Key Events * Việt Nam’s 14th Party Congress Signals a New Phase of Power Consolidation; * Party Leadership Flags Charter Reform
Few postwar European narratives have proven as enduring as the claim that during the Indochina War (1946-1954), the French Foreign
The 14th Party Congress has settled one of its most consequential activities: the election of the new Central Committee of
The 14th National Party Congress concluded on Jan. 23, 2026, with personnel decisions that clarify the country’s political direction for the next five years, reinforcing continuity at the top while tightening control within the Communist Party’s core institutions.
Following the Congress and the First Plenum of the newly elected Central Committee, the 14th Politburo and Secretariat were formally announced, revealing a leadership structure that places unprecedented emphasis on party discipline, internal coordination, and security oversight.
At the center of the new configuration is Tô Lâm, who was re-elected as general secretary, cementing his dominance within the party hierarchy. His reappointment signals continuity of recent trends that prioritize centralized authority and the growing role of the security apparatus in political governance.
Alongside him, Trần Cẩm Tú was re-elected as standing secretary of the Secretariat, a position that has gained heightened importance under revised party rules. The pairing places both ideological leadership and day-to-day party operations firmly within a closely aligned inner circle.
The newly unveiled Politburo consists of 19 members, forming the highest decision-making body between party congresses. The lineup reflects strong institutional continuity, with senior figures responsible for the military, public security, party organization, and the legislature retaining central roles.
Key members include leaders from the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Public Security, and the National Assembly, underscoring the enduring influence of state security and administrative institutions within the party’s power structure.
One of the most striking features of the new Politburo is its gender imbalance. Bùi Thị Minh Hoài is the sole woman among the 19 members, making her the only female figure at the apex of party power in this term. Her inclusion highlights both her political standing and the broader limitations of female representation at the highest levels of Vietnam’s leadership, despite years of official commitments to gender equality.
The Secretariat of the 14th term was also formally announced, with Trần Cẩm Tú retaining his role as Standing Secretary. The Secretariat is expected to play a more assertive role in supervising party discipline and implementing Central Committee decisions, further strengthening internal control mechanisms.
Observers note that this structure reduces the space for competing power centers within the party and reinforces vertical accountability.
Equally notable are the absences. Several senior state officials did not secure seats in the new Central Committee, effectively excluding them from the top tier of party decision-making. Their future roles now depend on upcoming National Assembly sessions, where key state positions, including the presidency and premiership, are expected to be confirmed or reshuffled.
Taken together, the outcomes of the 14th Party Congress suggest a political system moving toward tighter consolidation rather than broad-based renewal. With power concentrated in a smaller, more cohesive leadership core, the next five years are likely to be defined by heightened internal discipline, limited elite turnover, and a continued emphasis on political stability over institutional pluralism.
In the immediate aftermath of the 14th National Party Congress, the Communist Party leadership has announced plans to study and propose revisions to the Party Charter (Điều lệ Đảng) “right from the beginning of the term,” setting the stage for potential structural and institutional reform that could shape political governance and internal party practice through the end of the decade.
The announcement was made at the closing session of the Congress on Jan. 23 and reinforced during the first meeting of the newly elected Central Committee for the 2026–2030 term.
At the final session of the Congress in Hà Nội, Trần Cẩm Tú, the newly reaffirmed standing secretary of the Secretariat, told delegates that the Central Committee will launch a comprehensive review of the Party Charter as a priority task early in the term.
This review will include summarizing and evaluating 15 years of experience under the current 2011 Charter, identifying obstacles and implementation challenges, and then proposing directions for substantive additions and revisions within 2026.
The Party Charter serves as the foundational legal and organizational framework for the Communist Party of Vietnam, outlining its goals, principles, internal structure, membership rules, and decision-making procedures.
Amending this document could have far-reaching implications for governance norms, the distribution of power among the party’s leading organs, and the mechanisms for accountability and leadership selection.
While the Charter can legally be amended at a Party Congress, the leadership’s choice to initiate research into revisions soon after the Congress rather than defer the discussion suggests an urgency to address internal procedural issues and adapt to evolving political and socio-economic conditions.
This move follows broad consultation prior to the Congress: the draft report summarizing 15 years of implementation of the current Charter was discussed by the previous Central Committee over multiple plenary sessions and further refined with inputs from millions of party members and citizens.
Delegates at the Congress expressed general support for moving forward with refining the Charter while also recognizing areas where existing provisions may be outdated, ambiguous, or mismatched with contemporary organizational practices.
Party leaders have signaled that any proposed revisions will be guided by the goal of strengthening internal discipline, enhancing institutional coherence, and aligning the party’s procedural norms with the evolving needs of national governance, particularly as Vietnam pursues ambitious economic targets and deeper global integration following the Congress.
Observers note that this initiative may also reflect the leadership’s desire to formalize changes in governance practice that have already taken place recently, including adjustments to leadership nomination and appointment processes and efforts to streamline internal bureaucracy.
Although details of specific proposed amendments have not yet been made public, the leadership’s emphasis on acting “from the beginning of the term” signals that Charter reform will be a central institutional priority for the party in 2026. The outcome of this review, and whether it leads to concrete amendments, will be closely watched both domestically and internationally for its implications on Vietnam’s political stability, governance norms, and the balance of authority within the one-party system.
Vietnam’s 14th National Party Congress, which was from Jan. 19 to Jan. 23 in Hà Nội, was marked by a striking rhetorical emphasis on the Communist Party’s foundational slogan “dân là gốc,” which means “the people are the root.” However, this catchphrase came just as the authorities were detaining critics and restricting public expression in the lead-up to the event.
In his political report to delegates at the opening session, General Secretary Tô Lâm insisted that all party policies and actions must place the people at the center of political life and national governance, framing this principle as essential to building a “thế trận lòng dân” (a strategy for securing and deepening the trust of the populace in the party’s leadership).
Tô Lâm’s reiteration of “dân là gốc” resonates with longstanding Communist Party doctrine that the legitimacy of the state and its policies depends on the alignment of party goals with the interests and aspirations of ordinary citizens.
According to his presentation, the party must consistently listen to and respect popular sentiment and ensure that its decisions improve people’s material and spiritual well-being and hold party members accountable to those they serve.
Tô Lâm urged cadres to adopt a mindset of service, warning that officials should feel a sense of shame if citizens remain in hardship or poverty and encouraging reflection on whether every task truly benefits the people.
Yet outside the halls of Congress, the political environment reflected a contrasting reality for Vietnam’s civic space. Independent activists, social media users, and critics faced heightened scrutiny and enforcement actions in the weeks leading up to the party’s quadrennial gathering.
Independent media and human rights organizations have documented several crackdowns, notably the arrest of Facebook user Hoàng Thị Hồng Thái under Article 117 for allegedly spreading “anti-state” content. These cases are part of a broader trend of administrative fines and detentions targeting individuals for online dissent or attempted protests.
Human rights monitors have highlighted that such enforcement often peaks around major political events in Vietnam, with critics arguing that these measures serve to minimize public debate and control the narrative during periods of significant party activity.
The party’s public endorsement of “dân là gốc” is being closely watched—and debated—by observers who see a tension between the stated principle of centering the people and the reality of restrictive civic policies.
Supporters of the Congress narrative stress that the phrase “dân là gốc” reflects a genuine commitment to improving governance outcomes for ordinary Vietnamese, consistent with the party’s historic emphasis on unity and national development.
They point to statements in Congress documents that call for policy frameworks aimed at enhancing living standards, reinforcing social stability, and sustaining economic growth. Analysts say that this message fits with the country's long-term strategic goals for growth through 2030 and 2045.
As the Party Congress continues and makes final decisions on leaders and policies, how the idea of “dân là gốc” is put into action—especially in terms of public involvement, openness, and individual rights—will be a key indicator of Vietnam’s political direction.
The 14th National Party Congress—a once-in-five-years political event where the Communist Party selects its top leadership and sets the strategic direction for the next term—is unfolding under exceptionally tight security restrictions that sharply limit communication and internet access for delegates and journalists alike within the premises of the event.
In efforts described by party authorities as essential to safeguarding information and maintaining order, mobile signals around the main venue have reportedly been deliberately disrupted, delegates are prohibited from carrying personal mobile phones, and digital connectivity has been heavily curtailed throughout the Congress period.
According to reporting from Reuters and detailed coverage by Luật Khoa Magazine, cellular service has been jammed in and around the National Convention Center in Hà Nội, where the Congress is taking place, preventing ordinary phone use and external calls during official proceedings.
Close to 1,600 delegates attending the event were provided with tablets preconfigured by organizers, but these devices lack internet connectivity and mobile data, restricting users to internal document workflows. The move is intended to protect the integrity of sensitive discussions, including leadership elections and policy debate, by minimizing the risk of leaks, unauthorized recordings, or external interference.
Beginning Jan. 20—the day the Congress formally opened—delegates were no longer allowed to bring their phones into the meeting halls or designated accommodation sites.
Journalists covering the event have faced similar constraints. While they may use their laptops for work, they are barred from using mobile phones and may connect to a limited network provided by event organizers. These measures, officials assert, are designed not only to prevent the dissemination of information that could be misinterpreted or misused but also to avoid “negative impacts” on Việt Nam’s national image or leadership reputation.
State media and party communications frame these steps as routine for a high-profile political gathering that attracts intense international and domestic attention.
By controlling the flow of information within the Congress environment, authorities say they can ensure discussions proceed without disruption, protect delegates from external influences, and maintain the decorum befitting a major national political event.
Critics and press freedom observers, however, note that such restrictions reflect and reinforce broader patterns of information control in Vietnam, where internet censorship and limits on free expression are longstanding features of the political landscape.
These observers caution that mobile signal suppression and bans on personal devices—even inside a closed event—may stifle transparency and reduce real-time reporting during an event of significant public interest.
As the Congress continues and its leadership decisions are finalized, the heightened security posture underscores how Việt Nam’s one-party system manages both internal governance processes and the accompanying information environment.
At the 14th National Party Congress, General Lương Tam Quang, minister of Public Security and a member of the Politburo, delivered a robust defense of the nation’s internal security apparatus, portraying it as both the “sword” and “steel shield” tasked with safeguarding the party, the state, the people, and the socialist regime amid evolving strategic challenges.
In a plenary address on Jan. 21, Gen. Quang reiterated the essential role of the People’s Public Security Forces in upholding stability, protecting national interests, and ensuring the resilience of the political system under one-party rule.
In his presentation titled “Public Security Work in Implementing the Party’s Three Strategic Goals,” Quang tied the mandate of the security forces directly to long-term national priorities: peace and stability, sustainable and high-quality development, and improved living standards for citizens.
These strategic imperatives reflect decisions laid out in the congress documents and were underscored as central to preserving the social order and enabling broader economic and social progress in the coming term.
Quang’s remarks echoed a narrative consistently emphasized by senior officials that the Public Security Forces must remain wholly loyal and disciplined to both the state and the party, acting preemptively to shield against threats—foreign or domestic—that could disrupt strategic priorities.
Drawing on the force’s self-described achievements in organizational reform, technological modernization, and proactive law enforcement, he framed the institution as a guardian of internal cohesion and national confidence in the party’s leadership.
Public statements by Quang and state media also highlighted broader modernization efforts within the security forces, aimed at enhancing professionalism, leadership effectiveness, and responsiveness to novel security challenges.
The response to the security challenges includes bolstering digital infrastructure, refining legal frameworks, and coordinating more closely with other state bodies, all while maintaining strict political alignment with the party’s directives.
Observers point out that Quang’s strong support for the security forces at the congress serves several purposes: it strengthens the credibility of the internal security strategy as a key part of governance, shows continuity with the previous leaders' focus on stability, and reaffirms the important role of law enforcement in achieving the socio-economic goals set by the party.
By emphasizing that the security forces are a proactive rather than reactive institution, his statement underlines an approach that prioritizes early detection and strategic foresight.
Quang’s framing of the People’s Public Security as an institution integral to national success also resonates with decades of official rhetoric that blends security, development, and political stability. At past high-level gatherings, top leaders have stressed that maintaining internal order and public safety is inseparable from the party’s broader mission of national rejuvenation and prosperity.
In an unprecedented outcome of the 14th National Party Congress, 20 members of the newly elected Central Committee hail from Hưng Yên Province, collectively accounting for 10% of the 200 committee seats, a striking concentration for a single province in the party’s leadership ranks.
Among these officials are some of the most powerful figures in the political system, including General Secretary Tô Lâm, Minister of Public Security Lương Tam Quang, Minister of Justice Nguyễn Hải Ninh, and Hanoi Party Secretary Nguyễn Duy Ngọc.
This member pool represents a substantial upgrade from the previous term, in which only seven Central Committee members came from Hưng Yên, reflecting rapid personnel shifts tied to influential networks and career trajectories over recent years. Analysts note that these appointments span diverse sectors—from public security and defense to legislative and judicial leadership—suggesting both institutional breadth and entrenched provincial influence within the party’s core power structure.
Party strategists at the 14th National Party Congress argued that the country has sufficient conditions, potential, and policy space to achieve annual economic growth of 10% or more during the 2026-2030 term. Presenting to delegates, Nguyễn Anh Tuấn, vice head of the Central Committee’s Commission for Policies and Strategies, said this ambitious target is urgent to meet the nation’s strategic goals through 2030 and 2045, despite never having reached double-digit GDP growth in recent decades. The position aligns with the Congress’s resolution to set the average GDP growth target at 10% or higher, framed as a cornerstone of long-term development planning.
The Central Internal Affairs Commission announced plans to expand control over assets and wealth across society as a key anti-corruption measure following the 14th Party Congress. The initiative aims to tighten monitoring of officials’ property and financial interests, closing loopholes and strengthening transparency to prevent misconduct before it occurs. According to the proposal, asset oversight mechanisms will be widened beyond public servants to include broader sectors where abuse of power and conflicts of interest may arise. The commission framed the expanded supervision as essential to restoring public trust, reinforcing discipline, and ensuring clean governance under the party’s strategic directives for the 2026–2030 term.
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