Key Events * Court Upholds 11-Year Sentence Against Trịnh Bá Phương on Dec. 27; * Việt Nam Tests Power Consolidation With Tô
Paul Schuler, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona, presents a systematic study of the National Assembly
In contrast to the turbulence of 2024—defined by the death of former General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng and unprecedented
Trịnh Bá Phương was sentenced on Sept. 27, 2025, by the Đà Nẵng People’s Court to 11 years in prison under Article 117 of the Penal Code for allegedly “making, storing, and disseminating materials against the state,” a term widely criticized for its vagueness and breadth. On Dec. 27, 2025, an appellate court upheld his conviction and sentence.
At the center of the conviction lies a single alleged piece of evidence: a handwritten A3-sized placard discovered during a cell search at An Điềm Prison on Nov. 18, 2024, bearing slogans critical of the Communist Party and the courts.
Authorities claimed Phương created the placard using materials purchased at the prison canteen and pasted it to a copy of Saigon Economic Times. Yet investigators failed to establish authorship or provenance.
Both the Quảng Nam provincial forensic unit and the Ministry of Public Security’s forensic institute in Đà Nẵng rejected handwriting analysis, citing insufficient conditions—twice.
No purchase records corroborated claims that Phương bought the A3 paper, and witnesses confirmed they only observed the cell search, not the act of writing or assembling the placard.
Complicating matters further, former political prisoner Nguyễn Bắc Truyển publicly stated that he may have authored a similar placard while detained at An Điềm, noting that the Saigon Economic Times was a newspaper sent to him by his family.
Under Article 117, prosecutors must prove both authorship and the defendant’s intent to oppose against the state. The case file appears to establish neither. Moreover, even if the placard were authentic, its content would fall within protected political speech under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Việt Nam is a state party.
Beyond just one defendant, the appeal resonates with millions affected by unresolved land disputes nationwide.
The Trịnh family of Dương Nội has been sentenced to a cumulative 40 years in prison sentences tied to land activism. As the appellate verdict looms, the silence of state media—and the weight of unanswered questions—underscore a trial that many see not as justice, but as a warning.
According to Bloomberg, Tô Lâm has been nominated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam to serve concurrently as general secretary and state president for the next term—an unprecedented step toward formally unifying the country’s two most powerful positions in one person.
Bloomberg reported the news on the evening of Dec. 23, citing anonymous sources, just hours after the conclusion of the 15th Central Committee Plenum.
Bloomberg’s sources said the proposed dual role—often referred to as “institutional consolidation” or nhất thể hóa—could still face challenges at the 14th National Party Congress, scheduled to take place from Jan. 19 to 25.
As previously reported by Luật Khoa Magazine, Tô Lâm indirectly signaled during his closing remarks at the plenum that he had been nominated for the next term, without specifying which position.
“On behalf of those entrusted with nomination to the Central Committee and the next-term leadership positions for consideration by the 14th Party Congress, we sincerely thank the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat for their trust,” he said.
He added: “We will continue to work in unity and consensus, with a strong sense of responsibility and high effectiveness, worthy of the party’s and the people’s trust.”
Bloomberg’s report confirms speculation circulating ahead of the 15th Plenum that the Central Committee was considering formally combining the roles of general secretary and state president. To date, Bloomberg remains the only international news outlet to confirm this information.
The Communist Party of Vietnam has not publicly released the list of nominees, despite announcing that personnel decisions were finalized during the 15th Plenum. Traditionally, the public can only infer—often with relative accuracy—who will occupy which positions after the conclusion of a Party Congress.
Historically, the two posts of general secretary and state president have been held simultaneously by one individual on only three occasions: Hồ Chí Minh (1956–1960), Nguyễn Phú Trọng (2018–2021), and Tô Lâm (2024). In all previous cases, the arrangement was temporary, prompted by extraordinary personnel circumstances. Never before has such a consolidation been institutionalized for a full term, as is now reportedly proposed for Tô Lâm.
Bloomberg has repeatedly been the first—or the only—outlet to break major political developments in Vietnam.
When state president Võ Văn Thưởng was removed from office in March 2024, Bloomberg reported the news a full day ahead of Vietnamese state media. Earlier, in January 2024, Bloomberg was also one of only two outlets to report on the hospitalization of then General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng.
Bloomberg is part of Bloomberg L.P., headquartered in New York, which also owns Bloomberg Businessweek. Since 2023, the magazine has been licensed to a Vietnamese company, Beacon Asia Media, to publish Green Development – Bloomberg Businessweek Vietnam as a supplement of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment’s newspaper.
The website of Bloomberg Businessweek Vietnam lists Henry Nguyen (Nguyễn Bảo Hoàng) as executive chairman of Beacon Asia Media as of March 2024. Nguyễn Bảo Hoàng is the husband of Nguyễn Thanh Phượng, daughter of former Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng. Both appeared at the launch ceremony of Green Development – Bloomberg Businessweek Vietnam.
VNeID is Việt Nam’s government-run national digital identification platform, developed by the MPS, that links citizens’ biometric IDs to online public services and is being expanded into a multi-purpose “super app” for digital governance.
The MPS wants to build a social network within the VNeID platform, and it also seeks to require other social media platforms to verify user identities through the app—according to an explanatory memorandum attached to a draft resolution on digital citizenship development.
The draft memorandum states that the MPS aims to develop VNeID into a “super application” providing digital tools for so-called digital citizens, including personal digital signatures, a national e-wallet, and a social network.
The objective the MPS wants for this application is to create a social network where 100% of users have their identities absolutely verified (via VNeID). This will be an official channel for citizens to provide feedback and criticism, and for state agencies to communicate and address the root causes of fake news.”
The memorandum further states that it is “necessary to regulate the deployment of a social network on VNeID, and to use VNeID accounts as a verification method for other social networks, in order to promote a safe and healthy digital citizenship.”
In the draft resolution, the MPS does not explicitly mention creating a social network. Article 8, which addresses the “development of the national digital identification application VNeID,” merely states that the app will be expanded to provide “unlimited digital utilities for citizens.”
That same article also describes VNeID as an “official communication channel, ensuring safety, security, and efficiency between citizens and the state, citizens and businesses, and citizens with one another.”
Within Việt Nam’s legislative process, such an explanatory memorandum plays a key role in clarifying legislative intent. The document remains in draft form and is expected to be signed by Minister of Public Security Lương Tam Quang.
According to the ministry’s reasoning, social networks developed by private companies have fostered problems such as fake accounts, misinformation, and online scams. At the same time, the state lacks an official, two-way communication channel to disseminate policies and receive public feedback.
The memorandum does not clarify what consequences citizens may face if they refuse to verify their identities on social media via VNeID.
The draft resolution also proposes a citizen scoring and ranking system based on participation through the VNeID app.
Under this scheme, citizens would be classified into three tiers based on their “digital citizen score”: “Active,” “Basic,” and “Unranked.”
Those deemed “Active,” with scores of 350 points or higher, would receive tax, fee, and administrative charge reductions ranging from 10% to 100% when completing procedures through VNeID.
Citizens in the “Basic” category, scoring between 100 and 349 points, would receive partial benefits, while those “Unranked,” with fewer than 100 points, would receive no incentives at all.
According to the latest Internet freedom report on Vietnam by Freedom House, the country’s online environment is rated “Not Free,” with a score of 22 out of 100.
Many individuals have been fined or imprisoned for expressing opinions on Facebook and other platforms. Notably, on May 30, lawyer Trần Đình Triển was sentenced to three years in prison under Article 331 of the Penal Code for Facebook posts deemed to harm the reputation of the Supreme People’s Court and its then chief justice, Nguyễn Hòa Bình.
Several dissidents have also seen their Facebook access restricted. In early June 2025, the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development called on Vietnam to end censorship of Telegram and other social media platforms, warning that such restrictions violate freedom of expression.
The public consultation period for the draft will close on Dec. 31, after which the proposal will be revised before being submitted to the government for issuance.
The deputy chairman of the Vietnam Journalists’ Association, Trần Trọng Dũng, has argued that defending the Communist Party’s ideological foundation is not merely a political responsibility, but also a distinct professional activity for journalists.
On the morning of Dec. 25, the Vietnam Journalists’ Association held a seminar titled “Improving the Quality of Multimedia Journalism Works on Protecting the Party’s Ideological Foundation in the New Context.”
State media reported that the event aimed to “strengthen the fighting capacity” of journalists ahead of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party, scheduled for Jan. 19–25, 2026. At the seminar, Trần Trọng Dũng said the press must fully promote its “core role” on what he described as the ideological front.
Looking to future strategy, Phương Quyên, head of the party-building desk at Nhân Dân (The People) newspaper, argued that combating “erroneous viewpoints” should not stop at opposition alone, but must also focus on “construction.” She said the press should anticipate developments and intensify the production of positive information.
The charter of the Vietnam Journalists’ Association explicitly states that the organization operates “under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam.”
Trần Trọng Dũng is a member of the Communist Party. In 2023, he was elected secretary of the party cell of Office No. 2 of the Vietnam Journalists’ Association. The current president of the Association is Lê Quốc Minh, a member of the Communist Party’s Central Committee.
The seminar took place shortly after the 15th Central Committee Plenum, a major political meeting convened to decide top-level personnel changes ahead of the 14th Party Congress. In the lead-up to the plenum, public discussion was dominated by widespread rumors, while state media remained notably silent.
The Communist Party tightly controlled information about the 15th Plenum until it convened briefly from Dec. 22 to 23, 2025. Rumors about leadership arrangements circulated widely on social media.
Given the Party’s long-standing practice of closed-door meetings and opaque decision-making, the public has few sources of information beyond speculation or what are believed to be leaks from internal circles.
Immediately after the plenum, state media outlets simultaneously published editorials titled “Party Congress Personnel: Major Matters Cannot Be Based on Rumors,” asserting that the 15th Plenum had operated in an open and transparent manner—despite the fact that the list of nominees finalized at the meeting has yet to be made public.
International reporting filled part of this information gap. Bloomberg was the first news organization to report that General Secretary Tô Lâm had been nominated by the Central Committee to hold both the posts of party general secretary and state president.
Việt Nam’s revised Press Law, passed by the National Assembly on Dec. 10, 2025, reaffirmed that the country’s media system is “revolutionary journalism,” defined as the “mouthpiece of the Party” with the duty to “propagandize, disseminate, and contribute to building and defending the party’s line, policies, and state laws.”
At the same time, the Communist Party is carrying out an unprecedented restructuring of the state media system under the 2025 Press Planning scheme. A key objective is the development of a small number of “core, multimedia press agencies” tasked with shaping public opinion.
Việt Nam’s press freedom remains at an alarming low level. The country currently ranks 173rd out of 180 in the World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders.
Starting Jan. 1, 2026, the Vietnamese authorities will be allowed to retroactively collect fines and seize the personal assets of individuals who are members of household businesses or family businesses to enforce administrative penalties. The change is among the new provisions introduced by Decree 296/2025/NĐ-CP.
Under Decree 01/2021/NĐ-CP on enterprise registration, a household business is an economic entity registered by a single individual or by members of a family household. Both household businesses and family households bear unlimited liability, meaning they are responsible for business obligations with their entire assets.
The decree was signed into law on Nov. 16, 2025, by Deputy Prime Minister Lê Thành Long.
Specifically, Clause 5, Article 4 of the decree allows authorities to deduct income and seize assets belonging to members of household businesses, family households, and cooperative groups if shared property is insufficient to enforce a coercive decision.
In practical terms, if business-related assets or common household property do not cover the penalty, the household head and all members may be held liable using their individual, private assets.
Notably, the decree does not distinguish which household members are considered liable, nor does it clarify whether those members must have been involved in the business activities in question. This ambiguity raises concerns that individuals with no direct role in a household’s business operations could still face enforcement actions.
In addition, the decree authorizes authorities to apply multiple administrative enforcement measures simultaneously, removing the previous requirement to follow a sequential order.
These measures include partial deductions from wages or income, withdrawals from bank accounts, seizure of assets for auction equivalent to the penalty amount, and collection of money or property held by third parties on behalf of the sanctioned individual or household.
It is still unknown whether this decree was issued under standard legislative procedures or through an expedited process. State media and official government outlets have published no information indicating that public consultation was conducted prior to its issuance, a step typically required for legal documents with wide social impact.
On May 4, the Communist Party’s Central Committee adopted Resolution 68-NQ/TW on private-sector development, a document widely described as containing “breakthrough” policy orientations.
This resolution identified the private sector as “the most important driving force” of economic growth and set ambitious targets for the next five years, including reaching two million enterprises nationwide and developing at least 20 large private firms integrated into global value chains.
However, by Dec. 23, in his closing speech at the 15th Central Committee Plenum, General Secretary Tô Lâm no longer referenced this economic philosophy. However, he also omitted the earlier orientation that had designated the state sector as playing a “leading role” in the economy.
Taken together, the timing and substance of Decree 296 raise questions about policy coherence. While the Party has publicly promoted private-sector growth as a central engine of development, new enforcement mechanisms targeting household businesses—many of which operate informally or at small scale—may add legal and financial risks for individuals and families already operating on their property, the margins of Vietnam’s economy.
Making his first public appearance since the conclusion of the 15th Central Committee Plenum, President Lương Cường chaired the third meeting of the Central Steering Committee for Judicial Reform on Dec. 25, delivering a familiar message to Việt Nam’s justice sector: the Communist Party exercises absolute and comprehensive leadership.
As state president and the Communist Party’s second-ranking figure, Lương Cường highlighted what he described as the successful implementation and timely institutionalization of the party’s directives and policies within the judicial system.
He said that during the past term, the National Assembly and its Standing Committee had enacted or amended 23 laws, five resolutions, and four ordinances related to judicial affairs. According to Lương Cường, judicial reform efforts have made “important contributions” to crime prevention and the protection of human rights.
Looking ahead, Cường tasked the judiciary in the next term with continuing reform efforts in strict compliance with resolutions to be adopted at the Communist Party’s 14th National Congress, scheduled for Jan. 19–25, 2026.
State media reports noted that the Steering Committee acknowledged “a number of shortcomings, limitations, and causes,” but offered no details on what these problems were. By contrast, official coverage focused extensively on achievements, leaving the nature and scope of the acknowledged deficiencies unexplained.
The Central Steering Committee for Judicial Reform is a party body, established on Sept. 21, 2011, under Decision 39-QĐ/TW of the Politburo during the early months of then General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s tenure.
By design, the state president serves as head of the Committee. Its standing membership typically includes the chief justice of the Supreme People’s Court, the prosecutor general of the Supreme People’s Procuracy, the minister of minister justice, and the head of either the Vietnam Jurists’ Association or the Vietnam Bar Federation, with the possible addition of senior judges.
The Committee meets on a fixed quarterly schedule or convenes extraordinary sessions as circumstances require.
The most important Party directive currently guiding judicial reform is Resolution 27-NQ/TW, on building a “socialist rule-of-law state,” issued by the Central Committee on Nov. 9, 2022.
Courts in Việt Nam—and judicial institutions more broadly—are not independent. They operate under the close supervision of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
All judges are party members, and Việt Nam’s legal system is grounded in the doctrine of “socialist legality,” built on four core principles: the comprehensive leadership of the Communist Party; the class character of law, understood as expressing the will of the ruling class; the flexible interchangeability between policy and law; and the primacy of collective interests over individual rights.
Việt Nam also lacks a constitutional review mechanism. Courts have no authority to assess the constitutionality of laws or administrative decisions enacted under the Party’s leadership.
In this context, Lương Cường’s remarks—reaffirming absolute Party control over judicial reform—underscore a system in which reform is framed not as a move toward judicial independence, but as a process of further aligning legal institutions with the Party’s political priorities.
On Dec. 21, Tô Lâm, general secretary of the Communist Party and secretary of the Central Military Commission, reiterated the party’s absolute control over the armed forces in an article marking the 81st anniversary of the People’s Army of Vietnam. Citing key historical milestones, he argued that military victories stemmed decisively from the party’s “absolute, direct, and comprehensive leadership.” Tô Lâm called this principle a “matter of survival” and warned against “peaceful evolution” and internal ideological erosion ahead of the 14th Party Congress. His remarks echoed long-standing party doctrine as Vietnam entered a sensitive leadership transition.
Under Decree 335/2025/NĐ-CP, issued by the Government of Vietnam on Dec. 21, criteria related to “attitude in serving citizens and businesses, and coordination with colleagues” account for just 2.5 out of 100 points in evaluating administrative agencies and civil servants. By contrast, “political qualities, moral integrity, and administrative culture” carry 10 points.
Citizens have no right to evaluate public agencies or officials; assessments are conducted solely by “competent authorities.” The rules do not apply to the military, police, or other sensitive bodies.
Effective Jan. 1, 2026, the decree expands evaluation coverage across Party, state, and mass organizations. While it mentions positive public feedback, it provides no mechanism for citizens to submit evaluations—fueling debate amid broader discussions on state-led scoring systems.
A Montagnard pastor from Việt Nam’s Central Highlands, now living in North Carolina, is urging the U.S. government to respond to what he says is intensified persecution of independent Christian communities during the Christmas season. Nglol Rahlan, founder of the Dao Blung Hlao Church, said the authorities have detained worshippers and pressured followers to attend state-controlled churches. He called on the United States and the international community to protect religious freedom, noting the gap between official claims and actions by the Vietnamese government. Rights groups say ethnic minority Christians, including Montagnards, face longstanding restrictions, surveillance, and arrests for practicing outside state-approved religious institutions.
Paul Schuler, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona, presents a systematic study of the National Assembly
In contrast to the turbulence of 2024—defined by the death of former General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng and unprecedented
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