provinces.
Phạm Thái Hà, former deputy chief of the National Assembly Office, was sentenced to five years and six months in prison for abusing his position to exert influence for personal gain.
Lê Ô Pích, former director of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and former vice chairman of the Bắc Giang People’s Committee, received three years in prison for abusing power while in office.
Nguyễn Duy Hưng, former chairman of Thuận An Group, received the harshest penalty — 10 years and six months in prison — for serious violations of bidding regulations.
Twenty-six other former executives and officials from the Thuận An Group, the Hà Nội Project Management Board, the Directorate for Roads of Vietnam, and other agencies were given sentences ranging from suspended terms to seven years in prison.
According to the indictment, Hưng exploited connections with senior officials, including Phạm Thái Hà, to manipulate bidding processes. By pressuring provincial leaders, the Thuận An Group secured preferential treatment in bidding, winning contracts for projects in the former Bắc Giang, Tuyên Quang, and Quảng Ninh provinces, in Hà Nội, and within the Ministry of Transport. These schemes caused more than 120 billion đồng ($4.5 million) in losses to state assets.
The court noted that the defendants had returned over 84 billion đồng, with more than 70 billion đồng and $90,000 already recovered to mitigate damages.
This trial marks one of the latest high-profile cases in Vietnam’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign, underscoring how entrenched networks of power and business collusion siphoned state resources through rigged procurement and construction contracts.
The Vietnamese authorities plan to shut down approximately 86 million banking accounts for failing to comply with newly mandated biometric identity verification, in what the State Bank frames as a nationwide “system cleanup.”
Of roughly 200 million active accounts across the country, only 113 million personal accounts and over 711,000 corporate accounts remain valid under the new biometric mandate. Banks began terminating accounts from Sept. 1, targeting those that were long dormant or unverified.
Officials argue the measure is essential for curbing fraud, money laundering, and abuse of ghost accounts. Yet critics warn of widespread disruption, especially for elderly or rural customers with limited access to biometric registration tools.
Meanwhile, the move has fueled renewed interest in crypto assets, as some citizens view decentralized currencies as a hedge against centralized banking constraints. The coming weeks will test Vietnam’s ability to balance financial security with inclusive access in the transition to a biometric-driven banking system.
Reuters reports that Communist Party chief Tô Lâm is expected to make a rare official visit to North Korea in October — the first by a Vietnamese leader in nearly two decades. Sources say the trip is still under preparation, and Lâm may meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Although the two countries maintain longstanding diplomatic ties, they currently do not engage in significant trade. If confirmed, this visit would mark a diplomatic milestone following lower-level bilateral engagement and align with 2025’s commemoration of 75 years of Vietnam–North Korea relations.
Residents of Hanoi are grappling with dangerous air quality conditions as the city repeatedly ranks among the world’s most polluted capitals. Reuters reports that the daily concentrations of PM have soared well above WHO safety thresholds, prompting calls for urgent emissions control. While the authorities have introduced measures to limit vehicle use and expand green zones, locals say the impact has been minimal. Health experts warn prolonged exposure to such polluted air can lead to respiratory, cardiovascular, and other chronic diseases.
Reuters reports that Việt Nam risks losing up to US$25 billion in exports to the United States after new tariffs introduced in August, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates.
The anticipated drop represents nearly one-fifth of Việt Nam’s annual U.S.-bound export volume. The decline could shave up to 5% off GDP growth, though damage might be softened by export diversification and domestic demand. Việt Nam already experienced a 2% month-over-month slide in shipments to the U.S. in August, with footwear exports slipping by 5.5%.
The Ministry of Home Affairs has directed provinces and cities to restructure the nationwide system of public schools and hospitals. On Sept. 21, the government Steering Committee issued a plan to reorganize education, healthcare, and state-owned enterprises. Under the directive, universities that fail to meet quality standards will be merged or dissolved. The move is part of broader efforts to streamline public services, reduce inefficiency, and ensure resources are better allocated. Authorities emphasize that the restructuring aims to modernize Việt Nam’s education and healthcare sectors while addressing longstanding concerns over quality and management.
The Ministry of Home Affairs has released an appraisal dossier for a draft resolution on the composition of provincial- and commune-level People’s Councils. Under the proposal, city-level councils formed from the merger of three provinces may appoint up to four vice chairpersons, while those formed from two provinces may appoint up to three. For merged provincial councils, the maximum is three vice chairpersons, while unchanged provinces are limited to two. At the commune level, each council would be allowed only one vice chairperson and two deputy heads of committees, aiming to streamline local governance.
On Sept. 18, the National Assembly’s Committee on Legal and Judicial Affairs reviewed proposed amendments to the Intellectual Property Law. A key highlight is a proposal to recognize intellectual property (IP) rights as tradable assets in the market. Under the draft, rights holders would be able to self-assess the value of their IP if it has not yet been formally appraised, allowing them to use it for commercial transactions, capital contributions, or fundraising. Lawmakers argue the reform could unlock innovation-driven investment, while also aligning Vietnam’s IP framework with global practices.
Việt Nam’s Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính has pledged that Hà Nội will continue trade with the United States while actively seeking new trade agreements to offset the impact of U.S. tariffs. The promise comes as Washington’s recent tariff measures pose a serious threat to Việt Nam’s export-reliant economy. Analysts warn the country could lose as much as $25 billion in U.S. sales this year. To respond, Việt Nam is prioritizing diversification of its export markets and negotiating fresh trade deals to stabilize economic growth.
Rest of World/Lam Le/Sept. 10
“Viettel, launched by Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense in 1989 to build antenna towers, is now the country’s largest telecommunications firm. Its businesses include 5G hardware, surveillance technologies, affordable mobile phones, and even robotics. In 2024, its revenue was $7.2 billion.
Viettel holds 30 U.S. patents and operates subsidiaries in 11 countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Now, it’s leading Vietnam into the artificial intelligence era.
…
Viettel has captured the biggest market share in the telecom market not only in Vietnam but also in Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, East Timor, Burundi, Haiti, and Mozambique. Viettel Global, the international business arm, earned $1.3 billion in revenue in 2024, and reached a breakeven point in six markets.
This growth, however, has come with a pinch of skepticism. Viettel’s Myanmar subsidiary, MyTel, has been criticized for allegedly acting as a tool of surveillance for the military junta.”
As Việt Nam and Germany mark fifty years of diplomatic ties, the broader challenge of advancing human rights education remains
Key Events * Vietnam Probes Massive Credit Data Breach Affecting 160 Million Records; * Thanh Hóa Leadership Shake-Up as Top Officials Arrested
Key Events * Activist Trịnh Bá Phương, Already in Prison, Faces New Trial in a Việt Nam Court; * Vingroup Pursues Legal
Đan Thanh wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on July 18, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh
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