Connect with us

Human Rights

Vietnam’s Cybersecurity Draft Law: Made in China?

Published

on

Photo credit: Asia Times.

During the first part of last year’s November, the National Assembly of China passed the Law on Cybersecurity and established its effective date to be June 1, 2017.

Then come June 2017, five days after said law went into effect in China, the Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) sent their own proposal regarding a draft of the Cybersecurity Law to the Vietnamese government. It has been claimed that this draft law was the result of a legislative process which began to take place since July 2016, when the National Assembly scheduled Cybersecurity Law as one of its agenda’s items then. The MPS then also established their own drafting team and an editing group to work on the drafts of Vietnam’s Cybersecurity Law in late March this year.

After going through various collections of public comments and four draft versions of the law, the final draft (Draft Law) now is in the hands of the National Assemblymen and women. It would be among the items to be discussed when they meet at the end of 2017, and if all things go according to plan, Vietnam’s Cybersecurity Law will get approved and signed into laws by the middle of next year.

Yet, whether purposefully or unintentionally, Vietnam’s Draft Law has shocked many people because it is almost identical to that of China’s.

In their proposal submitted to the government, the MPS stressed that they have researched, and thus taken into considerations Cybersecurity laws from China, Japan, the Czech Republic, South Korea, and the U.S when drafting the Draft Law.

I have to make it clear that I do not have any evidence to conclude the Vietnamese government has indeed copied China’s Cybersecurity Law. Moreover, if both countries are functioning under an identical political system, then the use of identical legislative tools would be very understandable. This is even more likely when the MPS openly admitted that they have considered Chinese laws as stated. Besides, copying or learning from other countries’ legislative experiences do not necessarily mean negative consequences.

However, let’s just go straight to comparing Vietnam’s 4th draft of the Cybersecurity Law currently sitting on the desks of the National Assembly’s members and the English translation of the Chinese laws, to see how much they are alike to one another, and whether such similarities will bring negative consequences to Vietnamese people.

1. Two documents, one technical term

There is one technical term in the Vietnamese Draft Law that one should pay close attention to, which is the “critical information system regarding national security” in Article 9.

In the China’s version, there is a similar technical term: “critical information infrastructure” in Article 31.

Both laws centered on these two technical terms, and their definitions are also very much alike. Both are used to define any information, that if being under attack, they would bring harms to national security, social order and public safety.

That information – as mentioned in both Vietnam’s and China’s Cybersecurity Law – would then include energy, finance, transportation, media, and publications, as well as electronic governance.

However, the Draft Law of Vietnam also includes military-security, national secrets, banking, natural resources and environment, chemicals, medicine, and other national security structures.

The Draft Law also does not distinguish between private companies and government agencies when applying the concept of “critical information system regarding national security”. Based on the context of said law’s wordings, the targeted entities are implied to be both of them. The government and the enforcing authorities could also interpret this law as broad as possible.

Baker & McKenzie, in their analysis of the Chinese Cybersecurity Law, has warned all companies whose may have established relationships with those entities which fall under the regulatory perimeters of said law, that this law could very well be applicable to them.

The agencies and enterprises who are within the application of this law shall abide the technical measures and regulations as set by the government, and submit themselves to be under the direct control and observation of the MPS. They will have to obtain all necessary business permits to operate and maintain their equipment while at the same time, must cooperate with the authorities in monitoring users’ information.

These regulations between Vietnam and China are identical.

2. Directly target information considered to be dangerous to the regime

It is not surprising to learn that both Vietnam and China are extremely concerned about cybersecurity.

As detailed in the proposal from the MPS, the Draft Law of Vietnam focuses on underlining the importance of “preventing, fighting against, and neutralizing all activities using cyberspace to intrude national security; subverting against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; propagandizing to destroy the ideology, the internal affairs, and the common national unification; inciting mass protests; and obstructing cybersecurity, from the reactionary forces and those who are enemies of the State”.

Further, Article 22 of the Draft Law clearly states that the Vietnamese government would apply all necessary technical methods to treat such information.

Article 12 of the Chinese Cybersecurity Law has a similar provision when it prohibits Internet users from using “the network to engage in activities endangering national security, national honor, and interests, inciting subversion of national sovereignty, the overturn of the socialist system, inciting separatism, undermining national unity, advocating terrorism or extremism, inciting ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination, disseminating violent, obscene or sexual information, creating or disseminating false information to disrupt the economic or social order, as well as infringing on the reputation, privacy, intellectual property or other lawful rights and interests of others, and other such acts”.

3. Requiring all Internet users to provide true identity

Article 47 of the Vietnamese Draft Law specifically demands all Internet service providers to require “users to provide true and correct personal information. If any user refuses to comply, the service providers shall have the responsibility to deny that user service”.

At the same time, Internet service providers must establish their own verification system to ensure the accuracy and veracity of the information provided by the service users according to Article 33.

Article 24 of the Chinese Cybersecurity Law has the same language as those contained in the Vietnamese Draft Law’s Article 47.

Once businesses and the State can obtain users’ detailed personal information, there will be no guaranty that they would not use it for improper purposes, and would not harm such users.

4. The server is required to be localized within Vietnam’s territory and the providers will have to transmit their data overseas

This requirement has proven to be the most controversial in the past few days among the public in Vietnam.

Article 34 of the Draft Law requires “foreign corporations and providers, in order to provide telecommunications and Internet services in Vietnam, must … obtain business permits to operate, maintain a local representative agency, and the server which manages Vietnamese users’ data shall be stored within the national territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”.

Article 48 further provides, all personal information and important data concerning national security shall be stored within the national territory of Vietnam. In the event that someone wants to transfer such information overseas, then a security assessment shall be performed according to the related governmental agencies’ requirements.

These rules and regulations have caused many Vietnamese concerns, that Google, Facebook, other social media platforms, email providers, and cloud computing service providers will soon pack up and leave Vietnam’s market.

Surprisingly, Article 37 of the Chinese version also provides for similar regulations as the two above-mentioned Draft Law’s articles.

As recent as this past June, tech giant Apple had to cooperate with a Chinese corporation to invest in a database center to comply with this specific provision. Microsoft, IBM, and Amazon had complied as well.

5. Forcing users and providers to act as informants

If the Draft Law gets passed into law, Internet users, telecom and Internet providers must cooperate thoroughly with the government.

Article 45 requires those who engage in activities using cyberspace must strictly comply with the government’s guidelines and shall allow the government to enforce their cybersecurity’s measures and safeguards.

Moreover, all service providers must work with the government to provide actual identities of those Internet users, while at the same time, shall have the responsibility to fend off all information which is deemed to be detrimental to the State, according to Articles 46 and 47.

Again, we find the same regulating language in China’s Cybersecurity Law. This time is located at Article 28, which demands that “network operators shall provide technical support and assistance to public security organs’ and state security organs; lawful activities preserving national security and investigating crimes”.

6. Forcing tech companies to follow government’s technical standards

Article 46 mandates all businesses involved in the production and putting in commerce digital products, as well as providing Internet services, shall be in accordance with the provisions of laws and with the “mandatory quality assurance of State standards”, before releasing their products to the market.

The State also shall pass laws which set the standards for the hardware and software to be used with the above-mentioned technical measures, as well as make sure that the applicable entities shall comply.

This provision also serves as the legal basis for the State to enact the necessary decrees and orders, regulating the specificity of the technical measures mentioned and how to enforce such measures.

Compare to China, the Chinese government had required all new computers to be pre-installed with the automatic content-control software – Green Dam – and also forced businesses, including Google, to have this software installed on all their computers.

The fact that the Vietnamese government had become increasingly more and more interfering with the technical measures regarding the high-tech market highlights the fact that it has opened the doors for corruption and abuse of power from the MPS, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Science and Technology, and other related governmental agencies.

7. Forcing all entities that have relations with “critical information” to be evaluated by the State when buying hardware and software.

Articles 11, 16, and 48 of the Draft Law gives the MPS, the MOD, and other State’s agencies, the authority to review equipment, networks products, and services which may be related to the national critical data system before they could be put into use or upgrade.

This is similar to Article 35 of China’s Cybersecurity Law.

Accordingly, this regulation means that any governmental agency or private business – who maintains an information system which related to energy, national finance, banking, transportation, chemicals, medicine, natural resources and environment, media, news and publishing, shall go through the MPS and/or the MOD when purchasing the necessary hardware, software, Internet service provider for their operation.

It probably makes sense to see this regulation being applied to government’s agencies, but the fact that it is stepping into fields such as banking, medicine, news, and publishing, raises questions about the State’s ambition in controlling information in society at large.

These regulations would grant the police and military the all-access key to both government’s agencies’ and private businesses’ hardware and software. This would be an opportunity for them to exert pressure on other agencies, businesses, as well as putting the whole society at risk for corruption and abuse of power.

The above were only seven strikingly obvious similarities between the Vietnam’s Draft Law and China’s Cybersecurity Law. With an in-depth reading of both documents, one probably finds, even though smaller, much more alike features.

This article is translated into English by Tran Vi from the article “Dự luật An ninh mạng: Hàng Việt Nam ‘Made in China’?“ that was published on Luat Khoa magazine on November 4th, 2017.

Human Rights

Tran Huynh Duy Thuc: A Decade Behind Bars

Published

on

By

Nine years ago, on January 20, 2010, the People’s Court of Ho Chi Minh City convicted Tran Huynh Duy Thuc, Le Cong Dinh, Le Thang Long and Nguyen Tien Trung under Article 79 of the 1999 Penal Code for “subversion against the people’s government.”

Tran Huynh Duy Thuc was sentenced to 16 years in prison and five years probation which technically meant five more years under house arrest.

Thuc was arrested in May 2009, and for almost a decade, the unique case of a successful entrepreneur turned dissident continued to be the highest profile among the hundreds of political prisoners and dissidents in the country.

Article 79 has faced harsh criticisms from the international community.

During Vietnam’s 2nd UPR cycle in 2014, the Vietnamese government accepted the recommendations to amend this and other arbitrary penal codes under the “national security” section, to ensure they would not be used to infringe the people’s human rights.

However, in reality, the amended Penal Code of 2015 did not change the situation in any way. The crime “subversion against the state” remains as Article 109 under the new code.

Thuc’s indictment described his criminal conducts included the act of forming and persuading people to join the Chan research group, to write and publish online articles defaming the government, creating division among the Vietnamese Communist Party.

The prosecution further alleged that he had attempted to reach out and establish a relationship with leaders of the VCP, with the intent of re-shaping their political opinion to change the regime, and that he had planned to manufacture a document named “The Vietnam Path” to subvert against the State.

The Vietnamese government’s point of view on “subversion against the State” is often not shared by the international community, especially democratic nations in the West.

The heart of the problem lies in Section 1, Article 4 of Vietnam 2013 Constitution which states:

The Communist Party of Vietnam – the Vanguard of the Vietnamese working class, simultaneously the vanguard of labourers and of the Vietnamese nation, the faithful representative of the interests of the working class, labourers and the whole nation, acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh’s thought, is the leading force of the State and society.

Because of this political monopoly, the VCP and the State of Vietnam became interchangeable in the mind of Hanoi’s regime.

The leaders of the VCP would not hesitate in sentencing people who hold a different political philosophy than theirs to prison for decades because questioning the ultimate leadership of the Party equates “overthrowing the government.”

This viewpoint effectively puts the VCP at odds with the universal values of human rights, in particular, the right to freedom of expression where holding a different political opinion, calling for pluralism and a multi-party system cannot be deemed criminal.

In Tran Huynh Duy Thuc’s case, the defendants were also found guilty because the government further alleged that they were members of the Democratic Party and had started to write a new constitution.

As one may correctly guess, organizing a political party in Vietnam – as in Thuc’s case – could also be construed as an act to “subvert the government.”

Vietnam, at press time, has only one political party.

Thuc has received the offer to be released into exile on numerous occasions, but he turned them down, stating that he would finish his full prison term instead of having to leave his home country indefinitely.

The offer to be released into exile to political prisoners in Vietnam is not a release.

It is more like a suspension of the sentence for either medical or humanitarian reasons. The released prisoners would not be able to come back to Vietnam, effectively being banned from their own country.

When the Penal Code was amended, Thuc’s attorney has argued that the government should release him according to Section 3 of Article 109. Because at most, the evidence provided by the prosecution could only show that the defendants were in “preparation” to commit a crime under Section 3, with the maximum sentence of five years.

His petition to review the case has gone unanswered.

On December 13, 2018, Julie Ward, a Member of the European Parliament representing the North West of England, sent a letter to the President of Vietnam – Nguyen Phu Trong – (who is also the leader of the VCP), calling for an unconditional, in-country release of Tran Huynh Duy Thuc. The letter addressed the concerns over allegations from his family that he had suffered abuse in prison.

A group of the EU Parliament’s MEPs, including Ms. Ward, has stated in more than one occasion that the release of prisoners of conscience like Tran Huynh Duy Thuc would be a critical condition for them to support the EU-Vietnam FTA.

On this 9th anniversary of his conviction, U.S. House Representative Zoe Lofgren also called for Tran Huynh Duy Thuc’s release and denounced the mistreatment of political prisoners by Vietnamese authorities.

Continue Reading

Land's Right

Timeline Of The Loc Hung Garden Incident

Published

on

By

Loc Hung Garden After the Forced Removal on January 8, 2019. Photo Courtesy: Facebook Nguyen Tri Dung.

The forced eviction at Loc Hung vegetable garden in Saigon on January 4 and 8, 2019 joined the long list of land disputes between the people and the State of Vietnam. We are putting together a timeline of events that have happened to date and will continue to update as this story develops.

December 20, 2018

News about a possible forced eviction came about on December 20, 2018, on social media. Blogger and human rights activist, Pham Doan Trang, reported on her Facebook that according to the residents at Loc Hung, 50 local police officers from different forces in Ward 6 of District Tan Binh showed up at the garden area, demanding the residents to allow them to perform an administrative check. By 1:30 p.m., the police withdrew.

December 29, 2018

The People’s Committee of Ward 6 issued an announcement, stating that they would begin a forced removal of all illegal constructions that were built after January 1, 2018, which also notified the residents that the time for such removal would take place within 90 days from January 2, 2019. It is unclear if all residents received the announcement.

January 3, 2019

During the night of January 1, 2019, the residents announced on social media that the local authorities have brought in barbed wires, frequency disrupting machine, forklifts, and bulldozers to the garden’s area.

January 4, 2019

At daybreak, a group of some 400 people from different police and security forces showed up at Loc Hung and began to block street access to the garden, starting from the Bay Hien intersection to Thanh Thai and To Hien Thanh streets. The removal of some 40 houses lasted from 7:30 A.M. until 6:00 P.M., during which time 20 people were arrested and taken to the Ward 6’s police station for opposing it.

The residents insisted that they had never received any order for such removal.

January 7, 2019

During the night, hundreds of police officers and civil security personnel were ordered to go to Loc Hung where the public speakers – on high volume – were announcing the government would only remove illegally built constructions. Cao Ha Chanh, one of the persons serving on the board of representatives for the families living at Loc Hung, recalled that the removing force still did not provide the people with any legal documents regarding the order to remove before they started to take down the homes.

January 8, 2019

Starting at 5:30 a.m., approximately 1.000 officers from different police forces and others entered Loc Hung garden. Similar to what happened on January 4, 2019, the authorities blocked off the streets leading to the area by putting up the barbed wires. To gain entry, people must show the police their identification. As soon as they arrived, they began arresting those residents identified as “leaders” in the community, including Cao Ha Truc.

Electricity and internet were cut off in the area. By 7:30 A.M., the forklifts and excavators were put to work as the authorities began to tear down the residents’ homes. By the end of the day, all of the houses at Loc Hung garden were demolished. The residents estimated there were about 200 homes.

Among the now homeless people were some 20 disabled veterans who served in the former South of Vietnam’s military who do not have a family and they were being taken care of by the residents and the priests from the Redemptorists Church.

On the same day, Amnesty International – Southeast Asia office – publicly denounced the Vietnamese government’s decision to remove the houses forcefully belong to Loc Hung’s residents.

January 9, 2019

In the early hours of the day, the police released Cao Ha Truc and other residents who got arrested the day before.

The Ho Chi Minh City Police Department’s newspaper was among the first state-owned media reported on the removal of Loc Hung Garden’s houses, which the government estimated to be around 120 in total. Accordingly, the People’s Committee of Ward 6 stated that the removal of the illegal constructions was carried out under proper legal procedures.

January 10, 2019

Tuoi Tre and a few others also reported the story, mostly to allow the District Tan Binh’s authorities to make their argument public, that they have only “enforced the removal of illegal constructions on a public area and not a forced eviction in a land recovery matter.”

Further, the People’s Committee of Tan Binh District confirmed with the media that they had followed the proper legal procedures when organizing the enforcement team to take down a total of 112 construction projects without a permit at Loc Hung between January 4-9, 2019.

January 11, 2019

Chris Hayes, a Labor Party’s member of the Australian Parliament, and a Vietnamese-Australian bishop, Vincent Nguyen Van Long, both called on the Vietnamese government to cease from enforcing the removal of Loc Hung resident’s houses, stating that it is a violation of the people’s freedom of religion and belief.

On the same day, the Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Ho Chi Minh City division, Nguyen Thien Nhan spoke about Loc Hung for the first time.

VnExpress quoted him saying: “there are many things which should be normal, but those who are plotting against the government would still abuse them to incite (others). As seen in a few cases in 2018, the city had learned from our experience so that we would not confront the people, but we will use propaganda activities to let them understand.”

January 12, 2019

The local authorities put up a large panel in the area, announcing a public construction was going to be developed after the removal team had flattened out the entire Loc Hung vegetable garden. On the same day, some of the residents met with a group of lawyers who have expressed interest in providing legal assistance.

January 13, 2019

The Committee for assistance in the development project regarding the public school at Ward 6, District Tan Binh, HCM City (the project to be developed at Loc Hung) announced the assistance policy that the District was going to be provided for those who were farming on the land. Accordingly, on January 10, 2019, the People’s Committee of HCM City approved the assistance proposal for those who have been using the land at Loc Hung garden for agriculture purpose at the rate of 7,055,000 VND/m2.

Attorney Trinh Vinh Phuc published a few photographs of the documents provided by the residents of Loc Hung in support of their claim for legal possession of the land.

January 14, 2019

At 9:00 A.M. a group of religious leaders of the Interfaith Council together with some of the priests from the Redemptorists Church in Saigon went to visit the residents of Loc Hung. In the afternoon, Bishop Paolo Nguyen Thai Hop also came to visit at around 3:00 P.M. During both the morning and afternoon visits of these religious leaders, the local government used loud public speakers to interfere with their prayers and speeches to the residents.

Summary of Factual Disputes Regarding Loc Hung:

The disputed land consists of 4.8 hectares in Ward 6, District Tan Binh, which includes parcels 126-5, 128-5, 129-5, and 131-101-5 according to the No. 12 Map (of the old recordings). The location of the land is as follows: the North West touches Alley 9/24 Cach Mang Thang Tam Street, the South West touches Hung Hoa Street, The South East touches Chan Hung Street, and the North East touches the current existing residence.

The People’s Committee of Tan Binh District claims this land is public because, before April 30, 1975, it was under the management and control of the former Republic of South Vietnam’s Department of Telecommunication and was used as a telecommunication tower. After April 30, 1975, the new government took control of the land according to Decision 111/CP dated April 14, 1977, issued by the Government Council, and continued to use the telecommunication tower.

On the contrary, Loc Hung’s residents claim that the original owner before April 30, 1975, was the Catholics Church of Vietnam who had granted them the right to farm on such land. After April 30, 1975, the residents continued to live and farm on the land undisrupted and without dispute with other people. After the Law on Land 1993 took effect in Vietnam, the residents have been petitioning the government in almost 20 years for the right to possess and usage of the land. However, the government did not respond to their petitions.

(To Be Continued)

References:

Loc Hung Vegetable Garden Continues To Be Harrassed (RFA-Vietnamese)

Loc Hung Vegetable Garden “Devasted after Forced Removal” (BBC-Vietnamese)

Loc Hung Vegetable Garden Under Siege (BBC-Vietnamese)

Forced Removal of 110 Households Was Done According to Law (HCM City Police Department Newspaper)

Forced Removal of 112 Illegally Constructed Houses in The Vegetable Garden (Tuoi Tre)

Tan Binh District Speaks About the Forced Removal at ‘Loc Hung Vegetable Garden’(Vietnamnet)

Australian MP and Vietnamese-Australian Bishop Speaks Up About Loc Hung Incident (RFA-Vietnamese)

HCM City Forced Removal of 112 Houses Built on Public Land (VNExpress)

Tan Binh District Provides More than 7M VND/m2 in Assistance for Loc Hung Vegetable Garden (Tuoi Tre)

Continue Reading

Human Rights

Vietnam Rings In 2019 with More Restrictions on Citizens’ Freedoms

Published

on

By

During the last week of December 2018, Vietnam’s state-owned newspapers flooded the country’s social media with articles on rules and tips for writing and blogging in a new era of internet usage, all in preparation for the 2018 Cybersecurity Law taking effect on New Year’s Day.

In the days leading to the country’s cyber D-day, on December 30, 2018, with the headlines “How to Write to Express your Political Opinion on the Internet without Violating the Law?” Tuoi Tre online newspaper essentially summarized the ultimate paradox for people living under one of the most repressive countries around the world.

While the article elicits opinions from a wide range of interviewees, from intellects and heads of certain IT firms to regular social media users, they all repeat the same government’s mantra: practice self-censorship and avoid criticism of the Party and the state, so that you can have the right to express yourself.

Like the headlines itself, the “opinion” of the group of people interviewed in this article seems to be blissfully ignorant of the international standards for freedom of expression, in particular, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, where a government not only cannot criminalize people for stating their political opinions but is also not allowed to censor them.

It is not surprising that the article of Tuoi Tre did not consider critical opinions of the government to be worthy of political opinions and instead endorsed the same old government’s propaganda which had been recycled throughout the past seven decades, that one could have an opinion about anything in Vietnam, except those that criticize the Party and the government. After all, all newspapers in the country are considered to be the arms and legs of that propaganda machine.

Another leading newspaper in Vietnam, Thanh Nien, also published an article on December 29, 2018, warning people to steer clear of “The 14 Ways to Violate the New Cybersecurity Law” with the first paragraph declaring the use of social media “to gather and call on other people to incite disorder” among the prohibited acts. The language of this paragraph is nothing new; it is the same as Decree 38 which has been used for regulating public gatherings in Vietnam, an ordinance that legal experts in the country have repeatedly questioned its constitutionality since its issuance in 2005.

Praising the accomplishments of the Party and the state, as well as reciting their propaganda, are not only welcome but also considered to be parts of the Vietnamese journalists’ obligations according to the “Code of Conduct” published by the Vietnamese Journalists Association (VJA).

The VJA, however, is an organization formed by the government according to its Media and Press Law of 2016 (link in Vietnamese), and these obligations are statutory. The Vietnamese authorities may think that by legislating journalists’ conducts, it would give them the appearance of a society that respects the rule of law. However, in reality, perhaps the only thing such laws could further demonstrate would probably be the systematic abuse of press freedom in the country.

Nevertheless, the Vietnamese government is now ready to roll out the “code of model behaviors” for people who use social media in the new year, and the VJA has taken an extra step this past week with the announcement of its “Eight Rules for Journalists to Behave on Social Media” on December 25, 2018.

Among others, most notably is the requirement that journalists are not to “post any news, articles, pictures, or audio recordings on social media or repost speech and opinions in opposition to the way, policy, and guideline of the Party or the State.”

Not stopping at that, the new rules for journalists according to the VJA also require that while online, they are not going to “comment, give an opinion or share any information which contains the purpose of inciting or engaging others to react negatively, as well as those issues that are political, economic, cultural, societal, relating to defense security, and external affairs,…with complexity and sensitivity which need consensus as well as positive and constructive observation and behaviors for society”.

Effectively, the new arbitrarily worded regulations for journalists, when being applied together with the new cybersecurity bill, could mean that the sharing of any information considered to be critical of a proposed law, such as the still pending draft bill on the Special Economic Zones which ignited the nationwide protests in June 2018 for example, may be deemed illegal and criminal by the government starting in 2019.

At the same time, state-owned media in Vietnam also welcomed the news of the CP-TPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) taking effect at the end of December 2018. In the new year, Vietnam continues to push for the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement to be ratified by the EU Parliament in March 2019. Both of these trade agreements demand serious improvement on the human rights situation in Vietnam, directly and indirectly.

However, in 2018, The 88 Project reported:

– Vietnam arrested 103 people (up from 43 in 2017)
– 120 activists were tried
– At least 22 of those who tried were females
– 35 had known religious affiliations
– 11 were sentenced to between 10 and 14 years
– Two received the sentence of between 15 and 19 years
– One person, Le Dinh Luong, was sentenced to 20 years

In total, 210 people are serving jail sentences for their peaceful activism in Vietnam with 19 more await trial.

Whether the Vietnamese government will yield to international pressure and improve its human rights records, or follows through and starts enforcing the new suppressive law on bloggers and journalists in 2019, the message from the activists’ community is unanimous: they will continue to write and express their opinions regardless. Before the Cybersecurity Law of 2018, Vietnam already has enough penal codes to send their political dissidents to prison for a long time.

Continue Reading

Trending