To this day, a common misconception persists among many in Việt Nam that Vietnamese troops and citizens are still stationed in the Hoàng Sa archipelago. The reality is that the archipelago has been under Chinese control for the past 50 years.
In 1974, China forcibly seized full control of Hoàng Sa from the administration of the Republic of Việt Nam. Since then, the archipelago has remained under Chinese occupation, fueling prolonged disputes and confrontations between the two countries.
Tensions flared recently when, on Oct. 31, Việt Nam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested China’s detention of Vietnamese fishermen in the archipelago, demanding their immediate release and compensation. [1]
This followed an earlier statement on Oct. 2, wherein the Vietnamese government voiced strong opposition to what it described as China’s “brutal attack” on Vietnamese fishermen in the area.
In response, the Chinese side asserted that the Paracel Islands (Hoàng Sa) are Chinese territory. Beijing urged Việt Nam to “raise awareness among its fishermen” to prevent what China deems “illegal” activities in waters it claims as its jurisdiction. [2]
Beyond the headlines, it is vital to understand not only Việt Nam’s historical sovereignty but also how China has distorted history to manufacture its claims. Nowhere is this more apparent than on Phú Lâm Island—the largest in the archipelago.
China has developed this site into the administrative and military hub of Sansha City, executing a doctrine of “military–civilian integration” where defense and civilian functions are merged into a single aggressive strategy.
In early 1956, taking advantage of a transitional period where the Republic of Việt Nam had erected sovereignty markers but not yet established permanent bases, China covertly deployed troops to seize Phú Lâm Island and the surrounding An Vĩnh group. [3][4]
Historical records paint a picture of what was lost; according to Nguyễn Thông’s Việt sử thông giám cương mục khảo lược, the island was once a pristine landscape inhabited only by "birds, coconut trees, and pine trees." [5]
Driven by Beijing's expansionist ambitions, Phú Lâm has been paved over to serve as the headquarters of “Sansha City,” established in 2012.
This administrative entity is the vehicle for China's vast territorial claims. Sansha City asserts jurisdiction over Hoàng Sa (Tây Sa), Trường Sa (Nam Sa), and Pratas Island (Đông Sa) —encompassing virtually all features within the nine-dash line. [6]
In total, it claims authority over more than 280 islands and reefs spread across two million square kilometers of ocean, an area roughly 1,000 times the size of Hồ Chí Minh City. [7]
Even before the formal creation of Sansha City, China had begun the physical transformation of Phú Lâm, paving roads and an airstrip as early as the 1990s. This infrastructure has since been heavily militarized: by 2018, bombers were landing on the island, and by June 2020, H-6J bombers were permanently deployed. [8] [9]
Additionally, satellite imagery from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) reveals two artificial harbors capable of docking ships up to 5,000 tons. [10] [11]
To connect this outpost to the mainland, China replaced the slow Qiongsha-3 supply ship with daily civilian flights from Haikou, established on Dec. 22, 2016. [12] [13]
Article 121 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states that a geographic feature only grants a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) if it can sustain stable human habitation and an independent economic life. Without these conditions, it is only entitled to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.
To circumvent this, China has artificially manufactured habitability on an island that originally lacked fresh water. In 2016, a desalination plant was commissioned, producing 700 tons of freshwater daily, supported by new wastewater systems and public housing. [14] [15] [16] [17]
Furthermore, to simulate an "independent economy," Sansha authorities have aggressively promoted tourism and aquaculture, boasting of hundreds of newly registered companies. [18] [19] [20]
To complete the illusion of a normal settlement, authorities encouraged long-term migration by rolling out 5G coverage and building a fully functioning school for the children of stationed personnel. Tax collection and administrative management are also now conducted through electronic systems. [21] [22] [23] [24]
Sansha City is structured entirely around the principle of “military–civilian integration.” Authorities have emphasized that all development is dual-use, designed to merge military capabilities with civilian functions to safeguard China’s “maritime rights and interests” [25][30].
Under this doctrine, Phú Lâm Island has evolved into a key naval base and the nerve center for regional control. China’s Central Military Commission has established a “joint operations command center” on the island, synchronizing the activities of the Navy, maritime law enforcement, and the maritime militia. [26] [27] [28]
This force integration is supported by advanced surveillance systems deployed on the island to monitor activities across the region. [29] Even private enterprises have been mobilized to participate in the defense of “national sovereignty” [31].
Beyond military might, Sansha City uses administrative tools to cement control. From its headquarters on Phú Lâm, the city has established party and government organs extending throughout the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa archipelagos. [32] This includes a judicial apparatus meant to enforce Chinese law in disputed waters; notably, the court on Phú Lâm Island adjudicated its first case in 2015. [33]
China’s steady and methodical consolidation of Phú Lâm Island underscores its critical role in Beijing’s expansion strategy. This shift has immediate, practical consequences: Vietnamese fishermen venturing into Hoàng Sa waters must now navigate a militarized zone where the risk of detention is high.
Many studies note that before 2012, China’s nine-dash-line claims were largely theoretical—lines drawn on a map without firm practical grounding. That era is over. With the transformation of Phú Lâm into a modern military–civilian base, China has moved to convert those paper claims into a concrete reality.
Today, China’s ability to enforce its asserted sovereignty is markedly stronger. [34] When Vietnamese citizens think of Hoàng Sa, they must look beyond the historical descriptions of their ancestors. The archipelago is no longer a pristine fishing ground; it has been engineered into a formidable forward outpost for China’s domination of the South China Sea.
Phạm Văn Luật wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Nov. 12, 2024. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.
Additional references:
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