The Forgotten German Veterans of Việt Nam

Few postwar European narratives have proven as enduring as the claim that during the Indochina War (1946-1954), the French Foreign Legion (Légion étrangère) functioned as a haven for former Nazi war criminals—particularly veterans of the Waffen-SS—who allegedly went on to fight under the French flag in the jungles of Vietnam. According to this narrative, the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ was not merely the final defeat of colonial France in Asia but also “the last battle of the SS.”

This interpretation, however, belongs more to the realm of political propaganda, journalistic sensationalism, and popular literature than to that of rigorous historical research.

The reality is far more complex, layered, and, above all, documentable. Looking at French and German archives, new academic studies, especially by historians Eckard Michels and Pierre Thoumelin, and checking military records, news sources, and personal accounts show a very different story.

The German Presence in the Foreign Legion

To understand the phenomenon, one must begin with a fundamental fact: Germans have constituted a central component of the French Foreign Legion ever since its founding in 1831.

It is no coincidence that an old Foreign Legion saying holds that “the Legion is only as good as its worst German.” The German and German-speaking presence, thus including Austrians, German-speaking Swiss, Dutchmen, and Flemish Belgians, has historically been perceived as the operational “core” of the legion.

After both world wars, this presence increased dramatically. At the end of the Second World War, Europe was crisscrossed by millions of refugees, former soldiers, prisoners of war, and individuals who had effectively become stateless due to territorial changes.

In 1939, a young man could identify as Polish; in 1940, as German; and in 1945, as a Soviet citizen. In this administrative and human chaos, the Foreign Legion represented one of the few viable exits for German soldiers: food, pay, a new identity, and the prospect of French citizenship after years of service.

The Postwar Context and Recruitment in Germany

In 1945, France found itself responsible for more than 500,000 German prisoners of war, out of approximately 11 million held by the Allies across Europe. Between 1944 and 1948, nearly 25,000 prisoners died in camps under French control, often due to hunger, disease, and disastrous sanitary conditions.

At the same time, Paris was attempting to reassert control over its Indochinese colony, where the Communist Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, had launched a war of national liberation.

Manpower was lacking, and on March 22, 1947, the French National Assembly approved funding for an expeditionary corps. The fastest and most pragmatic solution was large-scale recruitment into the Foreign Legion, particularly in the German zones under French occupation: Baden, Württemberg-Hohenzollern, Rhineland-Palatinate, and the Saarland.

Posters, recruitment offices, and intermediaries operated openly. Between 20,000 and 30,000 German prisoners enlisted, often moving almost directly from internment to the Indochina theater of war.

Real Numbers: How Many Germans Served in Indochina?

Between 1945 and 1954, approximately 150,000 legionnaires served in Indochina. The maximum combat strength reached 36,312 men. Because of the Legion’s anonymity—the system designed to protect the identity of its members—precise figures are difficult to establish. But most historians agree on one point: between 40% and 60% of legionnaires were of Germanic origin.

It follows that an estimate of roughly 50,000 Germans passing through Indochina over nearly a decade is not only plausible but also highly likely. This figure, however, does not automatically imply a massive presence of former SS personnel.

The Waffen-SS Question: Controls, Exclusions, and Reality

Officially, the Legion excluded members of the Waffen-SS. Between 1945 and 1946, French recruiters subjected candidates, especially Germans, to rigorous physical examinations, including inspection for the notorious blood-group tattoo under the left armpit, characteristic of the SS. Suspicious scars could also result in rejection.

These controls were imperfect. Some former Waffen-SS members managed to evade them, particularly in the immediate postwar years. However, German archival records indicate that out of approximately 30,000 German legionnaires, only 3,000–4,000 were former Waffen-SS, that is, less than 10%. This proportion is consistent with the overall composition of the Third Reich’s armed forces and far removed from the image of a “Nazified” Legion.

Moreover, most Wehrmacht veterans who enlisted in 1945–46 had completed their service well before the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ. By the early 1950s, the average age of a legionnaire was just over 20: many Germans were simply young men who had grown up in the Hitler Youth, without any real political or military responsibility within the Nazi regime.

Điện Biên Phủ and Việt Minh Propaganda

The notion of the Legion as a refuge for Nazi criminals originated primarily in Viet Minh propaganda following their victory at Điện Biên Phủ in May 1954. The Vietnamese authorities claimed that many captured German prisoners were former Waffen-SS. These accusations, however, were never documented.

It should also be recalled that more than 26,000 French prisoners died in Vietnamese captivity, and only 11,000 were released in August 1954. Documenting the identities of prisoners would have meant exposing the inhumane conditions of their detention. The narrative of “Nazi mercenaries” served to justify the treatment of prisoners and to reinforce the moral legitimacy of the anti-colonial struggle.

Approximately 1,400 German legionnaires deserted during the war and defected to the Việt Minh. Some were later welcomed in East Germany as heroes of the communist front, sometimes compelled to participate in propaganda events against colonial France. This situation was often used to support the idea that the Legion had unclear beliefs, but in truth, most desertions were mainly caused by hunger, tiredness, disappointment, and the harshness of the war.

Internal Perceptions of Germans Within the Legion

An aspect often overlooked by popular historiography concerns how German legionnaires were perceived within the Legion. Contrary to the external image of a suspect and ideologically ambiguous force, Germans were largely regarded as a source of stability and professionalism.

Many postwar French officers, some of whom had fought against the Wehrmacht only a few years earlier, openly acknowledged the military skills of German soldiers and actively encouraged their recruitment.

In many units, especially parachute formations and mobile forces deployed in the most dangerous operations, Germans were predominant. This contributed to the development of a pragmatic military culture in which battlefield effectiveness mattered more than individual political pasts, provided no clear criminal responsibility emerged.

This attitude, while understandable in a wartime context, nonetheless fueled suspicion and controversy outside the Legion, particularly in metropolitan France.

The only formation that systematically recruited former Waffen-SS personnel was the BILOM (Bataillon d’Infanterie Légère d’Outre-Mer), a specific, post-World War II French military unit formed in 1948 from German POWs and French collaborators for colonial service.

The BILOM was not part of the Foreign Legion, had no insignia, offered no promotions, and provided no amnesty. It was disbanded in 1949 following a political scandal, well before Điện Biên Phủ.

This fact is crucial: the BILOM, not the Legion, is the true antecedent of the myth.

The Myth's Construction in Popular Culture

During the 1950s and 1960s, newspapers such as L’Humanité and Neues Deutschland promoted the idea of a “Nazi Legion.” The myth fully crystallized in 1974 with the publication of The Devil’s Guard by George Robert Elford, a novel presented as a biography but now unanimously regarded as a historical fabrication.

Journalists such as Peter Scholl-Latour also contributed, often in good faith, to the dissemination of unverifiable figures. From there, the theme entered popular culture, sensationalist documentaries, and certain forms of television popularization.

Losses, Sacrifice, and Suppressed Memory

The Indochina War was the conflict in which the Foreign Legion suffered the highest losses in its history: more than 10,000 dead, a toll exceeding that of the First World War. Germans, who were a numerically dominant component in many units, were therefore overrepresented among the casualties. Thousands died in counterinsurgency operations, jungle ambushes, grueling marches, and sieges such as Điện Biên Phủ.

A significant portion of these fallen soldiers are today listed in German archives as having “died for France,” a designation that has provoked mixed reactions among families and in German public opinion. 

Some families explicitly requested that this wording be removed, rejecting the idea that their sons should be associated with a colonial war fought under a foreign flag only a few years after the catastrophe of the Third Reich. This memorial discomfort helps explain why the German presence in Indochina long remained a marginal topic in European historical memory.

In recent decades, the opening of archives and the work of professional historians have made it possible to move beyond a simplistic and moralizing view of the phenomenon. The presence of former German soldiers in the Foreign Legion cannot be interpreted either as a continuation of Nazism or as a mere operation to “recycle” war criminals. 

Rather, it should be understood as the product of a combination of structural factors: the collapse of European states in the postwar period, the massive displacement of men, French military needs, and the brutality of a colonial conflict fought on the margins of international attention.

In this sense, the myth of a “Nazi Legion” likely reveals more about the fears, suppressed guilt, and ideological tensions of postwar Europe than about the concrete reality of the Indochina War itself. Recent historiography, therefore invites us to replace the logic of accusation with that of historical understanding, neither absolving nor demonizing, but restoring complexity to a story too long reduced to slogans.