Freedom of Expression in Việt Nam - Final Part: Whose Voice Is Heard? Press, Protest, and Assembly in the Country Today

Lê Giang wrote this Vietnamese article, published in Luật Khoa Magazine on June 12, 2025. 

As Việt Nam enters what some have described as a new “era of rising ambition,” a fundamental question remains: can its people speak in their own voices? Although the 2013 Constitution was initially seen as a progressive step for human rights, including freedom of expression, a significant gap persists between its written guarantees and real-world practice.

The true openness of a society is revealed through the evolution and current implementation of three core pillars of expression: the press, assembly, and protest.

On Press Freedom and Media Legislation

On Dec. 28, 1989,  Việt Nam established its first dedicated legal framework for journalism with the enactment of the country’s Press Law (Law No. 29-LCT/HĐNN8). From the outset, the right to establish a media outlet was restricted to state-run or state-controlled organizations.

Nearly three decades later, on April 5, 2016, the National Assembly passed a new Press Law (Law No. 103/2016/QH13) to replace the 1989 version, which took effect in January 2017. This new legislation continued to affirm the Communist Party’s guiding role over the media and more clearly defined journalists’ responsibilities under Article 9, which prohibits acts such as spreading “false information,” “inciting ethnic division,” or “distorting history.” 

Despite official claims that  Việt Nam enjoys 'freedom of the press,' the legal framework explicitly prohibits private media ownership (however in reality, there was private media ownership), with Article 14 of the 2016 law requiring all press agencies to be affiliated with a state institution.

Just two years after the updated Press Law, the National Assembly passed the 2018 Cybersecurity Law, which took effect on Jan. 1, 2019. This legislation significantly tightened control over online expression, and authorities began to heavily regulate news content and social media activities under the pretext of “protecting national security.”

At the same time, the media became a key target in the state’s broader crackdown on freedom of expression, a campaign that intensified under the leadership of Nguyễn Phú Trọng.

In the years that followed, the number of cases labeled as 'national security' violations rose significantly, particularly those involving the exercise of democratic freedoms, with investigations often initiated by the Ministry of Public Security.

Now, eight years after the 2016 Press Law took effect, the government has made no moves to amend or expand press rights in a more pluralistic direction. Any legislative discussions on the subject, if they exist at all, continue to be held behind closed doors and remain inaccessible to the public.

On Feb. 10, 2025, the full text of a draft amended Press Law was published on the government’s official website, with the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) opening it to public consultation. While this major overhaul is intended to address outdated provisions in the 2016 law, it also aims to further institutionalize the Communist Party’s policies. The draft positions the press to take on an even more prominent role in promoting Party ideology, with Article 3 explicitly stating that only “revolutionary journalism” - meaning journalism that is solely pro-government - is permitted in Việt Nam. 

This redefines the mission of the press to be providing “truthful information about the country and the world in accordance with the interests of the nation and the people; to propagate, disseminate, and contribute to building and protecting the Party’s lines and policies.” Previous duties related to fostering international understanding and contributing to global causes have been removed.

Additionally, the draft law expands state control over cyberspace by establishing new digital oversight mechanisms. Article 30 mandates that online press activities must comply with laws governing both journalism and cybersecurity. To enforce this, the state will invest in “digital tools” to monitor and regulate journalism in cyberspace. The draft also requires online platforms and aggregated news sites to enter into formal “agreements” if they wish to use content produced by official news agencies.

On the Right to Peaceful Assembly

Following the Đổi Mới (Renovation) period in the end of 1986, a multitude of social associations and professional organizations were established in Việt Nam. However, civil space remained tightly controlled, as all groups were required to have a supervising state authority and receive government approval to operate.

To this day, Việt Nam has yet to enact a formal Law on Associations, even though the right to form such groups was first recognized in the 1946 Constitution and reaffirmed in the 2013 Constitution (Article 25).

Instead, as of October 2024, the right to association is governed by Decree 45/2010/NĐ-CP, a sub-law document issued by then-Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng.

This decree requires all associations to register, secure a license, and operate under a supervising organization. Most significantly, it mandates that a new group cannot “duplicate the name and main field of activity of any previously established and legally recognized association within the same territorial jurisdiction.”

These rules create invisible barriers to freedom of association, trapping all organizations—from disability advocacy groups to policy-oriented bodies like the Việt Nam Union of Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA)—in a restrictive ‘request–permit’ system.

Under this legal framework, journalists at Luật Khoa Magazine have provisionally categorized associations in Việt Nam into three groups:

• First, the ‘Rooted/Affiliated’ Associations: Established by the state or its mass political organizations (e.g., the Women’s Union, the Veterans’ Association, the Journalists’ Association), these groups function as the “extended arms” of the state apparatus. They are prioritized for licensing and typically receive designated offices, state budgets, and a voice in policy matters.
• Second, the Semi-Autonomous or Professional Associations: This category includes groups such as the Architects’ Association, the Red Cross, and other field-specific professional societies. While these associations are licensed, they remain dependent on their supervising ministries. This limits their operational scope and creates difficulties if their work touches upon policy or issues the state deems “sensitive.”
• Third, the Independent Associations: Aimed at promoting bottom-up initiatives, these groups face the most significant economic, cultural, social, and political barriers. They often operate as private initiatives, scientific research institutes, or even non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

In the last group stated above, these independent groups are characterized by a distinct set of operational circumstances. They are fully dependent on government approval for establishment, yet often lack a clear supervisory body, which hampers their ability to get licenses for research, fieldwork, or policy advocacy. With no access to public funds, they are forced into financial self-reliance, which in turn leaves them vulnerable to accusations of “illegal activity” or “tax evasion.”

In practice, associations that engage in advocacy or address sensitive topics such as human rights or the environment are frequently surveilled, harassed, and penalized—both administratively and criminally—by police and security forces.

Efforts to draft a formal Law on Associations began as early as 2006, aiming to replace Decree 45/2010/NĐ-CP and restore the right to association to its constitutional standing.

After a long cycle of compromise and government hesitation, a revised draft was finally submitted to the National Assembly for discussion on Oct. 25, 2016. It contained notable progressive proposals, including allowing associations to form without a supervisory body, expanding their right to operate independently of the state budget, and recognizing their ability to form coalitions and engage in policy advocacy.

However, these proposals faced strong opposition. Concerns were  raised that the law could be “exploited by hostile forces” or lead to an “uncontrolled proliferation of associations.” Ultimately, the draft was withdrawn from the 2017 legislative agenda and has not returned to the National Assembly's docket since.

Instead of a comprehensive law, on April 8, 2024, the state issued Decree 126/2024/NĐ-CP, on governing the organization and management of associations, to replace Decree 45/2010/NĐ-CP.

In parallel with the issue of associations, the right to peaceful public assembly in Việt Nam remains unregulated by any specific law. Currently, public gatherings that disrupt public order or obstruct civil activities can be administratively punished under Decree 144/2021/NĐ-CP. This lack of a clear legal foundation for expressive assembly grants the government wide discretion in enforcement.

In contrast, other forms of assembly are governed by specific legislation. Activities such as neighborhood meetings, voter consultations, and meetings held by political–social organizations fall under laws like the 2022 Law on Grassroots Democracy and Government Decree 59/2023/NĐ-CP. However, these legal documents are oriented toward administrative management and control, rather than the recognition of assembly as a fundamental human right.

On the Right to Protest

Alongside the rights to freedoms of press and association, the right to protest in Việt Nam remains a road without a destination—perpetually unfinished. Although it has been constitutionally enshrined for nearly 80 years, the right to protest still lacks any implementing legislation. As a result, protesting remains tightly controlled by administrative and security regulations.

This legal vacuum was put on full display in the summer of 2011, when a wave of spontaneous protests erupted in Hà Nội and Hồ Chí Minh City, denouncing China’s actions in the South China Sea. Despite the demonstrations being patriotic and carrying clear viewpoints and messages, participants were dispersed, summoned for questioning, detained, or fined. In Việt Nam, no transparent legal framework exists that distinguishes between lawful protests and public disorder.

However, in the face of public pressure and the need to institutionalize constitutional rights, Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng took a notable step in 2014.

In an unprecedented move, he tasked the Ministry of Public Security with drafting a Law on Protests. This marked a significant political moment, raising hopes that the right to protest would finally be codified after decades of legislative neglect.

In response, the Ministry drafted the law and solicited feedback through multiple rounds, with state media openly reporting on related discussions among scholars, lawyers, and National Assembly members.

Regrettably, this period of open discussion ended abruptly in March 2016. Just months before the conclusion of the 13th National Assembly's term, the draft Law on Protests was postponed and removed from the legislative agenda, with the stated reason being that “more research is needed; the issue is complex and sensitive.”

Since then, there has been no indication that the law would return to the legislative agenda. It remains absent from all annual plans, draft law sessions, and parliamentary discussions, despite the right to protest being explicitly guaranteed under Article 25 of the 2013 Constitution.

This ongoing situation creates a dual consequence for the nation. On one hand, citizens are effectively denied their ability to exercise a legitimate civic right. On the other, the state deprives itself of a crucial and effective channel for receiving public feedback.