Key Events * Communist Party Strips Top Officials of All Party Roles, Expels Former Minister; * Caught Off Guard: Việt Nam Faces
There was a mass migration of Vietnamese Catholics from the North to the South following the signing of the Geneva Accords on July 20, 1954.
Thúc Kháng wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luat Khoa Magazine on February 14, 2025. Restoring Order
In a major development regarding Communist Party discipline and personnel, on July 19, 2025, General Secretary Tô Lâm announced that the Central Committee has reached a high level of consensus on the need to maintain strict adherence to party principles in managing cadres.
Lâm emphasized the importance of upholding the party's unified leadership in personnel work, insisting on a process that is procedural, objective, transparent, democratic, and rigorous—while actively preventing unhealthy lobbying practices.
Building a capable cadre system at all levels, he said, requires not only focusing on training strategic-level officials but also strengthening grassroots leadership. Those selected for key leadership roles must meet strict standards of political integrity, ethics, practical competence, innovative thinking, accountability, public service commitment, and a clear developmental vision.
Reflecting this approach, the party Central Committee has decided to impose disciplinary measures as follows:
The Committee also approved Đỗ Đức Duy stepping down from his position as a member of the 13th Party Central Committee, and for Võ Chí Công to leave his post as an alternate member of the Committee.
These decisions mark a significant escalation in the Party’s ongoing campaign to tighten discipline and restore trust in leadership at all levels.
Vietnamese leadership was reportedly "surprised, disappointed, and angered" by President Donald Trump’s abrupt announcement of a 20% reciprocal tariff on Vietnamese goods, made via his Truth Social account on July 2. The decision came after rounds of trade negotiations between the U.S. and Vietnam, culminating in a phone call with Vietnamese President Tô Lâm.
According to Politico, Trump’s plan includes a 20% tariff on Vietnamese exports, a 40% tariff on transshipped goods—those allegedly rerouted through the country from third countries such as China—and a requirement that it open its markets entirely to U.S. goods at zero tariffs. Vietnamese officials had anticipated a ceiling of 11%, making the final terms far more severe than expected.
Sources quoted by Bloomberg and Politico noted concerns among ASEAN members, where the complexity of tariffs and a lack of clear legal definitions—particularly for determining transshipped goods—raise compliance costs and legal risks for Vietnamese exporters.
Despite the harsh terms, Radio Free Asia (RFA) Vietnamese reports that the tariff gap between Việt Nam and China may revive Vietnam’s comparative advantage, potentially attracting more investment and supply chain relocation—especially in supporting industries. Chinese firms have already begun expanding operations in Việt Nam to adapt.
However, in an interview with RFA Vietnamese, Dr. Nguyễn Huy Vũ (from Norway) cautions that Vietnam’s role remains limited to final assembly with little control over core technology. Without leveraging foreign direct investment to boost domestic innovation and supporting industries, Việt Nam risks remaining at the bottom of the global value chain. Even with administrative reforms, Dr. Vũ warned, Việt Nam won’t seize this opportunity if the same outdated personnel stay in power.
Meanwhile, Trump’s administration also announced retaliatory tariffs for several other countries, including Brazil (50%), Sri Lanka (30%), Algeria (30%), Thailand (36%), Libya (30%), the Philippines (20%), and Indonesia (19%)—with some facing lower rates than Vietnam.
On July 14, the Supreme People’s Procuracy of Việt Nam issued an indictment against Phạm Thái Hà, former deputy chief of the National Assembly Office, for abuse of power for personal gain under Article 358 of the 2015 Penal Code (amended in 2017). He is one of 29 individuals prosecuted in connection with widespread corruption involving the Thuận An Group, a major construction and infrastructure contractor.
The indictment alleges that the Thuận An Group secured numerous major infrastructure contracts across various provinces—including Bắc Giang, Tuyên Quang, Quảng Ninh, and the capital city Hà Nội—and under the Ministry of Transport. Key projects include:
Investigators say Nguyễn Duy Hưng, chairman of Thuận An Group, exploited personal connections with high-level government officials—including Phạm Thái Hà—to manipulate the bidding process. Hà allegedly used his political influence to pressure local and ministerial leaders into favoring Thuận An in project awards, effectively smoothing the way for the company to win bids and benefit illicitly.
The Supreme People’s Procuracy concluded that this collusion resulted in illegitimate profits for Thuận An and its consortium partners, causing over 120.4 billion đồng ($4.7 million) in losses to the state budget.
Specifically, Phạm Thái Hà is accused of using his position to influence provincial leaders in Bắc Giang, helping Thuận An secure contracts there. His actions alone are estimated to have caused nearly 97 billion đồng in state losses.
This case underscores again the deep entanglement of political influence and corporate interests in Vietnam’s infrastructure sector, with high-ranking officials now facing legal reckoning for abuse of power.
On July 12, Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính issued Directive No. 20/CT-TTg, ordering Hanoi to ban all gasoline-powered motorcycles and scooters from entering the Ring Road 1 area starting July 1, 2026. The directive outlines a phased transition away from fossil fuel vehicles in urban centers as part of Vietnam’s green transportation agenda.
The policy further aims to restrict private gasoline-powered cars within Ring Roads 1 and 2 by Jan. 1, 2028, and ban all personal fossil-fueled vehicles within Ring Road 3 by 2030.
To discourage continued use of polluting vehicles, the directive also calls for a review of increased fees for vehicle registration, license plates, and parking within central urban areas for fossil-fuel vehicles.
Although a 2017 resolution by the Hà Nội People's Council previously hinted at restricting gas-powered motorbikes, the latest move has reignited public debate. State media reports suggest public support for cleaner transportation and environmental goals.
However, reactions on Vietnamese social media, as reported by Luật Khoa Magazine, show a different picture: widespread anxiety, skepticism, and frustration over the feasibility and motives of the plan.
There is suspected corporate favoritism, with many citizens alleging that VinFast, the electric vehicle company owned by billionaire Phạm Nhật Vượng, stands to benefit most.
There are fears of a transportation crisis, as Hà Nội’s public transit system remains underdeveloped and unprepared for a large-scale shift away from motorbikes.
There are public doubts about electric vehicles being seen as a silver bullet given the unresolved issues around power supply, charging infrastructure, fire risks, and battery recycling.
On July 14, Hà Nội Vice Chairman Dương Đức Tuấn announced supporting measures to help roughly 450,000 motorbike users in the affected zone transition to electric vehicles.
While the directive mentions only Hà Nội by name, Hồ Chí Minh City (HCMC) is also advancing a similar plan. According to a draft proposal by the HCMC Institute for Development Studies (HIDS), starting in early 2026, gas-powered motorbikes will be ineligible for registration as ride-hailing vehicles. By early 2029, the city plans to ban all ride-hailing drivers from using gasoline-powered motorbikes.
As Việt Nam moves toward electrification of urban mobility, both cities are now racing against time to deliver the infrastructure, policy support, and public trust required to make the transition successful.
On July 14, Việt Nam’s Ministry of Public Security announced the prosecution of 18 individuals in a sweeping corruption case involving bribery, document forgery, and regulatory abuse tied to the Department of Food Safety under the Ministry of Health.
The investigation centers on TSL Science Co. and the Herbitech functional food scandal, where authorities discovered that Herbitech used fake testing certificates issued by TSL to register substandard health supplements. This triggered a broader inquiry into fraudulent approvals across the health supplement sector.
Among the 15 officials charged with accepting bribes are high-ranking figures from the Ministry of Health:
According to investigators, these officials collectively received over 75 billion đồng in bribes to illegally approve over 10,000 product registration documents. Former Director Nguyễn Thanh Phong is accused of pocketing more than 60 billion đồng between 2015 and 2024. He admitted that during inspection visits, subordinates routinely handed him envelopes containing “thank you” money from companies under review.
The scandal centers on a key regulatory step: before health supplements can be manufactured, they must be certified by the Department of Food Safety. Investigators found that officials routinely accepted bribes to overlook violations, enabling both initial approval and post-market inspections of unqualified products.
The case has broader public health implications. Authorities allege that the corruption enabled the mass production and distribution of fake or substandard health supplements, many targeting vulnerable populations such as the elderly, children, and pregnant women.
Among the companies implicated is MegaPhaco, whose director Nguyễn Năng Mạnh allegedly paid bribes to obtain four food safety certifications and 207 product registration approvals for supplements produced at his two factories: MediPhar and MediUSA. With the backing of compromised ministry officials, MegaPhaco and its partners launched over 900 health supplement products into the market.
The Ministry of Public Security emphasized that the actions of these officials have seriously undermined public trust and put consumer health at risk. The case is one of the most significant corruption crackdowns in Việt Nam’s healthcare and consumer safety sectors in recent years. Further investigations and prosecutions are ongoing.
On July 11, the Hà Nội People’s Court sentenced Nguyễn Văn Hậu (also known as Hậu “Pháo”), chairman of the Phúc Sơn Group, to 30 years in prison for accounting violations, bid rigging, and bribery. The trial involved 41 defendants, including former provincial leaders. Notable sentences include: Hoàng Thị Thúy Lan, ex-sparty secretary of Vĩnh Phúc, 14 years; Lê Duy Thành, former Vĩnh Phúc chairman, 12 years; Cao Khoa, former Quảng Ngãi chairman, 7 years; and Phạm Văn Vọng, former Vĩnh Phúc party secretary, 3 years.
According to BBC News Vietnamese, on July 12, Mai Hoàng, director of the HCMC Police Department, was promoted from major general to lieutenant general—less than two years after his last promotion in December 2023. This rapid rise appears to bypass Article 22 of the 2018 Law on the People’s Public Security, which mandates a minimum of four years between general-level promotions. Under Decree 184/ND-CP, he would not qualify for early promotion until late 2025. Notably, Vietnamese state media has remained silent on both his promotion and his earlier appointment as HCMC police chief.
As of the latest official count, 35 people have died and four individuals are missing in the aftermath of a disaster that caused a tourist boat carrying 53 passengers to capsize on July 19 during Storm Wipha in Hạ Long Bay, around 200 km northeast of Hà Nội. Most of the passengers are from Hà Nội, though nationalities remain unconfirmed. Emergency crews are continuing search operations. Storm Wipha, the third typhoon of the season in the South China Sea, brought high winds, heavy rain, and lightning, disrupting flights at Nội Bài Airport.
On July 16, the Ministry of Public Security officially assumed the role of state capital representative in FPT Telecom, taking over from the State Capital Investment Corp.. The transfer aligns with party and government directives to strengthen the ministry’s capacity in safeguarding national security, particularly in cybersecurity, telecommunications, and information infrastructure. Founded in 1997, FPT Telecom is one of Vietnam’s leading internet and telecom providers. Earlier, on Feb. 27, the ministry also took control of the state stake in MobiFone, signaling a broader consolidation of telecom assets under security authorities.
On July 1, the government issued Decree 189/2025, granting commune-level police chiefs the authority to impose administrative fines up to 50% of the maximum penalty, equating to the powers of provincial police directors. In parallel, Circular 53/2025 authorizes commune police to conduct unannounced residential inspections, during which they may collect data on registration, residency management and impose fines for violations. The measures significantly expand local police power in administrative enforcement and the monitoring of citizens.
Fulcrum/Lê Hồng Hiệp/July 14
“On 2 July 2025, US President Donald Trump announced a new US–Vietnam trade deal, declaring that 'Vietnam will pay the United States a 20% tariff on any and all goods sent into our territory, and a 40% tariff on any transshipping.' While the deal's specifics are still being finalised, the ‘transshipping’ provision, which apparently targets goods from China that are routed through Vietnam to evade higher US tariffs, has raised concerns in Hanoi about potential retaliation from Beijing.
What constitutes ‘transshipping’ in President Trump’s announcement remains ambiguous, creating uncertainty about its economic impact on Vietnam and broader Vietnam–China relations. ... Vietnam is highly reliant on Chinese inputs and intermediate goods, especially in key export sectors like electronics and textiles. As such, if a broader definition is applied and the US sets a low threshold for Chinese content to trigger the ‘transshipping’ clause, a much larger share of Vietnam’s exports to the US could be subject to the 40 per cent tariff rate.
Both America’s insistence on curbing the Chinese transshipment practice and China’s threats of retaliation reflect the broader dynamics of US‑China economic and strategic rivalry, an intensifying contest in which smaller countries like Vietnam are caught in the middle. Vietnam, whose economy depends heavily on the US as an export market and China for critical inputs, has limited room to manoeuvre.”
Thanh Tâm wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luat Khoa Magazine on May 7, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh
Bảo Khánh wrote this article in Vietnamese, published in Luật Khoa Magazine on May 12, 2025. June 2018 will go
Hoàng Mai wrote this article in Vietnamese, published in Luật Khoa Magazine on March 21, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated
Key Events * Việt Nam Faces International Scrutiny Over Political Repression at the Review of the International Covenant on Civil and
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