'Rebuilding While in Motion': How Party Directives Are Sidelining Việt Nam's Constitution

Hoàng Mai wrote this article in Vietnamese, published in Luật Khoa Magazine on March 21, 2025. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

Việt Nam has been pursuing a significant overhaul of its local government and Constitution under the approach of “rebuilding while in motion.” This ambitious strategy, however, raises fundamental questions about its feasibility, constitutionality, and respect for the democratic rights of the people. 

The 2013 Constitution itself provides the framework for this debate, with its preamble stating that, "The People of Việt Nam build, implement, and defend this Constitution for the goals of a prosperous people, a strong country, democracy, justice, and civilization."

This principle is echoed in Article 119, which affirms:

1.  “The Constitution is the fundamental law of the Socialist Republic of Việt Nam and holds the highest legal authority,” and
2. “The National Assembly, its agencies, the President, the Government, the People’s Courts, the People’s Procuracies, other State bodies, and all citizens are responsible for defending the Constitution.”

However, this foundational structure is being tested. A central concern is whether the Politburo is encroaching upon the powers of the National Assembly in deciding constitutional amendments. This potential overstep raises these questions about the entire process: What does this mean for the legitimacy of a revised Constitution, and how can such a deviation from established procedure be corrected?

Party-Led, People-Less

The Politburo's Conclusion 127, issued on Feb. 28, 2025, outlines a plan to reorganize Việt Nam’s political system that firmly places Party directives above constitutional and legal norms. This top-down approach is most evident in its timeline, which positions constitutional amendment not as a foundational prerequisite, but as the final step after the Party has already finalized major government restructuring.

The outlined roadmap dictates the following sequence:

1. Merging administrative units at the provincial and communal levels while eliminating the district level.
2. Restructuring mass organizations and socio-political entities following the merger.
3. Reorganizing the local Party apparatus to fit the new structure.
4. Restructuring local courts and procuracies to align with the new administrative model.
5. Continuing with military organizational reforms.
6. Only then, reviewing and amending Party regulations, the Constitution, and national laws to ratify these changes.

In effect, the Party is tasking its own internal committees—within the National Assembly, the Government, and the Ministry of Justice—with drafting constitutional amendments. These proposals were submitted to the Politburo in early March 2025 and finalized no later than June 30, 2025. 

While the political will demonstrated in Conclusion 127 is clear, such determination must operate within constitutional bounds, which require public consultation and National Assembly approval before these sweeping changes are decided.

What the Constitution Actually Requires

The process detailed in the Politburo's Conclusion 127 starkly contrasts with the unambiguous requirements of the 2013 Constitution. Article 110 mandates that the' formation, dissolution, or merging of administrative units must be subject to public consultation and follow established legal procedures. 

Furthermore, Article 120 lays out a multi-stage path for any constitutional amendment. It requires that proposals come from the President, the National Assembly Standing Committee, the Government, or at least one-third of Assembly members, and at least two-thirds of the Assembly must approve any amendment. 

Therefore, the plan to eliminate the district level and merge provinces legally requires public input and strong parliamentary consensus.

The process is designed to be deliberative. Following initial approval, a Constitutional Drafting Committee must be formed to draft the new text, organize public consultations, and present the revisions for a final vote. The Constitution demands that the public have a significant voice before any change becomes law.

Yet, these mandated public consultations are conspicuously absent from Conclusion 127. The only gesture toward this requirement is a vague phrase in its “Purpose and Requirements” section, which calls for the process to be “objective, democratic, scientific, specific, in-depth, open-minded, and aligned with reality.” 

This single line is offered in place of any actual plan for public engagement, a fact made clear by the proposed timeline. Likewise, the period from February to June 2025 is far too compressed to allow for the meaningful public consultation the Constitution demands.

A Party Directive, Not a Legal Mandate

It is crucial to establish that Conclusion 127 holds no legal authority. As an internal directive of the Communist Party, it does not legally bind state institutions. While the Party is entitled to conduct research and develop proposals that serve its reform vision, it must follow the process clearly stated in the Constitution to turn that political vision into law.

The process is no longer an internal matter for the Party. After the Politburo's Conclusion, the issue must be brought before the National Assembly, where its constitutional role—and the role of the people through public consultation as per Articles 110 and 120—begins.

The Politburo still has time to handle this correctly by presenting its reform proposals as a constitutional issue for the National Assembly to debate and decide upon. This is a critical moment for the people, intellectuals, and the Assembly to seriously uphold the supreme legal value of the 2013 Constitution, which was passed after many heated discussions over a decade ago.

The Party’s Will vs. the People’s Power

The duty of implementing and protecting the Constitution falls to the people, intellectuals, and the National Assembly; it is deeply concerning when legal experts appear to sidestep this responsibility. Surprisingly, some jurists have publicly contributed opinions on reforming the state apparatus according to the Politburo’s direction, without first raising the question of whether the amendment process itself is constitutional.

For example, state media has quoted Associate Professor Dr. Tô Văn Hòa, Vice President of Hà Nội Law University, making detailed proposals for reform, but not on the constitutionality of the process. If legal experts do not champion the constitutional process, who else can be expected to speak up? This raises further questions about the role of the press. 

Is this a case of incomplete reporting, or have jurists who questioned the process simply not been reported on by state media? Either possibility is troubling.

This situation reinforces the central argument: the current amendment process violates the Constitution, driven by a mentality that places the Party above the law and the people. The Party's decisions, especially on reforms of this magnitude, require the people's consensus. That legitimacy can only be earned through the constitutional process, not by bypassing it.

Legitimacy Comes from Respecting the Process

In 2013, the National Assembly Office, in partnership with the United Nations and Việt Nam National University, published a Vietnamese translation of the “Practical Guide to Constitution Building” from International IDEA. The guide emphasizes a universal democratic principle: the legitimacy of a constitution is determined as much by its creation process as by its final content.

It is time for Việt Nam's leaders to revisit these lessons, especially on how to conduct the meaningful public consultations required under Articles 110 and 120. Only by embracing a transparent and participatory process can Việt Nam ensure that any changes to its highest law are politically driven, legally sound, and democratically grounded.