Become a Member for $9.99/month

To this day, a common misconception persists among many in Việt Nam that Vietnamese troops and citizens are still stationed in the Hoàng Sa archipelago. The reality is that the archipelago has been under Chinese control for the past 50 years.

In 1974, China forcibly seized full control of Hoàng Sa from the administration of the Republic of Việt Nam. Since then, the archipelago has remained under Chinese occupation, fueling prolonged disputes and confrontations between the two countries.

Tensions flared recently when, on Oct. 31, Việt Nam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested China’s detention of Vietnamese fishermen in the archipelago, demanding their immediate release and compensation. [1]

This followed an earlier statement on Oct. 2, wherein the Vietnamese government voiced strong opposition to what it described as China’s “ brutal attack ” on Vietnamese fishermen in the area.

In response, the Chinese side asserted that the Paracel Islands (Hoàng Sa) are Chinese territory. Beijing urged Việt Nam to “raise awareness among its fishermen” to prevent what China deems “illegal” activities in waters it claims as its jurisdiction. [2]

Beyond the headlines, it is vital to understand not only Việt Nam’s historical sovereignty but also how China has distorted history to manufacture its claims. Nowhere is this more apparent than on Phú Lâm Island—the largest in the archipelago.

China has developed this site into the administrative and military hub of Sansha City, executing a doctrine of “military–civilian integration” where defense and civilian functions are merged into a single aggressive strategy.

Sansha City on Phú Lâm Island In early 1956, taking advantage of a transitional period where the Republic of Việt Nam had erected sovereignty markers but not yet established permanent bases, China covertly deployed troops to seize Phú Lâm Island and the surrounding An Vĩnh group. [3][4]

Historical records paint a picture of what was lost; according to Nguyễn Thông’s Việt sử thông giám cương mục khảo lược, the island was once a pristine landscape inhabited only by "birds, coconut trees, and pine trees." [5]

Driven by Beijing's expansionist ambitions, Phú Lâm has been paved over to serve as the headquarters of “Sansha City,” established in 2012.

This administrative entity is the vehicle for China's vast territorial claims. Sansha City asserts jurisdiction over Hoàng Sa (Tây Sa), Trường Sa (Nam Sa), and Pratas Island (Đông Sa) —encompassing virtually all features within the nine-dash line. [6]

In total, it claims authority over more than 280 islands and reefs spread across two million square kilometers of ocean, an area roughly 1,000 times the size of Hồ Chí Minh City. [7]

The Militarization of Phú Lâm Even before the formal creation of Sansha City, China had begun the physical transformation of Phú Lâm, paving roads and an airstrip as early as the 1990s. This infrastructure has since been heavily militarized: by 2018, bombers were landing on the island, and by June 2020, H-6J bombers were permanently deployed. [8] [9]

Additionally, satellite imagery from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) reveals two artificial harbors capable of docking ships up to 5,000 tons. [10] [11]

To connect this outpost to the mainland, China replaced the slow Qiongsha-3 supply ship with daily civilian flights from Haikou, established on Dec. 22, 2016. [12] [13]

Article 121 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states that a geographic feature only grants a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) if it can sustain stable human habitation and an independent economic life. Without these conditions, it is only entitled to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea.

To circumvent this, China has artificially manufactured habitability on an island that originally lacked fresh water. In 2016, a desalination plant was commissioned, producing 700 tons of freshwater daily, supported by new wastewater systems and public housing. [14] [15] [16] [17]

Furthermore, to simulate an "independent economy," Sansha authorities have aggressively promoted tourism and aquaculture, boasting of hundreds of newly registered companies. [18] [19] [20]

To complete the illusion of a normal settlement, authorities encouraged long-term migration by rolling out 5G coverage and building a fully functioning school for the children of stationed personnel. Tax collection and administrative management are also now conducted through electronic systems. [21] [22] [23] [24]

Military–civilian Integration Sansha City is structured entirely around the principle of “military–civilian integration.” Authorities have emphasized that all development is dual-use, designed to merge military capabilities with civilian functions to safeguard China’s “maritime rights and interests” [25][30].

Under this doctrine, Phú Lâm Island has evolved into a key naval base and the nerve center for regional control. China’s Central Military Commission has established a “joint operations command center” on the island, synchronizing the activities of the Navy, maritime law enforcement, and the maritime militia. [26] [27] [28]

This force integration is supported by advanced surveillance systems deployed on the island to monitor activities across the region. [29] Even private enterprises have been mobilized to participate in the defense of “national sovereignty” [31].

Beyond military might, Sansha City uses administrative tools to cement control. From its headquarters on Phú Lâm, the city has established party and government organs extending throughout the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa archipelagos. [32] This includes a judicial apparatus meant to enforce Chinese law in disputed waters; notably, the court on Phú Lâm Island adjudicated its first case in 2015. [33]

What Should Be Remembered About Phú Lâm Island? China’s steady and methodical consolidation of Phú Lâm Island underscores its critical role in Beijing’s expansion strategy. This shift has immediate, practical consequences: Vietnamese fishermen venturing into Hoàng Sa waters must now navigate a militarized zone where the risk of detention is high.

Many studies note that before 2012, China’s nine-dash-line claims were largely theoretical—lines drawn on a map without firm practical grounding. That era is over. With the transformation of Phú Lâm into a modern military–civilian base, China has moved to convert those paper claims into a concrete reality.

Today, China’s ability to enforce its asserted sovereignty is markedly stronger. [34] When Vietnamese citizens think of Hoàng Sa, they must look beyond the historical descriptions of their ancestors. The archipelago is no longer a pristine fishing ground; it has been engineered into a formidable forward outpost for China’s domination of the South China Sea.

Phạm Văn Luật wrote this article in Vietnamese and published it in Luật Khoa Magazine on Nov. 12, 2024. Đàm Vĩnh Hằng translated it into English for The Vietnamese Magazine.

References: LINH, D. (2024, October 31). Việt Nam yêu cầu thả ngay ngư dân cùng tàu cá bị bắt giữ trái phép, bồi thường thiệt hại. TUOI TRE ONLINE; tuoitre.vn. https://tuoitre.vn/viet-nam-yeu-cau-tha-ngay-ngu-dan-cung-tau-ca-bi-bat-giu-trai-phep-boi-thuong-thiet-hai-20241031163520161.htm . LINH, D. (2024, October 2). Việt Nam lên tiếng việc ngư dân bị Trung Quốc đánh, tịch thu tài sản tại quần đảo Hoàng Sa. TUOI TRE ONLINE; tuoitre.vn. https://tuoitre.vn/viet-nam-len-tieng-viec-ngu-dan-bi-trung-quoc-danh-tich-thu-tai-san-tai-quan-dao-hoang-sa-20241002202619802.htm . ‘Tư Liệu Chủ Quyền: Trung Quốc Cưỡng Chiếm Trái Phép Hoàng Sa’ ( Camau.gov.vn 2020) https://www.camau.gov.vn/wps/portal/?1dmy&page=trangchitiet&urile=wcm%3Apath%3A/camaulibrary/camauofsite/gioithieu/chuyende/biendaoquehuong/tulieuvanban/sdfgaetwe t> accessed 11 November 2024. TỰ, M. (2016, December 16). Hoàng Sa và âm mưu 70 năm trước . TUOI TRE ONLINE; tuoitre.vn. https://tuoitre.vn/hoang-sa-va-am-muu-70-nam-truoc-1236865.htm . Đoàn Lê Giang; Nguyễn Thị Phương Thúy,”Việt sử cương giám khảo lược 越史綱鑑考畧 by Nguyễn Thông – An important document to affirm Vietnam’s island and maritime sovereignty”, Journal of Science Thang Long University, 2021, B1(2):14-25. 民政部关于国务院批准设立地级三沙市的公告 [“Bộ Nội vụ thông báo về việc Quốc vụ viện Phê duyệt thành lập thành phố Tam Sa cấp huyện”], 中国政府网 [Báo điện tử chính phủ Trung Quốc], 中国政府网, July 21, 2012, https://perma.cc/3Q23-SQGA 三沙概况 [“Khái lược về Tam Sa”], 三沙市人民政府网 [Trang web uỷ ban nhân dân thành phố Tam Sa], https://perma.cc/Y229-DKBH . Feleke B, ‘China Tests Bombers on South China Sea Island’ ( CNN 20 May 2018) https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/20/asia/south-china-sea-bombers-islands-intl/index.html > accessed 10 November 2024. Newdick T, ‘China Deployed Bombers to One of Its South China Sea Islands for the First Time according to Photo’ ( The War Zone 12 August 2020) https://www.twz.com/35655/china-deployed-bombers-to-south-china-sea-island-for-the-first-time-according-to-image > accessed 10 November 2024. ‘Woody Island | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’ ( Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 8 July 2022) https://amti.csis.org/woody-island/ > accessed 11 November 2024. 王子谦 [Wang Ziqian] and 王晓斌 [Wang Xiaobin], 三沙市永兴综合码头一期交付使用 [“Bến tàu tích hợp Yongxing của thành phố Tam Sa đã hoàn thành giai đoạn đầu tiên để đưa vào sử dụng”], 中国新闻网 [China News Net], July 18, 2013, https://perma.cc/TJ3UE8RW . 陈欣 [Chen Xin], 三沙开通民航公务包机航班 学者：定期民用航线将成可能 [“Tam Sa mở các chuyến bay kinh doanh hàng không dân dụng chính thức, Học giả: Các tuyến bay dân dụng thường xuyên sẽ trở thành khả thi”], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], December 23, 2016, https://perma.cc/8896-HQN7 . D.Ngọc. (2016, December 23). Yêu cầu Trung Quốc chấm dứt ngay bay dân sự tới đảo Phú Lâm . Nld.com.vn; https://nld.com.vn. https://nld.com.vn/thoi-su-trong-nuoc/yeu-cau-trung-quoc-cham-dut-ngay-bay-dan-su-toi-dao-phu-lam-20161223193537338.htm . 宋国强 [Song Guoqiang], 海南三沙市公用住房 7 月交付使用 总投资 1870 万 [“Nhà ở xã hội Tam Sa Hải Nam bàn giao đưa vào sử dụng tháng 7, tổng vốn đầu tư 18.700.000 NDT”]. 三沙市长：永兴岛 1000 吨海水淡化工程已经完工 [“Thị trưởng Tam Sa: Dự án khử muối nước biển 1.000 tấn của Đảo Phú Lâm đã hoàn thành”], 新浪网 [Sina Net], March 15, 2016, https://perma.cc/PB6X-HZQT . News, V. (2016, October 4). Trung Quốc ngang ngược vận hành nhà máy lọc nước ở Phú Lâm . Báo Điện Tử VTC News; VTC News. https://vtcnews.vn/trung-quoc-ngang-nguoc-van-hanh-nha-may-loc-nuoc-o-phu-lam-ar279749.html 宋国强 [Song Guoqiang], 海南永兴岛污水处理及管网工程已投入使用 [“Dự án xử lý nước thải và đường ống đảo Phú Lâm đã được đưa vào sử dụng”], 中国经济网 [China Economy Net], July 11, 2013, https://perma.cc/J4KZ-KSZC 谢文卿 [Xie Wenqing] and 高华 [Gao Hua], 西沙旅游航线开通六年累计航行逾 460 航次 [“Tuyến du lịch Tây Sa mở cửa trong sáu năm đã thực hiện được 460 chuyến đi”], 新浪网 [Sina Net], April 27, 2019, https://perma.cc/Y8UZ-FAWW . 夏冠男 [Xia Guannan], 三沙经济加快 注册企业破百家 [“Nền kinh tế Tam Sa tăng tốc, số công ty đăng ký vượt mốc 100”], 三沙市人民政府网 [Sansha City People’s Government Net], January 15, 2016, https://perma.cc/3BZL8NNF . 夏冠男 [Xia Guannan], 三沙经济加快 注册企业破百家 [“Nền kinh tế Tam Sa tăng tốc, số công ty đăng ký vượt mốc 100”], 三沙市人民政府网 [Sansha City People’s Government Net], January 15, 2016, https://perma.cc/3BZL8NNF . 廖飞菲 [Liao Feifei], 三沙局创新征管方式以网路代马路 [“Phương pháp quản lý và thu thuế sáng tạo của Cục thuế Tam Sa thay thế đường bộ bằng Internet”], 国家税务总局海南省税务局网 [Cơ quan thuế nhà nước, Mạng lưới quản lý thuế tỉnh Hải Nam], June 4, 2019, https://perma.cc/2WGC-SE59 . 高鹏 [Gao Peng], 鼓励渔民常住岛礁！每年住满 180 天三沙市政府给补贴 [“Khuyến khích ngư dân định cư lâu dài trên đảo và rạn san hô! Mỗi năm sống 180 ngày, chính quyền thành phố Tam Sa trợ cấp”], 凤凰网 [ifeng Net], November 23, 2015, https://perma.cc/BV4E-GC4W . 阮强 [Ruan Qiang] and 乔光伟 [Qiao Guangwei], 中国电信开通海南三沙市永暑礁、永兴岛 5G 基站 [“China Telecom mở trạm 5G tại Đá Chữ Thập, thành phố Hải Nam, Tam Sa và Đảo Phú Lâm”], 凤凰网 [ifeng Net], July 25, 2019, https://perma.cc/H2MB-ZK4Y . AFP, ‘China Builds School on Disputed Island’ (https://www.bangkokpost.com15 June 2014) https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/415459/china-builds-school-on-disputed-island > accessed 11 November 2024. Isaac B. Kardon, “Maritime Rights and Interests,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, July 16, 2015, https://amti.csis.org/maritime-rights-and-interests/ . 中国三沙市综合执法船联合海警驱离一侵权外国渔船 [“Tàu thực thi pháp luật toàn diện của thành phố Tam Sa của Trung Quốc hợp tác với Cảnh sát biển xua đuổi tàu cá nước ngoài xâm phạm”], 新浪网 [Sina Net], December 18, 2015, https://perma.cc/UL4Q-48KC . 王洪山 [Wang Hongshan] and 曾政雄 [Ceng Zhengxiong], 中央军委批复同意组建三沙警备区 为正师级单位 [“Quân ủy Trung ương phê chuẩn thành lập quân đồn trú tại Tam Sa, đơn vị cấp sư đoàn”], 中国网 [China Net], July 23, 2012, https://perma.cc/XT74-6WWB . 三沙军警民联防指挥中心开工[“Trung tâm chỉ huy phòng thủ chung hải quân, hải cảnh, dân quân biển Tam Sa bắt đầu xây dựng”],凤凰网 [ifeng Net], July 26, 2015, https://perma.cc/F4ZU-HXZF . 侯坤 [Hou Kun], 信息化民兵哨所落户南海岛礁 [“Lập đồn dân quân tin học hoá trên đảo-rạn san hô ở Biển Đông”], 中国军网 [China Military Net], June 30, 2015, https://perma.cc/D7RB-LLJZ . 游苏杭 [You Suhang], 肖杰：军民融合是三沙发展的必由之路 [“Quân dân dung hợp là con đường duy nhất để Tam Sa phát triển”], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], March 13, 2016, https://perma.cc/FG8U-RAWT . Zoe Haver, “Sansha City and Corporate Activity in the South China Sea,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, September 22, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/sansha-city-and-corporate-activity-in-the-south-china-sea/ . 赵叶苹 [Zhao Yeping], 三沙创新方法建强基层守护祖国南大门 [“Phương pháp sáng tạo của Tam Sa xây dựng lực lượng cơ sở bảo vệ cửa ngõ phía Nam của Tổ quốc”], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], December 22, 2016, https://perma.cc/UR2R-CAXG 宋起来 [Song Qilai], 三沙市三沙群岛人民法院首次在永兴岛审理案件 [“Tòa án nhân dân thành phố Tam Sa, quần đảo Tam Sa xét xử vụ án đầu tiên trên đảo Woody”], 中国新闻网 [China News Net], June 4, 2015, https://perma.cc/P979-4MBF . Greg Poling, “Beijing’s South China Sea strategies: consolidation and provocation,” East Asia Forum, March 28, 2014, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/03/28/beijings-south-china-seastrategies-consolidation-and-provocation/ . Additional references:

Andrew Chubb, “Chinese Popular Nationalism and PRC Policy in the South China Sea” (PhD diss., The University of Western Australia, 2016), p. 89 Michael B. Petersen, “The Chinese Maritime Gray Zone: Definitions, Dangers, and the Complications of Rights Protection Operations,” in China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, eds. Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019), p. 20.